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Abstract 
Background: Patient safety reforms were instituted by Queensland Health in 2005 
being part of an international process to raise awareness of human error and to reduce 
preventable harm in hospitals. Since 2005, Root Cause Analysis (RCA) has been applied as a 
structured analytical technique to investigate harm events in Queensland healthcare facilities. 
Little is known, however, about the functioning of the RCA in addressing patient safety.  
 
Aims: The aims of the research were to: explore the social construction of 
documents that address patient safety in Queensland Health; develop an understanding of the 
influences that inform the RCA process in Queensland; explore the relevance of RCA to 
serious adverse events that result in death and/or permanent harm; and develop theoretical 
propositions about RCA and patient safety. 
 
Methods: A document analysis was conducted. The sample comprised 48 RCA 
reports (hard-copies) generated in 2009, 2010 and 2011 which were extracted from various 
Queensland Health facilities. Strict legislative conditions exist around the RCA. De-
contextualised RCA text comprised the data. The data were subjected to manifest and latent 
analysis as social scientific devices. Manifest analysis depicted the frequency of recurring 
text and involved more than enumerating words. Latent analysis exposed unintended and 
unrecognised functions of the RCA.  
 
Analysis: The manifest analysis revealed distinctive patterns in the text which 
established new ideas. These ideas generated four key theoretical propositions and were the 
focus of latent analysis. The latent analysis concluded that the function of the RCA as a 
systematic process of analysis was masked by language decoys that saw relevant cause and 
effect information circumvented or ignored. This created a disjuncture between the 
prevailing policy and theoretical directives where a systematic process of analysis departed 
from organisational policy. As a result, organisational latent issues were not sufficiently 
identified and notions of causality were disconnected from solutions. In the absence of a 
systemic process of analysis, individual failures dominated the RCA because the focus of 
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error was fixed on perpetual active failures. Heuristic devices such as familiarity and 
consensus contributed to the deconstruction of a systematic process of analysis. A theoretical 
relationship was exposed that revealed political and legislative influences created occassions 
for the construction of the RCA to deviate from organisational agendas which provided a 
flexible approach to the conduct of the RCA. 
 
Conclusion: If we accept the prevailing assumption in healthcare that patient harm 
is a systemic issue then it appears that the RCA fails to conform to the aims of organisational 
policy and dominant theoretical ideas to address harm events in Queensland’s public 
healthcare setting.  
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
 Introduction Chapter 1:
In healthcare, the concept of humans attempting to do the right thing and 
occasionally executing an imperfect procedure is called an error, violation, slip or lapse 
(Reason, 1990). This type of mistake is not isolated to healthcare and is the critical common 
element in the systemic potential for disaster. Every disaster has a unique set of contributing 
factors although not every disaster has a unique explanation. Indeed, a distinctive pattern 
emerges across nations in national disasters. In Australia, in 1902, the Mount Kembla 
Mining Disaster saw the loss of 96 lives. The coal explosion was caused by the ignition of 
gas in the mine from the naked flames of the torches used by the miners. It had been reported 
that the mine was absolutely without danger from gases (McShane, 2010). In 1970, in 
Melbourne, the West Gate Bridge collapsed during construction killing 35 construction 
workers. The collapse was created by a time saving counter-leverage procedure which 
precipitated a buckle and the subsequent structural collapse of the bridge. In 1977, the 
Granville Rail disaster in New South Wales resulted from a crowded commuter train 
derailing and running into the supports of a road bridge which then fell on to two of the train 
carriages. This disaster killed 83 people, injured 210 and affected 1300 others. The cause of 
the accident brought the safety standards of the NSW railways into question (Brown, 2002; 
Australian Emergency Management Institute, 2010) due to the poor fastening of the track. It 
was reported that the incident was related to the high turnover of staff combined with a lack 
of standardised procedures for track inspections (Wainwright, 2003).  
A distinctive pattern surfaced from these disasters and the related Royal Commission 
enquiries into Australian disasters. The most salient factor was a culture of organisational 
denial where a series of beliefs and actions led organisations to discount the possibility of 
disaster and/or dismiss early warning signs. In almost all of the above situations, the system 
flaws and protocol violations antedated the disasters by years. This type of phenomenon is 
termed ‘normalisation of deviance’ and results when violations of safe operating procedures 
are progressively tolerated and unsafe actions become routine and normalised (Vaughan, 
1996).  
In some circumstances, deviance from safe operating procedures is encouraged by 
management in the pursuit of profit. An example was the 1986 NASA Challenger accident. 
Initial inquiry into this tragedy quickly found the cause of the accident to be a technical 
failure. The O-rings sealing the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) joints had failed to seal 
allowing hot gases at ignition to erode the O-rings and penetrate the wall of the booster and 
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destroy Challenger and its crew (Vaughan, 1996, p. 316). The commission which inquired 
into the disaster discovered a number of NASA organisational failures. NASA managers 
proceeded with the launch despite objections from contract engineers who had raised 
concerns regarding the effects of predicted cold temperatures on the rubber-like O-rings. 
This information had been suppressed which violated rules of organisational communication. 
O-ring damage had been identified for years by NASA and left unattended before the 
accident. Furthermore, NASA accepted that flying with known flaws was not deviant but 
routine. Budget cuts also meant that NASA was required to run as a cost-efficient business 
where managers were under schedule pressure and cover-up strategies were also condoned 
by managers (Vaughan, 2004).  
The NASA Challenger accident reflected a situation where patterns of disaster were 
created within an organisation where there was never an intention to harm (Vaughan, 1999). 
Vaughan (1999) demonstrated that the dominant explanation for the Challenger disaster was 
incorrect in arguing that disaster occurred because of individual errors, conformity to the 
dominant culture and violation of safe operating procedures. In all probability, these same 
factors influence public safety in healthcare and jeopardise patient safety principles (Banja, 
2010). As Runciman, Merry, & Walton (2007) pointed out, about half of the healthcare 
delivered to patients in the USA was in conflict with basic quality indicators or failed to 
provide the patients with appropriate treatment. From a safety perspective, unnecessary, 
undesirable, inappropriate, and/or unintentional routine unsafe practices placed the patient at 
risk of harm (Runciman et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the risk to patient safety appears to 
comprise unsafe practices and is a gamble healthcare organisations knowingly undertake. 
Patient harm rates in Queensland are consistent with global trends of harm and 
appear unaffected by resource intensive approaches designed to address harm (Brennan et 
al., 1991; Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2000). Approximately 320 Queensland patients have 
been victims of preventable harm episodes annually (Queensland Health, 2012). These harm 
rates include Severity Assessment Code (SAC) 1 harm. The SAC 1 harm classification refers 
to harm that result in death or permanent disability (Queensland Health, 2009a). The figure 
above has remained unaltered for the past 5 years in Queensland. The events, identified as 
SAC 1 events, represent a minority of the total reported clinical adverse events in 
Queensland public health facilities. In this thesis, these events are considered ‘disasters’. A 
disaster is understood as the combination of system failures but, moreover, a disaster is the 
unintended outcome of healthcare where the consequences for the patient are death or 
permanent disability (Queensland Health, 2009a). In the event of an SAC 1 clinical incident, 
a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is undertaken to identify the underlying reason for the event 
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and makes recommendations to prevent recurrence. Despite use of the RCA as one technique 
to reduce harm, and changes implemented to report and the application of human factor 
concepts to the providers of healthcare, the cost to human lives has not diminished. Human 
factors are concepts to define a fit between people working in a system, their equipment and 
the environment (Cacciabue & Vella, 2010). This predicament, between the RCA and social 
characteristics that strive to improve patient safety underpin the impetus for this research. 
Since the 1990s, patient harm has been explored in the context of patient safety 
using a variety of error classification modalities and within a number of philosophical 
disciplines. There has been a significant amount of State and Commonwealth resources 
applied to patient safety to raise awareness of the issue of patient harm in healthcare. Yet, 
despite these resources, preventable patient harm rates remain static and prevention elusive. 
It is argued that the traditional view of patient safety initiated a compartmentalised 
perspective, where patient safety initiatives directed change with specific incentives, such as 
reporting and the vision of a just culture. While these incentives cannot be underestimated 
and have not been disregarded, today the view has shifted to a more transparent social 
approach where the safety of patients is considered diverse and evolutionary. Thus, the 
sociological underpinnings of this research postulate that a contradiction exists in healthcare 
where the organisational constructs that inform principles of safety also inhibit the 
translation of patient safety into clinical practice. Little is understood about the social 
construction of the RCA and the function of the RCA in SAC 1 harm mitigation.  
The research sets out to explore the social constructs of patient safety in an 
investigation via an analysis of documents that report on harm in Queensland healthcare 
services. The focus of the research is SAC 1 harm, although all clinical incidents are relevant 
to harm minimisation. In SAC 1 events, harm is considered preventable and yet in the event 
of SAC 1 harm, patient consequences are disastrous. The documents include RCA reports 
from Queensland Health Care facilities; Queensland legislative documents and national 
agency reports on issues that inform healthcare providers of the delivery of care, including 
technical and non-technical measures that support the improvement of patient safety in 
hospitals.  
This chapter begins by declaring the researcher’s reflexive status within section 1.1. 
In this section, a reflexive approach is identified to make clear my interest in the research 
area as a former patient safety officer and my current position as a researcher. The purpose 
of the research is defined in section 1.2 where the research question and aims are set down. 
The significance, scope and definitions are described respectively, in sections 1.3, 1.4 and 
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1.5. Section 1.6 defines the context of the research and finally, section 1.7 provides a 
systematic outline of the thesis. 
  
1.1 REFLEXIVITY 
I embarked on this research with the knowledge and education gained from 
employment as a patient safety officer. Hidalgo (1998) postulates that this is equivalent to an 
overlapping insider/outsider status which shapes the approach to research and the 
interpretation of findings. An acknowledgment of ‘insider’ status means that I bring to the 
research knowledge and experience of the organisation, the structure, processes and tasks, 
knowledge of patient safety and of the conduct of the RCA. This knowledge cannot be 
ignored but through reflective processes a distinctive blurring can emerge between new and 
old knowledge to illuminate new meaning from the language (Vaughan, 1999).  
The clinical incident that instigated this PhD journey involved the unexpected death 
of a patient who developed a stage IV pressure injury and later died of sepsis. The patient’s 
death was a tragedy and a systemic review was commissioned. The RCA report identified 
that the patient’s death resulted from daily routines of non-compliance to attend to re-
positioning. The RCA referred to Vaughan’s (1999) concept of normalisation of deviance 
and thus, the theoretical journey of this study was initiated. The point is not to victimise 
health professionals for not re-positioning, nor to postulate that normalisation of deviance 
influences the RCA, but to highlight that the issue of harm was organisationally systemic. 
More importantly, pressure injuries, like many other SAC 1 clinical incidents, are recurring 
and avoidable. Since 2005, the RCA has been applied in Queensland Health to investigate 
SAC 1 harm events Yet, despite the endorsement of the RCA in Queensland Health, little 
appears to have influenced SAC 1 harm rates or improved the safety of patient’s in care. This 
incident and my knowledge as a patient safety officer informs my insider status.  
According to Hidalgo (1998), my outsider status sits with my position as a doctoral 
student. The qualitative nature of this research supports Hidalgo’s conception of 
insider/outsider status as reflected in the researcher’s positionality. Drawing on Hidalgo’s 
work, the insider/outsider concept embraces the idea of learning from harm as a patient 
safety officer as well as a researcher.  
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1.1 PURPOSES 
The purpose of the research is to explore the function of the RCA as applied in 
Queensland Healthcare facilities.  
1.1.1 Research Question 
The research question is: 
What is the function of the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) in an investigation of SAC 1 
harm events in Queensland? 
1.1.2  Research Objectives 
The aims of the research are to: 
• Explore the social construction of the Queensland Health RCA reports as it is 
informed by Queensland legislation and national and international policy on patient 
safety in Queensland; 
• Develop an understanding of the influences that inform the RCA process; 
• Explore the relevance of the RCA and supporting documentation to SAC 1 patient 
harm events and patient safety; 
• Develop theoretical propositions around patient safety;  
• Contribute to the body of knowledge to minimise SAC 1 preventable harm events; 
and 
• Provide recommendations for policy development. 
 
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE 
The significance of the research is that it contributes to knowledge by theoretically 
exploring the text of Queensland Health RCA reports. The RCA report is a legislatively 
protected confidential report on an investigation into a serious patient harm event that has 
taken place in a Queensland public hospital. For the first time, this research explores 
privileged textual information by exploring the language in and structure of Queensland 
RCA reports. Importantly, this research expands on existing knowledge around the RCA. 
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In addition, the research draws on theoretical views to yield new lines of inquiry. 
Vaughan’s (1999) theoretical work on systemic disasters not only frames the research but 
supports the methods as an analytical lens through which to explore the relationship between 
the system, the organisation and individuals and the systemic development of harm in 
healthcare. This research is exclusive as no health research has applied Vaughan’s (1999) 
concepts that underpin disaster theory as a theoretical lens to examine RCA documents. 
Nonetheless, conceptual frameworks applied by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
2010, established a framework for the purposes of exploring unsafe healthcare around the 
world. Within this framework the WHO classifications comprise structure, process and 
outcomes (Jha, Prasopa-Plaizier, Larizgoitia, & Bates, 2010). These classifications closely 
resemble Vaughan’s (1999) theoretical constructs.  
 
1.3 SCOPE 
The scope of this research is confined to RCAs conducted in Queensland. 
Nonetheless, the implications of the research extend to healthcare contexts internationally. 
This is because the theory and legislation upon which patient harm event investigations are 
based are largely globally agreed upon.  
 
1.4 DEFINITIONS 
The following information defines the terms used in this dissertation in alphabetical 
order and are not restricted by definitions used by Queensland Health: 
 
Chain of Events: The Chain of Events supports the conduct of the RCA in the 
provision of two documents. Documents 1 and 2 – the Final Flow Diagrams.  
 
Clinical Incident: a clinical incident is defined as any event or circumstance which 
has actually or could potentially lead to unintended and/or unnecessary mental or physical 
harm to a patient of a Queensland Health service. 
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Clinical Incident Management Implementation Standard (CIMIS): The CIMIS 
(Queensland Health, 2009a) is the organisational Standard for the conduct of the patient 
safety including the RCA during 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
 
Commissioning Authority: The authority to commission an RCA is delegated by 
the Director-General of Queensland Health and is provided for through an Instrument of 
Delegation, in accordance with s38ZI of the Health Services Act (1991), specifically: 
a) An appropriately qualified officer or employee of the Department or Health 
Service employee; or 
 b) A health executive (Queensland Health, 2009a, p. 35). 
 
Contributing Factors Diagram. These diagrams provide an illustrative 
representation of the events that led to the occurrence of the reportable event (Queensland 
Health, 2009a, p. 35). 
 
Patient Safety: The World Health Organization (2011) defines patient safety as “the 
prevention of errors and adverse effects to patients associated with health care”. Patient 
safety is not defined by Queensland Health. 
 
Reportable Event: A Reportable Event is an event of fatal consequence or an injury 
that is permanent and occurring in hospital.  These events are legislatively notifiable to the 
Health Quality Complaints Commission.  
A Reportable event as noted in the Health Services Amendment Regulation (No. 1) 2008. 
Are prescribed as 
(1) For section “38G of the Act, definition reportable event, the 
following events are prescribed— 
(a) the death of a person, or an injury suffered by a person, while 
giving birth; 
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(b) the death of a person caused by the incorrect management of the 
person’s medication; 
(c) the death of a person, or neurological damage suffered by a 
person, caused by an intravascular gas embolism; 
(d) the wrong procedure being performed on a person, or a 
procedure being performed on the wrong part of a person’s body, resulting in 
the death of the person or an injury being suffered by the person; 
(e) the retention of an instrument, or other material, in a person’s 
body during surgery that requires further surgery to remedy the retention;  
(f) the death of a person, or an injury suffered by a person, caused by 
a haemolytic blood transfusion reaction resulting from the wrong blood type 
being used for the 
person during a blood transfusion; 
(g) the suspected suicide of a person receiving inpatient health care; 
(h) the suspected suicide of a person who is undertaking mental 
health treatment or rehabilitation while residing in the community; 
(i) any other death of a person, or an injury suffered by a person, that 
was not reasonably expected to be an outcome of the health service provided 
to the person. 
(2) For subsection (1), a reference to an injury is a reference to an 
injury that is likely to be permanent” (Health Services Amendment 
Regulation (No. 1) 2008, p.2-3). 
 
Reportable Incident Brief (RIB) is defined as the method for reporting significant 
events in Queensland Health; specifically, reportable events (SAC 1) or serious adverse 
mental health events that fall outside of the definition of clinical incident (Queensland 
Health, 2009a, p. 40).  
 
Root Cause Analysis (RCA): The RCA is an organisational document for the 
systemic review of a clinical incident. The RCA is commissioned in accordance with s38ZI 
of the Health Services Act (1991), this Act has been repealed but was used as a legal 
instrument to invoke the provisions of Part 4B of the Health Services Act (1991) as in force 
July 2010. 
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• Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is required for all SAC 1 events with the exception of a 
suspected suicide in the community of a person under the care of a mental health 
service. In these cases, the Commissioning Authority must determine the analysis 
type after consultation with the local mental health mortality review committee. 
• RCA is a quality improvement tool. It is a systematic process for analysing serious 
clinical incidents to identify: 
o What happened? 
o Why it happened? 
o How could it be prevented? 
An RCA is a systematic process of analysing reportable events to identify: 
1. factors that contributed to the event and 
2. remedial measures that could be implemented to prevent a recurrence of a 
similar event. 
An RCA of a reportable event does not include: 
• investigating the professional competence of a person in relation to the event, nor 
• finding out who is to blame for the happening of the event. 
 
Safety: According to Queensland Health, safety is defined as “a state in which risk 
has been reduced to an acceptable level” (Queensland Health, 2009a, p. 40). According to 
Cook (1998, p. 4), “Safety is a characteristic of systems and not of their components”. 
 
Severity Assessment Code (SAC): refers to the measurement of consequences to a 
patient associated with a clinical incident. The SAC score (1, 2 or 3) is used to determine the 
appropriate level of analysis, action and escalation for clinical incidents (Queensland Health, 
2009a, p. 40). 
 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 10 
Severity Assessment Code 1 (SAC 1): refers to death or likely permanent harm 
which is not reasonably expected as an outcome of healthcare (Queensland Health, 2009a, p. 
29). 
 
1.5 CONTEXT 
Preventable patient harm resulting in death or permanent injury is the antithesis of 
professional care that traditionally reinforces safe care. Yet, the literature points out, patterns 
of harm do recur (Queensland Health, 2012) despite resource intensive interventions in 
Queensland and around the world. Harm of this nature is not isolated to classification of 
harm such as pressure injuries, medication errors, wrong site surgery or a combination of 
human error principles but is a complex interplay of social forces and changing patterns of 
health that requires further investigation. To date, no research has explored the text of RCA 
documents and regulatory documents that inform the constructs of RCA in relation to SAC 1 
harm events. This thesis sets out to learn more about the function of the RCA by exploring 
text of unedited RCAs. Thus, an inside-out view applies through an analysis of the text of 
unedited RCAs. The applies a critical lens to explore the social patterns that comprise RCA 
documents 
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
The outline of the thesis is presented as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the concept of 
patient safety by acknowledging that human disaster and system failure in Australian 
organisations is relevant to patient safety and harm. The concept of system failures has its 
origins in the investigation of the 1986 NASA Challenger disaster (Vaughan, 1996). 
Vaughan (1996) argued that the disaster was not just the result of O-ring failure but of broad 
failures within the organisation. This, in part, comprises Vaughan’s (1999) system failure 
disaster theory. System failure and disaster (Vaughan, 1999) is important to this thesis to the 
extent that Vaughan’s theoretical perspective is applied as the lens to shape and focus the 
analytical processes of the research. The theoretical starting point is that a causal relationship 
exists between the environment in which an organisation operates its organisational 
structures, processes and tasks, and individual acts. In this thesis, Vaughan’s (1999) causal 
factors, the environment, the organisation and the individual constitute the framework 
through which RCA of SAC 1 harm events were analysed.  
Chapter 2 provides a contextual review of the literature surrounding the concept of 
patient safety, the notion of harm in healthcare and the RCA. In particular, this chapter 
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focuses on literature central to Queensland’s patient safety framework that informs the RCA. 
The literature review engages with literature from international and national perspectives 
around patient safety and preventable serious harm in healthcare organisations. 
The purpose of chapter 3 is to argue and justify the theoretical framework that 
underpins the research. As noted above, the theoretical argument draws on Vaughan’s (1999) 
sociological view of system failure and disaster. The assumption is that the origins of harm 
lie in system failures and not human failures and thus the research draws on Vaughan’s ideas 
to help understand more about system failure in healthcare and SAC 1 harm, where death is 
unexpected and considered avoidable. In this research, three causal ideas, posed as a priori 
categories, that support the research are: the environment, the organisation and the 
individual.  
Chapter 4 addresses the design of the research and provides a detailed description 
and justification of the research methods. The chapter draws on a number of theoretical ideas 
to frame the methods. Five phases of document analysis are applied to the data. The data 
were acquired from Queensland Health’s public healthcare facilities where the RCA is 
conducted before lodgement with the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Service. In 
addition, the data supports ethical considerations and manual data sorting of excerpts of text. 
The issue of research rigour is addressed through the concept of “trustworthiness” whereby 
the research makes a credible contribution to knowledge.  
Chapter 5 presents the results of the manifest analysis (Merton, 1968) of the RCA 
data. While this involved an enumeration of recurring words from the RCA text it was not 
solely about quantifying the number of words. As the words were counted and usage of text 
uncovered, the manifest analysis identified frequencies and patterns of words that are 
graphically represented and discussed in relation to each a priori category. The result of the 
manifest analysis was the generation of four key theoretical propositions. 
Chapter 6 presents the findings of a latent analysis (Merton, 1968). In this chapter, 
the key theoretical propositions derived from the manifest phase are explored and interpreted 
to learn more about the function of the RCA. Latent functions “represent significant 
increments in sociological knowledge” because latent findings depart from “common sense 
knowledge about life” and produce more than manifest functions (Merton, 1968, p. 122). 
Latent analysis is a process of identifying and classifying the “thrust or intent” of text to 
produce collateral results that are extraneous to standard social consequences (Merton, 
1968). Latent functions may be paradoxical and controversial. This Chapter reveals the 
conflicts that surround legislative and organisational agendas that guide the RCA. 
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Chapter 7 ‘the RCA unlocked’ argues that theoretical safety agendas that underpin 
the RCA have not translated effectively in practice (Nicolini et al., 2011) and the notion of 
conceptual slack (Schulman, 1993) is central here. In this Chapter, social tensions of 
language and processes are characteristics that deconstruct a systems approach and render 
the RCA lacking as a technique to improve patient safety. Recommendations are presented 
to address these concerns and move patient safety closer to achieving a systems approach. In 
closing, the chapter presents the conclusions of the research, determines the limitations and 
considers concepts for future research. 
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 Contextual Literature Review Chapter 2:
This chapter contextually situates the research within the existing literature to 
develop an understanding of knowledge that informs patient safety and healthcare’s RCA.  
In so doing, relevant literature including policy documents are reviewed to provide rational 
and direction to the research. In the first instance to section 2.1, the emergence of an 
international focus of safety and harm in healthcare is examined. In this section, the 
establishment of international agencies that drive and regulate patient safety are addressed.  
Then, the focus of the Chapter centres on the rise of patient safety regulation in Australia. 
Section 2.2 provides a closer examination of the literature and policy and guides patient 
safety in Queensland Health. In this section, documents that conceptually inform patient 
safety are appraised to provide context to relevant patient safety ideas that support and 
inform the RCA. Section 2.3 provides a close examination of National and State-wide 
legislative frames and specific policy documents that inform the RCA in Queensland. 
Following this section, the decentralisation of Queensland Health is briefly addressed to 
provide current context. With situational literature informing the Chapter identified, section 
2.5 draws on scholarly publications comprising literature related to the application and 
conduct of healthcare’s RCA. It is here that a gap in knowledge is revealed. Finally, section 
2.6 summaries the chapter to justify the direction of the research. 
 
2.1 THE EMERGENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL FOCUS ON SAFETY 
AND HARM IN HEALTHCARE 
In the evolution of the concept of patient safety, adverse events were not 
traditionally identified as avoidable harm, but as a tragic outcome of a procedure. These 
events were mostly concealed in the literature (McCombs, 1950). According to Vincent 
(2010) what was reported were deaths of patients resulting from medical procedures. In the 
earliest recorded cases, tragic outcomes occurred in maternity hospitals. During the 17th 
century, patient deaths were viewed as an outcome of hospitalisation and not a consequence 
of actions (Vincent, 2010). The first recorded deaths, noted in Paris in 1646, were the result 
of epidemics of puerperal fever or childbed fever (De Costa, 2002). It was not until two 
hundred years later that Dr Thomas Watson, a London physician, investigated the incidence 
of puerperal fever and discovered the transference of bacteria.  At that time, the 1800s, the 
concept of transfer of infection from one person to another was both ground breaking and 
controversial within the medical fraternity. Florence Nightingale (1820 – 1910), was also an 
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instrumental pioneer with her work that identified the effects of poor hygiene, poor nutrition 
and sanitation in death rates of wounded soldiers during the period 1853-1856, the Crimean 
War (Nightingale, 1987). 
Years later in 1945, the Second World War had ended and the Charter of the United 
Nations on Human Rights was signed (Charter of the United Nations, 2015). The Charter for 
the Declaration of Human Rights, generated discussion on the establishment of a global 
health organisation and this was influential to the founding of the World Health Organization 
(WHO).  Following these discussions the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
was announced on 10th December 1948. The UDHR and the WHO remain influential in the 
realm of patient safety (WHO, 2012). The World Health Organization (WHO) as a leading 
authority on global health matters (ACSQHC, 2015) defined patient safety as “the prevention 
of errors and adverse effects to patients associated with health care” (World Health 
Organization International, 2011, para. 1). While definitions of patient safety are rich 
internationally (Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research, 2015; Australian Commission 
on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, 2015; IOM 2000; National Institute of Health, 2014), 
studies reveal that the effectiveness to prevent harm remains elusive (Mitchell, 2008).  
The concept of patient safety as preventable harm events has emerged as a relatively 
new healthcare discipline although issues around patient safety have been reported since the 
mid-20th century. For example, Schimmel (1964) and Steel, Gertman, Crescenzi, & 
Anderson (1981) reported deaths of patients in university hospitals unrelated to their 
presenting medical condition or the expected outcome of healthcare. These pioneers 
prompted a way of thinking that challenged medicine of that time. The following decade, 
James Reason published the book entitled Human Error. Reason (1990) identified human 
fallibility as inherent in complex organisations and argued a link between people and their 
ability to operate in complex systems. Yet the term patient safety did not appear until 
published in the IOM report (2000). The IOM report alerted the public to harm statistics by 
acknowledging the vast numbers of medical errors that resulted in patient harm in hospital. 
Importantly, the seminal IOM report made clear that although harm rates were high and the 
result of human error, medical error was not an intentional act because “human beings, in all 
lines of work make errors” (IOM, 2000, p. xi). The focus of the IOM report was systems 
improvement rather than human failings and a combination of techniques were 
recommended to improve patient safety. 
The view was that human error contributed to healthcare harm. Harm could be 
avoided if errors were recognised in time and processes established to mitigate harm. Around 
the same time as Reason’s 1990 work, in England The Harvard Medical Practice Study 
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(HMPS) produced an interdisciplinary report on the number of adverse events caused by 
medical mismanagement (Brennan et al., 1991). Although the focus of Brennan et al’s., 
(1991) research was medical litigation, this work concluded that rates of harm were the 
outcome of substandard care. The results of the HMPS and Human Error (Reason, 1990) 
were internationally significant and disseminated widely, producing a surge of this type of 
research on harm in healthcare. By the mid-1990s in Australia, patient safety had taken hold 
and resulted in the ground-breaking national retrospective study entitled The Quality in 
Australian Health Care Study (QAHCS) examined 14,000 admissions in 28 hospitals in New 
South Wales and South Australia. The findings were influential for Australian healthcare 
revealing that 16.6% of admissions were associated with an adverse event. Wilson et al. 
(1995) identified a number of systemic and human factor issues that contributed to the 
adverse events and argued that 50% of these events were considered preventable (Wilson et 
al., 1995, p. 458). A few years following, the American Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
published To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System (IOM, 2000). As noted earlier, 
this report identified significant levels of harm in the American healthcare system that 
became a catalyst to drive change in America and internationally. The IOM report called for 
a 50% reduction in medical errors over the following 5 years with a “focus on health care as 
a system” (Jensen, 2008, p. 309; see also van Beuzekom, Boer, Akerboom, & Hudson, 2010) 
and encouraged healthcare providers to “become learning organisations” (Waring, 2009, 
p. 1722). Today, these reports remain influential in the discourse on patient safety and the 
view to lower harm rates prevail. The key elements considered essential to the improvement 
of patient safety included: 
• communication; 
• a shift from a posture of reliance on human infallibility (i.e. shame and blame), to 
checklists that recognised the contribution of the system and accounted for human 
limitations; and 
• a cultivation of non-punitive open and/or de-identified/anonymous reporting of 
safety concerns, including close calls, in addition to adverse events (Bagian, 2006, 
p. 287). 
In addition to the above elements, the IOM report highlighted issues of a culture 
where patient harm was considered the “the cost of doing business” (Bagian, 2006, p. 288) 
which exposed tragic levels of harm. Healthcare was identified not only as a place where 
harm occurred but where almost half of the harm was deemed preventable and the culture 
was attributed. The popular culture of denying error challenged healthcare to acknowledge 
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error and to embrace a systems approach to “transform the current culture of blame. The 
culture of blame made individuals take defensive precautions against being assigned 
responsibility for error – into a culture of safety” (Healy, 2011; Jensen, 2008, p. 309) and 
changing a culture of blame to improve patient safety remains a current patient safety 
strategy (Morello et al., 2011).  This is important because central to the design of an RCA is 
to focus attention from investigating individual actions to address issues within the 
organisation. Thus, the impetus is to convert RCA logic away from harm framed around an 
individual.  
In the United Kingdom in 1999, Sir Liam Donaldson, the Chief Medical Officer of 
the British Department of Health, was also driving the patient safety agenda. Donaldson 
published, An Organisation with a Memory (British Department of Health, 2000), which 
argued that the National Health Service (NHS) must learn from clinical adverse events. A 
year later, the IOM released a further report, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A new health 
system for the 21st century (IOM 2001) to provide a strategy and action to improve the 
delivery of care. Reports of harm (Wilson et al., 1995;  IOM 2000, 2001; British Department 
of Health, 2000) had global significance in the recognition of the need to improve safety for 
patients. Moreover, the wave of patient safety reports acknowledged a connection between 
human error and complex systems that reflected an unprecedented approach to changing the 
way healthcare thought about harm and to patient safety reform agendas (Shekelle et al., 
2013). The impact of these reports, in particular the QAHCS report by Wilson et al. (1995), 
brought home the message that harm in healthcare was as real in Australia as in other 
countries.  
These reports to name only a few provided the momentum to drive a patient safety 
reform agenda in Australia. Yet, it is argued that the progress of patient safety has been 
challenged because patient safety reform has been time consuming, complex and vastly more 
expensive than originally projected (Morath, Hain, Deshpande, Gitlin, & Churchwell, 2009; 
Stelfox, Palmisani, Scurlock, Orav, & Bates, 2006). The reason was that, as the IOM 
indicated, the goal to reduce errors and improve patient safety was more intangible than 
anticipated (Leape & Berwick, 2005) and critics converged on the point that patient safety 
was a “tough problem” because of its vast scale and heterogeneity (Vincent, 2009, p. 1777; 
see also Casper & Morrison, 2010; Leape & Berwick, 2005; Morath et al., 2009). Cook, 
Render, and Woods (2000) agreed and pointed to the multi-dimensional nature of patient 
safety arguing that past efforts had not had the desired outcomes because they focused on the 
application of patient safety rather than exploring underlying mechanisms.  
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By the late 1990s hospitals around the world became formally recognised as places 
where harm existed and where mistakes and disasters happened which could result in death 
(Vincent, 2010). Of relevance to this research, preventable adverse events and studies on 
contemporary disasters were surprisingly similar in establishing the existence of disaster 
patterns (Vaughan, 1999).  Bagian (2006 ) argued that accidents involving the unexpected 
death of a person in other high-risk organisations, such as mining or aviation, showed a 
characteristic pattern leading up to the disaster. The data from reports (Brennan at al., 1991; 
IOM, 2000; Wilson et al., 1995) suggested that healthcare was not dissimilar to other high-
risk organisations.  Thus, disaster characteristics are consistent to patient harm events.  These 
disaster characteristics include: 
• multiple people;  
• all performing actions in a seemingly innocuous manner;  
• breaching the organisation’s safety procedures, or defences; and 
• resulting in serious harm, disaster or death (Banja, 2010; Mascini, 2005; Reason, 
1990; Vaughan, 1996).  
Reason (1995) argued that harm resulted from a social interplay between active 
errors and latent errors within a system not designed to capture systemic faults and 
weaknesses. These errors, slips and lapses went unnoticed and unattended for a period, 
permitting the active errors to breech system defences and to jeopardise patient outcomes, 
thereby causing harm (Reason, 1990; Vaughan, 1999). Furthermore, for organisations and 
healthcare workers, the concept of error was fraught with contradictions and the struggle was 
to balance blame, accountability and culpability (Dekker, 2009). These constructs added to 
the complexity of harm in healthcare and contributed to patient safety issues. 
According to Dekker and Hugh (2010, p. 275), the difficulty of healthcare harm 
rested in “drawing the line between blameworthy and blameless acts”, as those external to 
the healthcare system and those internal to it espoused opposing philosophies. The former 
struggled to isolate accountability and culpability within system boundaries and the tort 
system; the latter sought a fair and just system within the organisation where no single 
person was to blame. Thus, a tension existed between corporate disciplinary systems such as 
the socially accepted tort system that punished human error where harm occurred; and a no-
blame culture that recognised error and harm in the healthcare system (Marx, 2001, p. 3). 
The tort system emphasised accountability and culpability through a judicial approach to 
defining fault. The other set of rules set by organisations applied a transparent form of 
accountability where human error was acknowledged to cause harm as stated in reports of 
harm (Brennan et al., 1991; IOM, 2000; Wilson et al., 1995), but no individual was at fault.  
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Thus, the emergence of patient safety was established from reports of high rates of harm in 
hospitals.  The problem was that human errors were attributed to preventable patient injury.  
Moreover, there was a tradition to hide error and not report adverse events.  International 
health reform agendas set down a focus to improve patient safety and  international 
regulatory bodies were established.  These governance frameworks have been instrumental 
to administer and regulate patient safety around the world.   
2.1.1 Patient safety regulation: an international agenda 
In relation to patient safety agendas, early regulatory provisions were established 
internationally by Dr Ernest Codman in 1910. Dr Codman was an American physician who 
influenced medical colleagues by establishing a set of standards and records of care to be 
evidence for health care outcomes.  Codman’s (1910) aim was to improve medical care. The 
impetus came from a study Codman undertook on discharged patients to determine whether 
or not their hospital treatment had been effective.  This study began the movement for the 
development of minimum standards which later the American College of Surgeons (ACS) 
established as the Hospital Standardisation Program (Joint Commission, 2012).  In 1918, the 
ACS began on-site inspections of hospitals.  A few years on, the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) in the 1950s released Standards for Hospital 
Accreditation to formally measure quality of care and accreditation programs in America 
(Joint Commission, 2012). These principles to provide a uniform set of measures of safety 
and quality standards across health care services draw on the JCAH initiating idea in 
Australia today. 
By the early 1970s escalating costs of professional liability insurance due to 
malpractice litigation was a concern in America.  The medical association sought alternatives 
to the tort system insurance scheme.  Mills in 1978 produced a report to address the gap in 
information.  The study focused on potentially compensable events and healthcare induced 
disabilities.   Mills (1998) concluded that 4.65 per cent of the population were the victims of 
harm generated from medical mismanagement.  Over the following decade in America, a 
wave of research into medical malpractice and harm eventuated which lead to changes in 
professional liability insurance and the triggered a closer examination of healthcare harm 
rates.  As noted, the 1990s saw reports of harm conclude that hospitals were not as safe and 
expected and a focus on patient safety was established (IOM, 2000). 
The emergences of an international focus on patient safety and regulatory authorities 
have influenced the structure and direction of patient safety in Australia.  The issue of 
iatrogenic harm was relevant to Australian healthcare institutions.  Moreover, reports of 
harm were instrumental in establishing patient safety processes adopted by Queensland 
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Health Patient Safety Centre, 2005. Specifically, the QAHCS (Wilson et al., 1995) provided 
a platform to launch education on patient safety principles across the Queensland and other 
States and Territories in Australia.   Seventeen years on, statistics on harm continue to reflect 
those of Wilson et al. (1995), despite significant investment in healthcare harm prevention by 
government agencies (Wilson & Van Der Weyden, 2005).  The introduction of governance 
agencies and legislative reform to standardise patient safety processes in Australia are 
addressed next. 
2.1.2 Patient safety regulation in Australia 
Since 1901, amendments to the Australian Constitution have established “health 
policy-making powers through broader interpretations of the responsibilities of a national 
governments for the health of its population” (Healy, 2011, p. 76). As a result, the Australian 
Government cannot legislate outside the Constitution Act 1901 and to date patient safety 
remains mostly non-legislated although regulation from Governmental organisations is 
growing. In 1902, the Royal Commission Act (Cth) (section 1A) provided the Governor 
General the power to instigate an investigation known as a Royal Commission (AusLii, 
2012).   Royal Commissions are independent public inquiries, initiated by the government 
and these have been significant to patient safety reform in Australia.  Twenty years on, in 
1921 the Department of Health in Australia was established to look after the health of the 
population following the end of World War I.   
In 1932, Australia’s Drug and Perfumery manufacturing plant was established which 
is now called Medicines Australia to standardise medicines in Australia.  World War II, from 
1939-1945 involved a vast majority of the world’s nations. Societies around the world were 
affected by issues of food, sanitation, shelter and disease to name only a few.  To that end, 
the Queensland Government assumed an expanded role in the provision of public health 
(AusMed, 2012). The Health Act (1937) was amended to consolidate previous legislation 
dedicated to public health to reflect the early stages of regulation in Australia. Not long after 
this, the Commissions of Inquiry Act (1950) was established to investigate matters of 
national importance.  These inquires became relevant to patient safety agendas as harm in 
healthcare settings became more public. By 1958, the Coroners Act (1958) was introduced to 
enable the coroner to be informed and to investigate the cause and circumstances 
surrounding death of a person. From 1970 to the mid-1980s, significant political influences 
saw changes in meta-regulation processes to monitor healthcare actions and patient outcomes 
that drew on “legislative, funding, administrative, professional and representational sources 
of authority” (Healy, 2011, p. 90).   
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To accord with international agendas, Australia’s hospital accreditation program was 
established in 1974, overseen by the Australian Council on Healthcare Standards (ACHS) to 
inform quality improvement for healthcare organisations. By mid-1970s the social and 
political nature of healthcare had conformed to the impetus for standardisation, regulation 
and evaluation of hospital quality processes.  This was seen as a way to improve the safety 
and quality of the delivery of healthcare services for Australians. Public health services were 
further transformed. For example, Medibank was re-named Medicare in 1984 to provide a 
universal health care system in Australia and funding for healthcare was available for low 
income earners.  In addition, with standardisation implemented into Medicines in Australia, 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (2014) subsidised a range of medicines for the public.  
In the late 1980s in Australia, patient harm were being uncovered. The Royal 
Commission into Deep Sleep Therapy at Chelmsford Hospital, NSW (1990) strengthened the 
legislative health agenda. This report exposed harm where a medical officer allegedly 
contributed to the death of a patient and that complaints were not addressed.  About the same 
time, but not linked to the events at Chelmsford, The Health Services Act in 1991 was 
assented which saw the delegation of Hospital Boards and Hospital Administrations to 
Regional Health Authorities with the appointment of Chief Executive(s). The Chief 
Executive(s) role was accountable to the Department of Health and the Quality Assurance 
Authorities and Quality Assurance Committees as appointed under Division 3 of the Act 
(Health Services Act, 1991). These legislative changes resulted from a Royal Commission 
Inquiry in 1991, the Carter Report. The Carter Report was an inquiry into ward 10B of the 
Psychiatric unit of Townsville General Hospital (Queensland Supreme Court Library, 2015) 
and as noted, was significant in examining patient safety and the provision of governance to 
Queensland’s healthcare.  
In 1992, a new national agency was introduced—the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) was established to debate and coordinate local and federal 
government activities. The role of COAG was to initiate, develop and monitor the 
implementation of policy reforms that were of national significance and required cooperative 
action by Australian governments. The membership of COAG comprised the Prime Minister, 
State Premiers, Territory Chief Ministers and the President of the Australian Local 
Government Association (ALGA) (Australian Government, 2014). COAG led the 
development of the new National Healthcare Agreements (NHA) and specific purpose 
payments were connected to output healthcare targets and performance indicators to measure 
the delivery of healthcare services across Australia (Queensland Parliament, 2008, p. 3606). 
In addition, the National Health and Hospitals Reform commission (NHHRC) announced a 
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new policy framework, Beyond the Blame Game: Accountability and performance 
benchmarks for the next Australian Health Care Agreements (NHHRC, 2008). This 
document focused on moving past blaming individuals for iatrogenic harm, to provide 12 
health and healthcare challenges. Of relevance here was that Point 8, “Promoting improved 
safety and quality of healthcare” (NHHRC, 2008, p. 15), referred to the number of adverse 
events in healthcare and the cost of these on the healthcare system.  
In the year 2000, the Australian Council for Safety and Quality was formed to 
provide leadership in the area of national standards, specifically healthcare safety and 
quality. This followed international trends to establish regulatory agencies to guide inform 
and monitor patient safety. The result was that healthcare organisations were required to 
measure and report patient safety as part of a strategy to improve outcomes in this area and 
reports were provided to the Government with comprehensive recommendations to help ease 
the burden of adverse events in healthcare (Richardson & McKie, 2007). To coincide with 
the recommendations, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), an 
independent statutory authority governed by a management Board and accountable to the 
Australian Parliament through the Health and Ageing portfolio, established the National 
Health Performance Framework to provide a structure for the reporting on the performance 
of the Australian health system (AIHW, 2012). These events were important to patient safety 
because in 2004, the AIHW and the Australian Health Ministers agreed to report on national 
sentinel event categories.  
National sentinel event categories comprised a range of serious adverse events that 
could be used as a ‘window’ to the vulnerabilities and safety of the healthcare system 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare & Australian Commission on Safety and Quality 
in Health Care, 2007). The Australian sentinel event list, now called the Reportable Events 
(RE) list in Queensland, drew on the American sentinel event policy and the American 
Veterans Affairs model and was introduced into patient safety in American accredited 
healthcare organisations in 1996 (The Joint Commission, 2012). In 2004, to support 
processes of safety and quality national reporting of harm, the AIHW instituted reporting of 
sentinel event categories. Today, the RE list and sentinel event categories are central to the 
RCA.  
In 2005, to coincide with the introduction of the classifications of harm, the sentinel 
event categories and reports on harm, the former Queensland Premier, Peter Beattie, AC, 
announced a full review of Queensland Health’s systems following the release of the 
Queensland Health Systems Interim report (Queensland Government, 2005a). This 
independent review known as the Forster Review (Queensland Government, 2005b), was 
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commissioned to complement the Bundaberg Royal Commission of Inquiry into allegations 
of patient harm at Bundaberg Hospital (Queensland Government, 2005b).  Around the same 
time in 2005 in Australia, a report entitled National Arrangements for Safety and Quality of 
Health Care in Australia: The Report of the Review of Future Governance Arrangements for 
Safety and Quality in Health Care, addressed issues of leadership and co-ordination of safety 
and quality improvement efforts (Paterson, 2005). These reports identified not only rates of 
patient harm but that patient safety was a high priority in Australia and in need of further 
evolvement. Thus Queensland reports that comprised patient deaths and consumer 
complaints, were influential in the evolution of patient safety in Queensland. Further, the 
Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care’s organisational arrangements were 
found to be inadequate. The Council was subsequently dissolved in 2006 and the Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) was created by Health 
Ministers. The ACSQHC remains funded by state, territory and federal governments, to lead 
and coordinate healthcare safety and quality improvements in Australia. This period saw the 
establishment of regulatory agencies to initiate centralisation of patient safety in Australia 
and Queensland.  
Today, the ACSQHC provides reports on the safety and quality of Australian 
healthcare services and has recently produced the document entitled National Safety and 
Quality Health Service Standards (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health 
Care, 2011). The National Standards contain a suite of ten national standards “to protect the 
public from harm and to improve the quality of health service provision” (ACSQHC, 2011, 
p. 3). The ACSQHC documents comprise a group of other closely linked national reports 
that are produced by affiliated Commonwealth organisations to inform the Health Minister 
and fulfil public disclosure requirements. An example is the health performance national 
reports. The AIHW report, Sentinel events in Australian public hospitals 2004–05, was 
significant to patient safety as it represented the collaboration of two primary Australian 
regulatory agencies, the AIHW and the ACSQHC (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare & Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2007).  
The regulatory agencies, COAG and NHHRC and the AIHW remain influential 
regulatory organisations that support healthcare’s national reforms and legislation and guide 
the RCA. In relation to patient safety, the issue of iatrogenic harm has progressed over time 
and this is due in part to the introduction of governance agencies. Despite this, patient safety 
was not as transparent (Queensland Public Hospitals Commission of Inquiry, 2005) as a 
National Health priority (AIHW & Commonwealth Department of Health and Family 
Services 1997). The intent to improve patient safety and learn from mistakes remained, while 
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the concept of safety appeared less important and processes of accreditation and auditing to 
improve safety appeared to predominate. While this idea appeared inconsistent with national 
agendas, Rowley and Waring (2011, p. 3) referred to such processes as “measure and 
manage”. These authors asserted that the recent approach to “measure and monitor” 
overlooked the culture of safety referred to as the “socio-cultural fabric of organisations”.   
These ideas inform the sociological direction that guides this research. An example of how 
safety culture is discounted can be seen in the new one-health safety and quality framework 
as identified within section 88.9 of the NHHRC (2009) Final Report that states: 
The Commonwealth, state and territory governments would agree to 
establish national approaches to health workforce planning and education, 
professional registration, patient safety and quality (including service 
accreditation), e-health, performance reporting (including the provision of 
publicly available data on the performance of all aspects of the health 
system), prevention and health promotion, private hospital regulation and 
health intervention and technology assessment (NHHRC, 2009, p. 275). 
While the NHHRC supports a national agenda on patient safety, as Rowley and 
Waring (2011) argued, measures that count harm fail to support the culture of the 
organisation because latent concerns remain concealed because the focus is on numbers of 
harm rather than the interconnectivity of safety outcomes. More about issues of safety and 
quality are addressed in Chapter 4. By late 2007, the formation and transformation of 
government and non-government regulatory agencies was well established as a healthcare 
strategy. The complexity of this approach created a paradox. The government aspired to 
improve patient safety however, the volume of elements, strategies, reports and submissions 
evolving from new health taskforces, agencies, foundations and commissions challenged the 
approach improve patient safety. One example was the 2007 a research paper entitled 
“Reducing the Incidence of Adverse Events in Australian Hospitals: An Expert Panel 
Evaluation of Some Proposals” (Monash University, 2007) that detailed improvements to 
policy to progress the decline of harm rates in healthcare. It is paradoxical that despite the 
formation reports and of more regulatory agencies over the past few years, there has been 
little evidence of improved patient safety rates of harm.  
On 29 November 2008, the National Partnership Agreement on Preventive Health 
(NPAPH) was announced by COAG. This agreement re-structured COAG’s Australian 
Better Health Initiative and the National Reform Agenda’s Type II Diabetes Initiative, which 
supplemented the National Health Care Agreement (COAG, 2012) to assent the Australian 
National Preventive Health Agency Act (Cth) 2010. Following assent of the Australian 
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National Preventive Health Agency Act, (Cth) in 2010, the National Preventive Health 
Agency (NPHA) was established (COAG, 2012). To complement the inception of new 
national organisations and legislation designed to provide Australia with a standardised 
health direction, the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care compiled 
and published the National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards (ACSQHC, 2011, 
p. 2) to “assist health service organisations to deliver safety and high quality care”. These 
national standards inform local accreditation processes where associated national financial 
remuneration schemes are viewed as instrumental to improve patient safety. Furthermore, the 
NPHA recommended the formation of a national independent body named the Australian 
Commission of Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC), to support and promote the 
safety and quality of healthcare and measurably improve safety and quality in healthcare.  
The National Health Care Agreement also strengthened regulatory reforms through 
the provision of Commonwealth activity-based funding as an incentive to care for patients 
more efficiently according to the numbers and types of services each healthcare facility 
provides (COAG, 2012). As a result, smaller regional networks were introduced to deliver 
better health services while maintaining overarching national governance. This approach was 
instrumental in repealing the Health Services Act (Qld) (1991) which saw the introduction of 
the Health and Hospitals Network Act (Qld) in 2011 (Queensland Parliament, 2011a, 
p. 3139).  
In Australia, the Commonwealth endorsed a ‘one health’ approach to healthcare 
delivery (National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, 2012) and this body 
announced a move to centralise patient safety. Yet, the emergence of national regulatory 
agencies and the establishment of national directives that aim to provide safety and quality 
healthcare for Australians (Council of Australian Governments [COAG], 2012), have 
changed the focus of patient safety to one more driven by quality methods. Today, the 
ACSQHC leads and coordinates national improvements in safety and quality in healthcare 
across Australia and the AIHW maintains health and welfare statistics. These organisations 
have been providing national support and informing patient safety in Queensland. 
Governance agencies are said to evolve from “governance without government”, the result of 
a move away from set-piece legislation towards merging the healthcare patient safety agenda 
within society (Fox & Ward, 2008, p. 521). However, considerable conflict exists because as 
noted above, regulation is acquired despite the establishment of “governance without 
government” (Fox & Ward, 2008, p. 521).  
The conflict appears between the notions of safety led by national and international 
reports of harm that prompted quality activities led by the ACSQHC (2011). A focus on 
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quality improvement approaches that measure and report rates of harm (AIHW, 2012) 
influenced by governance decisions on safety have been the impetus. According to Ben 
(2010) the problem with that approach was that in healthcare, governance agencies provided 
both financial governance and clinical governance with little reference to social governances 
that drive effective healthcare delivery.  These safety ideas and regulatory reform agendas 
established governances within local authorities from which patient safety concepts were 
launched into Queensland’s public healthcare facilities. 
 
2.2 QUEENSLAND PERSPECTIVE 
In Queensland, central concepts such as harm, blame, error, reporting and latent 
failures consistently inform the Queensland patient safety perspective.  The literature 
acknowledges that an adverse event, as an injury related to medical management, is in 
contrast to complications of disease (World Health Organization, 2005).  Adverse events are 
preventable or non-preventable and  are defined as an adverse event caused by an error or 
other type of systems or equipment failure (WHO, 2005, p. 8). In this research, an adverse 
event that results in the unexpected death or permanent harm of a patient is an SAC 1 event 
in Queensland (Queensland Health, 2009a).  Central patient safety concepts are addressed 
next. 
2.2.1 Healthcare harm 
The concept of harm in healthcare is underpinned by the notion of human error. The 
argument is basically framed around the concept that errors contribute to harm and if the 
error was prevented harm would not have occurred (Pronovost & Colantuoni, 2009).   More 
importantly, an assumption underlying harm in healthcare is that the system manifests 
human error which creates a causal connection between the system, error and patient harm 
(Vaughan, 1999). In Queensland Health, harm was not explicitly defined in the CIMIS 
(Queensland Health, 2009a).  However, the Queensland Health policy in 2008, announced 
harm as a death, disease, injury and/or disability experienced by a person; destruction, 
damage or threat to the organisation, loss of or damage to property, or pollution of the 
environment. This policy is no longer active and has not been applied in any further context 
to the research.  It is important to note contextually however, that harm was defined and was 
current for the period 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
Harm as notable reports reveal, is measured statistically. Harm rates are arguably 
central to the measure of patient safety in Queensland and are represented in the incident 
classification system. Queensland Health’s commitment to patient safety acknowledges 
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annual reports of harm in the form of harm and no-harm data as well as programs and patient 
safety incentives. An example is the period 2007/2008 where the report indicated that the 
total rate of harm was calculated to be 22% (n = 12,665) (Farmer, 2010, p. 23). In the 
following annual report of 2008/2009, a similar trend was identified where total harm 
incidents of 22% (n = 15,590) were recorded (Farmer, 2010, p. 31). Of those reported 
incidents, 2% resulted in death or likely permanent harm. For the period 2007/2009, 23% 
(n = 15,590) of patients were unexpectedly harmed in healthcare (Queensland Health, 2012, 
p. 36). This type of reporting is consistent with international trends. 
A famous international example of harm is the Vincristine administration errors. 
Vincristine, an oncological agent, is only to be administered intravenously and yet 
internationally Vincristine continues to be inadvertently administered intrathecally. When 
given in this way, Vincristine causes central nervous system (CNS) toxicity, which produces 
progressive ascending myeloencephalopathy (Lagman et al., 2007, p. 45). Incorrect 
administration of Vincristine continues to cause harm even after adoption of systemic 
interventions, litigation and international coverage. Analysis of this harm shows it to be a 
classic systems error which has proved intractable for nearly 40 years (Noble & Pronovost, 
2010). Patterns of harm appear in Queensland Health data. 
The Queensland Health rate of reported death or permanent disability was 
approximately 320 patients annually for the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 (Queensland 
Health, 2012). According to an article in the Queensland Courier Mail, 324 most serious 
incidents—those resulting in death or permanent patient harm—represented a minuscule 
percentage of the 14 million episodes of care in Queensland Health facilities during the year 
(Miles, 2012). The view here is that death and permanent harm should not be linked to 
episodes of care. Rather, preventable death and permanent harm events are healthcare 
disasters that represent opportunities to improve patient safety and should not be reduced to a 
proportionate measure. 
In contrast to the notion that all harm was preventable, Pronovost and Colantuoni 
(2009, p. 1273) asserted that some patients “inevitably die of system complications despite 
receiving the best known medical therapies” and this was not preventable harm. They went 
on to say that “most harms are preventable to some degree, but evidence is lacking about 
how much” (Pronovost & Colantuoni, 2009, p. 1274). For example, pressure injuries are 
considered preventable, but the level of injury determines the severity of the harm. A patient 
may sustain a minor pressure injury that resolves with regular re-positioning. The patient 
may also sustain a major pressure injury that does not resolve with regular re-positioning and 
pressure-relieving devices. Despite this, it remains unknown and the complexities to 
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determine at what point harm is preventable are not clear. Of course clinical decisions adjust 
for patient risks such as co-morbidities, disease processes and diagnoses but “these models 
appear to motivate little effort to improve care” (Pronovost & Colantuoni, 2009, p. 1274). 
More recently, an international systematic review of databases from 2001 to 2011 revealed 
that the definition of preventable harm in healthcare was inconsistent and that no single 
definition supported high-quality evidence (Nabhan et al., 2012, p. 1). The issue, is that 
healthcare harm is linked to errors and an RCA is a technique applied to locate error and 
mitigate harm.  
2.2.2 Error in healthcare 
Human error is considered a primary contributor to incident causation as well as a 
contributing factor to patient safety related issues including errors, violations, mistakes, 
misconduct and disasters (Banja, 2010; Flin, 2007; Marx, 2001; Reason, 1990; Vaughan, 
1996). It is argued error occurs because of a relationship between workers and complex 
systems (Reason, 1990) where multiple interactions create variances in tasks (Perrow, 1984). 
Again, the report (IOM, 2000) made clear that healthcare workers were susceptible to 
fallibility in complex systems.  This sparked a new way of thinking that saw system latent 
failures and human errors as causal factors that influenced patient safety and these errors 
were similar to other high-risk organisations (Reason, 1990; Runciman et al., 2007). From 
this perspective, clinical mistakes are viewed as human mistakes committed within a human 
system inadequately designed to identify those mistakes in time (Nance, 2008). These 
constructs remain central to improving patient safety today. 
The WHO definition of error stated that an error was “the failure of a planned action 
to be completed as intended (i.e. error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an 
aim (i.e. error of planning). Errors may be errors of commission or omission, and usually 
reflect deficiencies in the systems of care” (WHO, 2005, p. 8). Errors according to the IOM 
report are part of being human, cannot be excluded, but are also noted to be avoidable. In 
addition, the IOM report defines errors within theoretical contexts such as Perrow’s Normal 
Accident Theory (1986) and Reason’s (1990) Swiss cheese representation of accident 
trajectories. These are addressed in more detail in Chapter 4. Research conducted by 
Hamilton (2000, p. 34) into healthcare errors demonstrated that clinical errors peaked in the 
first year following medical graduation. Baldwin, Dodd, and Wrate (1997) in an earlier 
study, argued that clinical errors influenced medical placements and imposed additional 
stressors on new doctors. In healthcare, errors are complex and an overlapping effect of error 
appears to contribute to accident trajectory pathways (Reason, 1990).  
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There are many classifications of error in healthcare. Traditionally, knowledge-
based, rule-based and skill-based errors were identified. These active errors were classified 
as cognitive errors (Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1990). The theory of cognition is central to 
the view of error in healthcare. According to Leape (1994, p. 1853) “most errors result from 
aberrations in mental functioning”. While this is argued, the framework adopted by 
healthcare draws on Reason’s (1990) notion that errors are both automatic and unconscious 
acts which at the same time can be conscious and controlled. It is these ideas that underpin 
skill, rule and knowledge-based errors (Rasmussen, 1997). 
Later, technical errors were classified as “flawed execution of correct actions” 
(Runciman et al., 2007, p. 117). Further, errors can be derived from knowledge-based issues 
or from a rule-based issue. Moreover, an error occurs when a person attempts to do the right 
thing but actually does the wrong thing (Runciman et al., 2007). Therefore, to consistently 
apply one classification system to this thesis, an error can be defined as: “the unintentional 
use of the wrong plan to achieve an aim, or failure to carry out a planned action as intended” 
(Runciman et al., 2007, p. 112).  
Esmail (2006) acknowledged error was accepted as an inherent consequence of the 
unpredictable nature of health and this is a defining characteristic of healthcare because 
patient risk cannot always be identified. In this sense the unpredictability in health leads to 
an acceptance of error in practice and also the normalising of practice (Bowie, Skinner, & de 
Wet, 2013, p. 1931). This means common errors become routine, normal and not 
problematic and consequently are not identified. These issues form some of the capricious 
patient safety concerns that contribute to unpredictability in the measure of safety in 
healthcare. While unforeseen patient risks may be unpredictable, it is also problematic in the 
quest to reduce patient harm (Iedema, 2009; Jensen, 2008; Reiman, Pietikäinen, & 
Oedewald, 2010; Vincent, 2009). 
Moreover, within the realm of errors in healthcare, violations are recognised. 
Runciman and colleagues (2007, p. 122) stated that “the boundaries between error and 
violations are by no means clear conceptually or with a particular accident sequence”. This is 
despite the fact that the past 30 years or more have seen the development of numerous error 
classification systems. Dekker (2007a, p. 181) argued that a fundamental flaw with the 
patient safety error classification system was in the categorisation and tabulation of errors in 
an attempt to draw conclusions and develop a philosophical position on safety in health. The 
problem, as Dekker (2007a) perceived it, was the linear and descriptive nature of counting 
and applying a safety rating relating to a numerical value. Dekker (2007a) has claimed that 
comparative error counting provokes the practice of using one count against another count, 
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against another organisation, or against annual error rates. Wilson and Van Der Weyden 
(2005, p. 260) agreed, in stating that “we manage what we measure . . . making a mockery of 
the tenets of continuous quality improvement”. In order to understand the intricacies of 
patient safety data all aspects from medical records, reporting systems, internal datasets and 
other such sources, need to be considered before the success or failure of patient safety can 
be measured. The following section addresses the concept of errors as violations. 
Healthcare Violations 
In healthcare, a violation differs from an error in that a violation involves an element 
of choice in combination with a trade-off (Runciman et al., 2007; Vaughan, 1996). A 
violation is a term used by scholars across a variety of disciplines. In healthcare, violations 
are frequently referred to as intentional non-malevolent acts (Beatty & Beatty, 2004; Reason, 
1995). Runciman et al. (2007, p. 1220) concurred and described a violation as “an act which 
knowingly incurs risk” and provided an example of a clinician not washing hands between 
patients, which increased the risk of spreading nosocomial infection.  
James Reason has contributed significantly to the classification of violations. In 
1990, Reason (p. 195) initially defined a violation as “deliberate — but not necessarily 
reprehensible — deviations from those practices deemed necessary (by designers, managers 
and regulatory agencies) to maintain the safe operation of a potentially hazardous system”. 
In 1995, Reason, (p. 1715) wrote that, “violations are . . . the deliberate deviation of action 
from safe operating procedures”. However, in 1998, Reason and colleagues dropped 
deliberate from the definition stating that “violations are deviations from safe operating 
procedures, standards or rules” (Reason, Parker, & Lawton, 1998, p. 292) 
Mascini (2005) argued that violations were not always blameworthy and that 
tightening enforcement was not always an effective solution. In healthcare, internal 
governances manage rule violations yet it remains unclear to what extent violations can be 
confirmed (Alper, 2009; Bradley et al., 2009). As Alper (2009, p. 752) argued, “a good 
decision may not always be compliance”. Yet, violations have remained the topic of 
extensive research in healthcare (Alper & Karsh, 2009). Regardless of whether the term is 
violation or error, many variables underpin compliant or deviant healthcare practice. Bagian 
(2006 p. 288) argued in relation to systemic deviance in healthcare that: “Procedures and 
techniques used to deal with the same clinical situation can vary not just between institutions 
but from floor to floor and provider to provider”. An example of this is evident in the 
application of the SAC 1 Clinical Incident Implementation Standards (Queensland Health, 
2009a) where mandatory processes may be determined, optional. 
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Latent Errors 
Latent failures are conditions that reside within the organisation that arise from the 
design of the organisation, management decisions and design of procedures to name only a 
few. Reason (2000, p. 395) termed latent errors “resident pathogens” because latent failures 
were hidden within the organisation and might lie dormant for years before triggering an 
incident. In healthcare, latent errors are considered causative and central to error production 
and preventable patient harm. In reports on harm and in the work of Reason (1990), it has 
been concluded that human errors are the result of either active error, which involves the 
human interface within the system, or latent error, which is failure within the system design.  
In other high risk industries, investigations into the Three-Mile Island incident in 
1979, Bhopal in 1984 and the NASA Challenger disaster in 1986 indicated multiplicities of 
mechanisms of error and asserted that operator error was only part of the explanation of 
failures in complex systems. This appears relevant to the complexity of SAC 1 events in 
healthcare. SAC 1 harm has been posited as the result of contributing factors that include 
internal and external, individual and systemic errors (Reason, 1990; Vaughan, 1999). 
Moreover, their view was that latent failures were central to improving safety in healthcare. 
For this reason, RCA focuses on latent failures that initiate organisational vulnerabilities to 
isolate root causes for correction. As Leap pointed out 20 years ago: 
The important point is that successful accident prevention efforts must focus 
on root causes—system errors in design and implementation. . . . Other 
errors unpredictable and infinitely varied, will soon occur if the underlying 
cause is uncorrected. Although correcting root causes will not eliminate all 
errors—individuals still bring varying abilities and work habits to the 
workplace . . . (Leape, 1994, p. 1854). 
Leape (1994) argued that identification of latent errors was complex because each 
stage of system development such as design, resources, training and development of 
operational procedures needed to be addressed. This makes the identification of latent 
failures a challenging prospect given that disasters in the form of SAC 1 events are the result 
of many interface faults that involve multiple points of care. Concepts of blame comprise 
this interface. 
2.2.3 Blame 
Blame has been linked to concealing harm and not learning from harm events (IOM, 
2000). The traditional notion of blame saw the last health professional in contact with the 
patient before the adverse event carry consequences of harm to the patient. Patient safety 
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reforms have attempted to shift these ideas. By design, the conduct of RCA processes shifts 
the focus of analysis from person-centred to latent system failures; to change the social view 
away from blaming people to give primacy to an analysis of faulty systems (British 
Department of Health, 2000). Yet, according to Tamuz, Franchois, & Thomas (2011, p. 38), 
“blame is still in circulation” and this is contextually relevant to challenges facing the RCA 
where no-blame concepts inform the conduct of RCA. In Queensland, the organisational and 
legislative views endorse a concept of no blame where “improving safety is all about 
identifying, understanding and managing risks. To that end, it is import to understand that 
different types of system failures occur in healthcare and how system failures result in harm 
is the focus of an RCA. The problem is that blame, harm and system failures are challenged 
in traditions of accountability and culpability which are addressed through a social judicial 
approach (Dekker, 2007b).  In healthcare these ideas are framed within organisational rules 
that do not assign individual responsibility to a harm event (Queensland Health, 2009). This 
dichotomy is inherent to the complexities of patient safety where SAC 1 harm is considered 
the result of system failures that accumulate from small indiscrete acts that result in 
unintended disaster (Reason, 1995). To improve patient safety and identify errors in the 
workplace that result in patient harm, adverse events in Queensland are known as clinical 
incidents. Clinical incidents are reported in an electronic database to classify harm and these 
are discussed next.  
2.2.4 Clinical Incidents and Reporting 
In April, 2005, the Patient Safety Centre (PSC) was established as an initiative as a 
regulatory agency to improve the safety of health services for patients and clinicians 
(Queensland Parliament, 2005b, p. 863) and provide governance around patient safety. The 
PSC introduced the concept of safety systems where reporting of clinical incidents was 
underpinned by the conceptualisation of human error and harm in healthcare. Safety systems 
were a new way for Queensland Health to think about patient safety.  These ideas included 
safety procedures, reporting harm events and investigating harm and organisational learning.  
The PSC was modelled on the successful American Veterans Affairs program and 
saw the appointment of 25 patient safety officers in Queensland health facilities to establish 
the new clinical incident management curriculum and standardise clinical practices 
(Queensland Parliament, 2005b, p. 863). In Queensland, the establishment of these State 
Government Regulatory Actors (Healy, 2011) formed part of a new comprehensive approach 
to develop regulatory authorities to help lead and co-ordinate patient safety principles and 
marked a significant step in informing patient safety and centralising patient safety in 
Queensland. This meant that the Queensland patient safety agenda saw a wave of new 
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principles, legislative health reform processes, human factor workshops and communication 
concepts launched in Queensland.  
A systems approach was established that drew on organisational accidents where 
harm was an outcome of contributory factors and root causes (Runciman et al., 2007; 
Vaughan, 1999). A formalised reporting programme was progressively introduced called 
PRIME CI. PRIME CI encouraged healthcare workers to report clinical adverse events 
without fear of reprisal. The overall goal of patient safety reforms was to address systemic 
human error without inflicting blame and to improve the safety of patients in care. Thus, a 
clinical incident in the local context was defined as any “event or circumstance which has 
actually, or could potentially, lead to unintended and/or unnecessary mental or physical harm 
to a patient of a Queensland Health service” (Queensland Health, 2009a, p. 7). This meant 
that a clinical incident included both harm and no-harm events. Over the past years hospitals 
“have invested heavily in incident reporting systems” (Board, 2013, p. 521). Queensland is 
no different. 
As noted, in Queensland, clinical incidents are reported on PRIME-CI although not 
all Queensland Health organisations report clinical incidents on this system. While the 
accuracy of harm classifications applied to reporting systems is contentious (Abbasi et al., 
2015) and the quality of incident reporting is negligible (Bagul &Kirkham, 2012) in 
Queensland, a patient safety incident may be into more than one incident type. The class or 
incident type is a descriptive term for a category made up of incidents of a common nature 
and grouped because of shared agreed features such as clinical process/procedure or 
medication/IV fluid incident although each concept is clearly defined and distinct from other 
concepts. Despite these systems, Runciman (2010, p. 3) argued that our systems, while 
essential and desirable, have been slow and have not improved patient safety.  
Reports of harm in Queensland have been complied in five Learning to Action 
reports (as they are commonly referred to) released almost annually. Since 2006 Learning to 
Action report have notified the public of trends in clinical incidents and sentinel events in the 
Queensland public health system. Yet, interpretation of clinical incident data contained 
within the reports is complex. The most recent Learning to Action report points out that 
reporting procedures have altered and influenced clinical incident data (Queensland Health, 
2012). Queensland Health (2012) argued the alterations were the result of technological 
advances and were necessary to accommodate legislative amendments and local and national 
regulatory requirements to improve patient safety. Yet, the variation across the Learning to 
Action reports challenge interpretation of harm rates in Queensland Health and coding 
incidents in practice is recognised (Iedema et al., 2006c). 
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Queensland Health had significant growth in the total number of clinical incidents 
reported between 2007 and 2009, figures that represent harm and no-harm counts. 
Furthermore, the number of SAC 1 events from the period 2006 to 2009 rose from 162 in 
2006 to 318 SAC 1 incidents reported in 2009. The increase in reported incidents, however, 
reflected legislative amendments in 2007 and functional changes to reporting processes. But 
from this time and according to the Patient safety: from learning to action 2012  report 
(Queensland Health, 2012) the rate of SAC 1 harm indicated no change in the “proportion of 
incidents reported with and outcome of death and permanent harm” (Queensland Health, 
2012, p. 20). The incidence of SAC 1 harm rates reported between 2009 to 2011 remained 
static at 0.4%.  
The same report indicated that, in 2010–2011, 79,399 clinical incidents were 
reported. Of these harm and no-harm incidents, 324 incidents or 0.4% comprised SAC 1 
events. The Patient safety: From learning to action IV report (Queensland Health, 2012) 
pointed out the value of voluntary reporting in Queensland, citing an increase in the number 
of reports. The increase was attributed to staff reporting more incidents where ‘no harm’ or 
near misses are recorded, while SAC 1 reported incidents remained stagnant. However, the 
incidence of serious harm, or SAC 1 events, was stationary and unaffected by patient safety 
management principles. In addition, the percentage of SAC 1 harm (0.4%) and percentage of 
SAC 2 harm (harm of a temporary nature that involves an extended length of hospitalisation) 
was 3.2% for 2009–2011 (Queensland Health, 2012). Therefore, the rate of harm is 3.8%, 
the summation of SAC1 and SAC 2 harm.  This excludes minor or no harm SAC 3 events.  
In 2012, the Patient safety: from learning to action 2012 report identified a 
significant growth in voluntary incident reporting showing an increase of 139% since 2005 
(Queensland Health, 2012, p. ix). To that end, Ragan and Carder (1994, p. 24) much earlier 
argued that increased reporting creates administrative pressures where unintentionally, the 
focus is directed at the incident classification rather than what caused an accident. The 
implication was that increased reporting lowers expectations to deliver safety outcomes 
because the safety process becomes associated with reporting rather than solutions. This is 
reflected in the data on ‘harm’ or ‘no harm’ events in Queensland which were not available 
until August 2006. The insertion of no-harm data provided the opportunity to report potential 
hazards and to identify and correct safety issues before they resulted in harm. Yet, this may 
be counterproductive because the focus becomes the classification of harm rather than safety. 
The emphasis on reporting no harm appears consistent with regulatory influences and the 
result of monitor and measure phenomena (Rowley & Waring, 2011). 
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Of relevance, the Patient safety: from learning to action 2012 report (Queensland 
Health, 2012) points to a diminishing trend in the number of SAC 1 events being subjected 
to an RCA. In 2007–2008, 56% of SAC 1 reported clinical events were commissioned to 
RCA. In 2009–2010, 49% of SAC 1 incidents were similarly commissioned and in 2010–
2011, 41% of SAC 1 clinical incidents reported were commissioned to RCA (Queensland 
Health, 2012, p. 18). The most recent data identifies that 38% of SAC 1 events were 
commissioned to RCA (Queensland Government, 2013). The reasons for the decreasing 
trend in the number of RCAs commissioned in Queensland are unclear although the 
Queensland Health (2012) report identifies the following: 
• the same outcome can be achieved using a less expensive HEAPS analysis 
tool;  
• conformity to the legal provisions is restrictive; and  
• RCA methodological application is complex (Queensland Health, 2012, 
p. 18). 
The statistics suggest that not all SAC 1 incidents are analysed through RCA as the 
organisational recommended procedure. It remains unclear why an alternative investigation, 
such as a Human Error and Patient Safety (HEAPS) process or a clinical incident review is 
used or if these processes are consistent with organisational safety expectations. What is 
clear is that routine decisions are made that deviate from legislation and the requirement to 
commission an SAC 1 event to an RCA. For example it is not clear whether SAC 1 clinical 
incidents were reported in the wrong classification to meet the criteria for an alternative form 
of analysis or whether the decision not to commission the SAC 1 event was discretionary. A 
further complication with reporting is that events are underestimated because of under-
reporting and this is a significant concern for healthcare (Weingart, Wilson, Gibberd, & 
Harrison, 2000). 
Nonetheless, clinical incident reporting provides the impetus for the compilation of 
annual patient safety reports. This has established an intricate and challenging framework to 
the workings of Queensland’s reportable data. In 2009, the discrepancy between SAC 1 
numbers recorded on PRIME and the number of national reportable events was identified 
(Queensland Health, 2009; 2010). The discrepancy was the result of definitional differences 
between Queensland Health SAC 1 events and the National Reportable event list. System 
upgrades have challenged the consistency of recording of rates of harm data and complicated 
the interpretation of harm in Queensland healthcare (Queensland Health, 2012). Local 
  
Chapter 2: Contextual Literature Review 35 
reports (Queensland Health, 2012) determined a growth in reporting was partly attributed to 
a positive cultural shift in healthcare (Queensland Health, 2012). The reports advocated a 
blame-free culture where reporting was encouraged and remained voluntary (Queensland 
Health, 2012). However, the number of clinical incidents where harm had occurred and was 
not the expected outcome of healthcare warrants urgent attention and “more needs to be done 
to ensure all patients are protected from harm” (ACSQHC, 2011, p. 15). As the Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) (2011, p. 15) stated, “data 
that measures the extent to which problems are occurring are unavailable or unreliable”. 
More importantly, the freedom and flexibility to report was not only clinically discretionary 
but also based on personal interpretation (Queensland Health, 2009a) which does not 
alleviate staff of pressures of time, workload commitments, computer availability and the 
view that little resulted anyway (Banja, 2010).  
The complexities of adverse incident reporting are challenged (Khorsandi, Skouras, 
Beatson, & Alijani, 2012). In Queensland Health’s reporting system, events may be reported 
as SAC 1 but on coronial review of the death, SAC 1 classification may be overruled by the 
coroner and determined inappropriate because of pre-existing and recognised conditions. The 
paradox in relation to harm data is that at the time of a patient’s unexpected death, a reporter 
cannot be unaware of a pre-existing condition determined by the coroner.  While 
complexities are acknowledged, the notion to improve culture through reporting processes 
remains central to this predicament (Jones, 2014). The social view restricting the reporting of 
events is reporting places individuals at risk both professionally organisationally (Iedema et 
al ., 2006b). Despite this characteristic, reported clinical incidents are rated into three 
distinctive classifications locally. Queensland Health’s harm classification system and 
regulatory documents acknowledge a hierarchy of documents that disseminate from national 
agendas to local healthcare facilities. These are discussed next. 
 
2.3 REGULATORY POLICY 
Clinical incident management in Queensland is informed by national and state-wide 
agendas.  At a state-wide level regulatory requirements are guided by standards, policies and 
procedures.  
2.3.1 National Sentinel Event (NSE) list  
The NSE is a list of recognised healthcare adverse events consisting of eight 
categories of harm, and endorsed by the Australian health ministers (COAG, 2012). Each 
state in Australia conforms to the national sentinel events list to notify the state minister of 
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health of reportable deaths. Yet, each state may manage reportable events in a different way. 
Reportable events are listed in Queensland Health’s incident classification system SAC 1 
harm rating system but are not limited to the NSE list (Queensland Health, 2010b). By way 
of example, a number of clinical incidents are recorded via the Reportable Incident Brief 
(RIB) but these events may not be equivalent to the National Sentinel Events list. To 
represent this, 7 deaths may be reported on the NSE list versus 204 deaths reported on 
Queensland databases. Although these events were considered SAC 1 events, they did not 
form part of the national reporting scheme (Queensland Health, 2012, p. 14). The difference 
between the NSE and Queensland Health’s record of severe adverse events reported through 
the RIB system resides within the description of harm described by the CIMIS (Queensland 
Health, 2009a) SAC rating, which has expanded the reporting definition.  
In Queensland, the conduct of an RCA is organisationally “enabling” (Wakefield & 
Rashford, 2011, p. 18). This means that individual health facilities can choose to conduct an 
RCA according to the legislative provisions (Health Services Amendment Regulation 
(No. 1), 2008; Health Services Regulation, 2002) even though the legislation does not 
conform to Queensland Health’s regulatory documents (Queensland Health, 2009a).  
2.3.2 Legislative documents 
The RCA in Queensland is strictly a confidential document that is protected by 
legislation and prohibits the release and disclosure of information (Health and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act, 2007). Moreover, sections of the RCA report are privileged 
which means that information is not distributed outside the health service (Health Services 
Amendment Regulation, (No.1), 2008). In addition, RCAs in Queensland are 
organisationally regulated by  policy and standards (Health and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act, 2007; Health Services Act, (Qld), 1991; Health Services Amendment 
Regulation (No.1), 2008; Queensland Health, 2009a). These documents inform and establish 
conditions for the conduct of the RCA, operational roles and organisational responsibilities 
and timeframes. 
Queensland Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, Act no.28 of 2007. 
Queensland Parliament passed the Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 
(2007) to introduce a statutory framework for the conduct of RCA to improve patient safety 
in public and private health services and the Ambulance Service. The legislation was 
introduced to meet clinical, organisational and political goals around patient safety in 
healthcare. The Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007, amends the Health 
Services Act, (Qld) 1991 and inserts definitions and the new Part 4B, Root Cause Analysis. 
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Part 4B provides a regulatory framework for the conduct of the RCA (Queensland 
Parliament, 2007a, p. 1761).  
Of relevance, the legislation (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007, 
Health Services Amendment Regulation (No.1), 2008) protected the RCA team from liability 
in the provision of release of information and disclosure clauses. This is viewed a strength of 
the legislation to grant professional RCA teams the freedom to speak-up with fear of 
retribution of ligation. Yet, it was argued in parliament “the new legislation was a complex 
piece of legislation with many clauses” (Queensland Parliament, 2007a, p. 1755). Despite 
the complexity, the legislation was passed with the objective to provide legislative provisions 
around the investigation of healthcare adverse events that enabled clear channels of 
communication without fear of blame or retribution and to learn from error as a quality 
improvement tool. In accordance with the legislation, the research being reported upon here 
complies with the legislative conditions of the Health Services Act (1991), Health and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act, (2007) and the Health Services Amendment Regulation (No. 
1), (2008). The approach to patient safety established legislation that focused on system 
latent failures rather than individual error (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 
2007, s38I). The RCA is legislated within the State for the purposes of reviewing clinical 
incidents and does not form part of the patient clinical record. 
The RCA is defined as a quality improvement technique that explores the chain of 
events responsible for adverse events in order to identify the factors which caused or 
contributed to the event as well as the measures that may be implemented to prevent or 
reduce recurrences of the same type of event (Queensland Health, 2010). Although quality 
activities are important to improve care (ACSQHC, 2012) conceptually safety and quality 
are different in the approach to provide safer care (Sheps & Cardiff, 2011). 
Queensland Health Services Amendment Regulation (No.1), 2008. 
The Regulation (2008) amended the Health Services Regulation (Qld), 2002 by 
inserting a new section, Part 6A. Part 6A of the Regulation (2008) defined the conduct of 
RCA.  The Regulation (Qld) (2008) authorised a range of governance agencies with safety 
and quality functions within Queensland Health to receive RCA reports and the use as a 
quality improvement technique.  
Overall, the RCAs systemic process of analysis was informed by three 
organisational documents.  
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2.3.3 Key Queensland regulatory documents  
The RCA was formally implemented in 2005 to coincide with the opening of the 
Queensland Health Patient Safety Centre in that year. The Patient Safety Centre provided 
governance as the regulatory body to drive the Queensland Health patient safety agenda. In 
this role the Patient Safety Centre produced documents to support the legislation and regulate 
the conduct and application of the RCA. Documents included: a Guide for Root Cause 
Analysis Teams (Queensland Health, 2009b) and Root Cause Analysis Training Reference 
Manual (Queensland Health, 2010) and the CIMIS (Queensland Health, 2009a) to frame 
organisational patient safety directives. These documents were informed by predominate 
legislation noted above: the Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007 and the 
Health Services Regulation, 2002; 2008. 
As such, many documents inform the RCA. In particular, the Queensland Health’s 
Clinical Incident Management Implementation Standard (CIMIS) (2009a) provides 
overarching organisational direction as an framework for “recognising, assessing and 
learning from clinical incidents” (Queensland Health, 2012, p. 4).  
Blameworthy acts are important to identify here. The Queensland Act (2007, s38) 
defined a blameworthy act as an intentionally unsafe act, deliberate patient abuse or conduct 
that constitutes a criminal offence and this is replicated in the CIMIS (Queensland Health, 
2009b).  In view that harm in healthcare is not about an individual but the focus of an 
investigation is about failures within the system, it is important to address conditions that 
surround blame. The 2007 Qld Act also announced to restrict commissioning an RCA where 
there were reasonable grounds to believe the capacity of a person, directly involved in health 
service provision when the reportable event occurred, was impaired by alcohol or other 
drugs. 
Queensland Health, Clinical Incident Management Implementation Standard (CIMIS), 
2009. 
The CIMIS is the Queensland Health operating standard for the conduct of the RCA 
(Queensland Health, 2009a). The CIMIS defined the RCA as “the systematic process for 
analysing serious incidents whereby factors that contributed to an incident are identified” 
(Queensland Health, 2009a, p. 39). Further, the CIMIS provided definitions, patient harm 
consequences, classifications, roles and responsibilities for Queensland Health staff to 
effectively manage clinical incidents and defined blameworthy acts (Queensland Health, 
2009a, p. 2). The CIMIS is a complex document with clearly defined sections to support and 
inform the management of clinical incidents. In the CIMIS the RCA report is defined as:  
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a description of the event, a statement of the factors contributing to the event 
and any recommendations about changes or improvements in a policy, 
procedure or practice to reduce the likelihood of, or prevent the same type of 
event happening again. The RCA report does not include the Chain of Event 
(COE) documents or details of RCA team members (Queensland Health, 
2009a, p. 19). 
In 2008, the CIMIS specified that RCA was mandatory for SAC 1 events with 
certain exceptions. The Patient safety: From learning to action IV report Queensland Health, 
2012 stated that: 
Mental health services may choose to perform an alternative form of analysis 
(such as HEAPS) for suicides in the community. The Queensland Health 
Services Act, 1991 (Qld) specifies that an RCA may not be undertaken in 
circumstances where there is a prima facie blameworthy act (Queensland 
Health, 2012, p. 28).  
In Queensland, clinical incidents have several classifications based on the severity of 
harm. Moreover, incident classification definitions have changed to meet political and 
regulatory conditions and inter-organisational needs. The most significant change occurred 
in the definitions of SAC 1 harm. In 2006, the definition of SAC 1 harm was “death or 
permanent loss of function unrelated to the natural course of the underlying condition” 
(Queensland Health, 2012, p. 23). In 2008, the definition was revised to “death or permanent 
harm which is not reasonably expected as an outcome of health care” (Queensland Health, 
2012, p. 23) to support the focus of patient and family expectations of care. This definition is 
represented in the CIMIS (Queensland Health, 2009a) and supports the legislative 
amendments for the conduct of the RCA as cited in Part 4B of the Health Services Act 
(1991), the introduction of an open disclosure communication process, and an expanded list 
of reportable events under the SAC 1 category. Even though incident classifications are 
considered controversial (Dekker, 2007a), the concept is applied internationally. In 
Queensland, clinical incidents are classified into three distinct Severity Assessment Codes 
(SACs). The classifications and associated actions are defined below: 
1. Severity Assessment Code 1 (SAC 1) is defined when the consequence to 
the patient is “death or likely permanent harm which is not reasonably expected (by the 
treating clinician(s), patient or family) as an outcome of healthcare” (Queensland Health, 
2009a, p. 29). These events are considered significant and as such, a clear and protective 
legislative framework surrounds these events and may include the National Sentinel Event 
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(NSE) list; Health Services Act, (1991); Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act 
(2007); and Health Services Amendment Regulation (No. 1), (2008). Added to this, 
regulatory guidelines are enforced including the CIMIS, (Queensland Health, 2009a) and 
local healthcare policy. 
Following the reporting of an SAC 1 clinical incident on PRIME CI the ‘action’ 
(Queensland Health, 2009a) is clear and mandatory. The directive is notification to the 
Patient Safety Centre using the Reportable Incident Brief (RIB) and any deaths reported to 
the Coroner. The timeframe to report an SAC 1 CI is the next business day or immediately if 
urgent action is likely to be required by the Director General or Health Minister. Analysis of 
SAC 1 incidents is via a mandatory Root Cause Analysis (RCA) with the exception of 
section 8 of the events list, community suicide (Queensland Health, 2009a, p. 29). Clinical 
incidents involving an event that resulted in patient harm or not—but considered a near 
miss—were encouraged to be registered on PRIME CI. The reporter, requested to ‘classify’ 
the severity of the incident in accordance with the Queensland Health incident classification 
system and Health Care Services Act, (1991) cited in the CIMIS (Queensland Health, 2009a, 
p. 26). 
At the discretion of an organisation, some SAC 1 events seek a coronial 
investigation. In these situations, the SAC 1 death rating was excluded from the PSQ dataset 
based on a coronial retrospective review of the death. In such cases, the Coroner has ruled 
that the death was expected because of underlying, unrecognised conditions. The Coroner’s 
ruling on these events does not fit the CIMIS classification (Queensland Health, 2009a). 
Unexpected as the patient’s death may be to the doctors and nurses reporting the event, data 
cleaning prevails in organisational reporting procedures. 
2. Severity Assessment Code (SAC) 2 is defined as an event where temporary 
harm has occurred that was not reasonably expected as an outcome of healthcare. By way of 
example, SAC 2 clinical incidents may include: 
• additional investigations performed; 
• surgical intervention; and 
• procedures involving the wrong patient or body part resulting in temporary 
harm. 
The action required following this type of incident is less regulated and mostly confined to 
the local systemic level. This includes escalation to the local unit manager using local area 
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processes, that is, PRIME CI. A HEAPS analysis is recommended which requires a 
multidisciplinary team approach to review the incident (Queensland Health, 2009a, p. 29). 
The HEAPS analyses are not regulated by state legislation.  
3. Severity Assessment Code 3 (SAC 3) is defined as an event where minimal 
or no harm is reported. These types of harm involve first aid treatment only or no injury. The 
action required following this type of incident is escalation to the unit manager or clinical 
director using local processes (Queensland Health, 2009a, p. 29). Incident classifications 
identify levels of harm and organisational actions are governed by key regulatory documents 
to provide structure and direction to healthcare’s harm events. 
As noted, to support the CIMIS framework, Queensland Health applied terms of 
reference in the form of a Guide for Root Cause Analysis Teams (Queensland Health, 
2009b). In the Guide (2009b), instructions guide the analysis and a breakdown of key issues 
to be covered during the four RCA meetings is provided. Furthermore, the document defines 
“five rules of causation” (Bagian et al., 2002, p. 541) to advise the RCA to explore the 
reasons behind the error, to gain a deeper perspective that moves from human factor issues to 
deeper system issues to inform the root cause. As such, the Guide (2009b) specifically 
defines the systemic analysis. In addition to the Guide (2009b) and the CIMIS (2009a),  a 
Root Cause Analysis Training Reference Manual (Queensland Health, 2010) provides 
learning tools to inform the conduct of Queensland Health’s RCA. The manual 
acknowledges the RCA as a “systematic analysis of factors contributing to clinical incidents” 
(Queensland Health, 2010, p. 3) and theoretical directives that inform the process of doing an 
RCA have been made clear.   Thus far, a comprehensive centralised approach to patient 
safety is applied. The RCA is informed by an international agenda to improve patient safety.  
To this, political reforms have established legislative provisions, set up regulatory authorities 
and created policy to inform RCA.  These social constructs underpin this research.   
During the progress of this research, organisational re-structure caused the 
dissolution of the Patient Safety Centre and de-centralisation is central to the context of 
patient safety in Queensland.  
 
2.4 DE-CENTRALISATION OF PATIENT SAFETY IN QUEENSLAND 
Despite the national curriculum and proposals to improve patient safety in 
Queensland, the Patient Safety Centre in Queensland was disbanded in 2011 in the wake of 
massive organisational financial issues and dishonesty within Queensland Health. The issues 
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were extraneous to the Patient Safety Centre, but the decentralisation of patient safety in 
Queensland was influenced by national policy and changing political leadership. 
Bureaucratic matters of patient safety remain central to public interest and political unrest.  
As such,  the Hon. L Springborg MP, Minister of for Health, declared: 
If there are concerns around patient safety they can be taken to the Health 
Quality and Complaints Commission. The hospitals themselves are also now 
front and centre of their own internal quality and safety processes. We also 
now have national guidelines around health quality (Queensland Parliament, 
Record of Proceedings, July 24, 2013a, p.44).  
De-centralisation has engendered matters of patient safety being passed on to regulatory 
agencies. In 2012 as a result of de-centralisation, Queensland Health was restructured and 
the role of Health and Hospital Services (HHS) was established. Health districts created in 
2005 were abolished and replaced with independent local Health Hospital Boards to manage 
and oversee issues of patient safety and clinical and non-clinical services. The last Learning 
to Action report was published in 2012 and reports of harm are less transparent across the 
State. 
The problem is that since the establishment and then dissolution of the Queensland 
Health Patient Safety Quality Improvement Service (PSQ) formally known as Queensland 
Health’s Patient Safety Centre, matters concerning patient safety in Queensland Health 
appear uninfluenced by Queensland Parliament (Queensland Parliament, 2013b, p. 2597). 
The reason is that concerns of patient safety are directed to individual Hospital Health 
Service (HHS) rather than an overarching regulatory authority. Thus, at the time of writing, 
no principal patient safety governance authority is endorsed in Queensland. Issues of patient 
safety are addressed at each Hospital and Health Service level.  
At a national level, the government supports regulatory bodies such as the Australian 
National Preventive Health Agency, The Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, 
The National Health Performance Authority, the AIHW and the ACSQHC. In addition to 
these agencies, national groups such as Medicare, the Australian Council of Health 
Standards, and Aged Care facilities support the national agenda. At a state level, each health 
facility (Hospital and Health Service) has the discretion to plan, purchase and control the 
management of performance and employment. This sees matters of patient safety managed 
by local safety and quality committees (Health and Hospitals Network and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act, 2012). At the facility or health service level the Health and Hospitals 
Boards Regulation, 2012, Part 6, section 30, appoints each health facility “a patient safety 
  
Chapter 2: Contextual Literature Review 43 
entity and authorised purpose” (Health and Hospitals Network and Other Legislation 
Amendment Regulation (No. 1), 2012, p. 24) and grants provisions surrounding the RCA to 
the health facilities safety and quality committees. Each Hospital and Health Service safety 
and quality committee has the function of “minimising preventable patient harm” although 
this is not clear from annual reports on harm (Health and Hospitals Network and Other 
Legislation Amendment Regulation (No. 1), 2012, p. 25).  
In view of the new legislative requirements, the role of the RCA as a quality 
technique to investigate system causes of harm is under consideration of each healthcare 
service following political reforms in 2011. Furthermore, the functions of the former Patient 
Safety and Quality Service (PSQ) to lead and co-ordinate state-wide patient safety incentives 
have blurred with the formation of another regulatory agency, the Health Service Innovation 
Branch, while issues of patient safety have evolved into regulated accreditation programs led 
by the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care and the Department of 
Health (formerly the Department of Health and Ageing). 
The challenge for this research is that despite the jurisdictions applied to legislation 
and regulations, explicit governance around patient safety is not provided.  Health Reform 
Agreement (NHRA) amendments strengthen patient safety decentralisation while providing 
local discretion in daily clinical operations. It may be that although the RCA is identified as 
an international patient safety technique and supported by legislation, safety is unclear. To 
that end, the following section addresses relevant literature that surrounds healthcare’s RCA.  
 
2.5  THE ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 
The RCA emerged in international literature in the late 1990s (Taitz et al., 2010). 
Yet, Percarpio, Watts, & Weeks (2008) reported that since RCA had been applied to 
healthcare no clinical trials prior to 2007 had been conducted. While Percarpio et al,. (2008) 
specifically addressed literature surrounding RCA framework, a low number of publications 
were returned at that time. A search of the medical literature in Medline and PubMED today 
with search terms ‘healthcare root cause analysis’ returned 256 articles. The number of 
clinical trials since 2007 to 2015 comprised 8 clinical trials and 12 systematic reviews. 
Although publications to address healthcare RCAs have increased, evidence to address the 
conduct of RCA appears is limited. Of 256 articles full texts were read, 35 articles were 
considered eligible that centred on the RCA framework and/or the application or conduct of 
the RCA, articles that involved clinical trials and systematic reviews were included. Two 
articles were excluded as they were not published in English.  
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In 1996, the American Joint Commission announced the conduct of mandatory RCA 
on all sentinel events in accredited American hospitals (Percarpio et al., 2008).  The RCA 
was originally developed within psychology and engineering systems to uncover latent errors 
(Reason, 1990) in high reliability organisations. Since the 1990s many countries have 
formally endorsed the RCA methodology to improve patient safety (Nicolini et al., 2011b; 
Queensland Health, 2010; Taitz et al., 2010) and to help healthcare providers learn from 
clinical errors (Bagian et al., 2002; IOM, 2000; Queensland Health, 2009a). The view is that 
SAC 1 harm events are similar to other organisational disasters where patterns emerge as a 
series of events which, if unattended, result in healthcare death or permanent harm.  
In healthcare, the RCA is an investigative tool to retrospectively analyse events to 
identify systemic causal factors of an event (Percarpio, et al., 2008; Perotti & Sheridan, 
2014). The United States Department of Veterans Affairs National Centre for Patient Safety 
implemented the RCA in 2000 (Bagian, 2002). Following this, healthcare organisations drew 
on these methods to inform the RCA to improve patient safety (Zastrow, 2015) because at 
the time, evidence of the effectiveness of the RCA to improve safety culture in other high 
risk industries was successful (Percarpio et al., 2008; Woloshynowych, Rogers, Taylor-
Adams, & Vincent, 2005; Wu, et al., 2009). Moreover, an RCA focuses on identifying root 
causes as system latent failures (Bagian, 2002) because there is a theory that system failures 
contribute to harm (IOM, 2000).  
The RCA analysis applies a variety of techniques by asking ‘why’ question several 
times to go deeper into the causes of an incident (Rogers et al., 2006).  Studies show that 
multiple system latent failures are identified in RCA investigations (Smith & Raab, 2011; 
Sauer and Hepler, 2013) yet the complexities of organisational accidents defined by Reason 
(1990), make it difficult to understand causes of error to improve patient safety (Lawton, 
Carruthers, Gardner, Wright and McEachan, 2012). To that end, issues that surround the 
shortcomings of the RCA are acknowledged. Reporting of RCA findings has been argued to 
dilute contextual relevant information revealed in RCAs (Cassin & Barach, 2012). 
Percapario et al., (2008, p. 391) determined a criticism of the RCA was the “uncontrolled 
study design and participant biases” where the effectiveness of RCA remains contentious. 
Moreover, problems with the RCA framework have been identified (National Patient Safety 
Foundation, 2015; Percarpio et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2009). Nonetheless, the view is that 
harm is socially constructed (Vaughan, 1999) and that healthcare can benefit from RCA is 
important.  Thus, the RCA framework continues to be applied to investigate adverse events.  
The literature points out that healthcare’s RCA technique is applied to clinical and non-
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clinical environments as an approach to systematically address an issue with variable success 
(Lee et al., 2014; Sadler et al., 2014; Wong et al., 2010). 
The function of the RCA has been noted to “reduce risk of recurrence” but this has 
not been as effective as predicted (Pham, et al., 2010, pg. 186). The literature provides 
evidence of a disjuncture between the rules and the conduct of the RCA (Iedema, Jorm and 
Long, 2006; Card, Ward & Clarkson, 2012). Multiple methods of analysis have been applied 
to the RCA (Iedema, Jorm, and Braithwaite, 2008) including survey’s (Iedema et al., 2006), 
observational research (Nicolini et al., 2011b) and review of RCA case reports (Perotti & 
Sheridan, 2015). Yet, the potential of RCA methodology is “untapped” (Taitz et al., 2010, 
pg. 5). A “review of analysis methods of accident causation” in 2005, concluded that more 
work is needed to develop a wider range of methods and techniques applied to the 
investigation of adverse events in health care supported by more training and experience 
(Woloshynowych et al., 2005b). These articles were drawn upon because it is argued that 
RCA methodology has “limited usefulness” (Cassin & Barach, 2012, p. 102) and more can 
be learned. 
Studies have found that an analysis of clinical incidents are characterised by issues 
that impinge upon the quality and robustness of the RCA report as RCA methodology is 
tested (Dekker 2007b; Nicolini, Waring, & Mengis, 2011a; Percarpio et al., 2008; 
Woloshynowych et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2008). Nicolini et al., (2011a) conducted an 
ethnographic study in the United Kingdom that identified the challenges to translate RCA 
methods into practice. Challenges were acknowledged from establishing teams to finalising a 
report (Nicolini et al., 2001a). Prior to this, Iedema et al. (2006, p. 1605), in a discourse 
analysis, exposed the challenges of clinicians to examine the practices of colleagues in 
developing the RCA. There is little doubt that methods that underpin causal analysis are 
complex (Boyd, 2014). In relation to the constructs that underpin RCA methodology, Waring 
(2007, p. 257) argued the development of root causes was an issue; root causes were rarely 
“developed theoretically or analytically”. Isolating root cause(s) and providing remedies to 
separate a complex set of interactions into singular units was also fraught with problems 
(Nance, 2008; Nicolini et al., 2011a) because the interconnectedness of an incident blurs the 
development of root causes (Wu et al., 2008). Wu et al., (2008) went on to argue that this 
may become lost with a singular root cause that aspires to localise specific outcomes to 
attribute the fault within the system. While other authors argued the difficulty to implement 
recommendations (Card et al., 2012; Perotti & Sherian, 2015; National Patient Safety 
Foundation, 2015). Nance (2008) pointed to the limitations of the RCA in claiming that 
organisational learning and patient safety was inadequate when recommendations were 
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based solely on the root cause rather than addressing contributing factors in conjunction with 
the root cause. Further, Nicolini, et al. (2011a) argued the RCA processes had not improved 
patient safety as they had opposing organisational agendas. One agenda supported a learning 
environment and the other supported a governing and regulation agenda (Nicolini et al., 
2011b).  
Thus, the literature highlights challenges and theoretical problems with RCA 
methods the framework (Card, et al., 2012; Nicolini et al., 20011a; Percarpio et al., 2008, 
p. 391; Wu et al., 2008;).  While processes are acknowledged and similarly applied, safety 
outcomes are hard to determine (Cassin & Barach, 2012).  Latino et al., (2011) asserted that 
a lack of RCA standards and various methodological approaches applied to RCAs 
established that the RCA falls short of providing a robust document. As such, “many RCAs 
are performed incorrectly or incompletely and do not produce useable results” Wu et al., 
(2009, pg. 686). The RCA faces the risk that “the story being told is simultaneously a tale of 
disorder in which the reality of danger masquerades as safety and a tale of order in which the 
reality masquerades as danger” (Weick & Westley, 1996, p. 456).  
Healthcare’s RCA has been subject to international criticism (Nicolini, Waring, & 
Mengis, 2011b); in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency (Wu, Lipshutz, & Pronovost, 
2008); the resource intensive investment in time and in labour (Braithwaite, Westbrook, 
Mallock, Travaglia, & Iedema, 2006); the quality of the RCA (Bagian, King, Mills, & 
McKnight, 2011).  Further, the literature has compared the RCA to other healthcare analysis 
techniques (Shaqudan et al., 2014;  Urswpring & Gray 2010; Smits et al., 2009) and RCA 
has been applied to explicit critical events or settings (Slakey et al., 2014; Tjua etal., 2014; 
Morelli et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2014; Bowie et al., 2013; Wallace et al., 2009). Of relevance 
here is that the success of the RCA is limited because RCA teams can be caught between 
balancing learning from error, mistakes and disaster (Percarpio, et al., 2008) where issues of 
conformity and agreement socially influence the conduct of RCA (Nicolini et al., 2011). 
Significant contributions to RCA literature have dedicated to understanding RCA 
methods to improve the RCA (Bagian et al., 2005; Burroughs et al., 2000; Gosbee & 
Anderson, 2003; Iedema et al., 2006, 2008; McDonald & Leyhane 2005; Pham etal., 2010; 
Smits et al., 2009; Sweitzer & Silver, 2005; Wong et al., 2010;). Despite this, the literature 
exposes a gap. No research has explored the text of original working RCA documents. To 
develop more understanding of the RCA, this research provides a textual analysis of entire 
RCA documents, not reports (Perotti & Sheridan, 2015) from a diverse ranges of SAC 1 
clinical incidents where death or permanent harm have unexpectedly resulted across 
Queensland’s public healthcare facilities.  This approach is unique in an exploration of the 
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content of RCAs to understand more about the language contained in transcripts of strictly 
confidential, highly privileged and legislated RCA documents.  
 
2.6 CONTEXTUAL SUMMARY 
The focus of this chapter has been the contextual literature that surrounds patient 
safety and the RCA and the documents that inform and guide the conduct of the RCA in 
Queensland Health. The literature identified that the RCA, as a patient safety initiative was 
adapted from high risk organisations to investigate clinical errors and is informed by 
knowledge, legislation and regulated by governing agencies nationally and state-wide. The 
approach aims to reduce the recurrence of harm in healthcare (British Department of Health, 
2000). Legislative conducts that inform the conduct of the RCA contain information 
disclosure provisions, protection from civil liability and protection against reprisals. In 
Queensland although the RCA is mandatory for SAC 1 events, legislative conditions allow 
for local authorities to determine another type of analysis and an RCA may be overturned.  
Despite the widespread use of the RCA and the diversity of literature surrounding the 
concept of patient safety, the effectiveness of the RCA to improve patient safety remains 
questionable (Wu et al., 2008).  
In Queensland, the RCA has been endorsed since 2005 and is widely applied 
throughout Queensland healthcare facilities and is viewed as a quality technique. 
Queensland’s RCA applies similar processes, the 5 Whys, to the United Kingdom, America 
and other parts of Europe, such as Scandinavia. The intent of RCA in healthcare is that 
organisations will learn from adverse events and improve patient safety using a systems 
analysis approach. The central concepts of the RCA are to expose causes of the event, or 
errors and develop recommendations to prevent another, similar incident from occurring. 
This is achieved by applying a systemic approach to identify active errors, (the person) and 
latent failures (the system) (Reason, 2000) as causal chains using principles of human factors 
and systems analysis (Queensland Government, 2010; Queensland Health, 2009a). 
Moreover, the approach is designed to shift the focus of harm away from individual error 
(the sharp end) onto failure within the system as a result of complexity and interactivity of 
people working in complex systems (Perrow, 1986; Reason, 2000). These ideas inform 
patient safety and seek to change the way healthcare providers think about harm and error.  
There is national and international expectations that the RCA would investigate 
error, learn from harm and improve patient safety. Yet despite widespread use of the RCA 
(Bagian et al., 2002; Boyd, 2015; Cater et al., 2014; Grissinger, 2013; Hettinger et al., 2013; 
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Iedema et al., 2008; Iedema, Jorm, Long, et al., 2006; Mengis & Nicolini, 2010; Nicolini et 
al., 2011b; Perotti & Seridan 2015; Percarpio & Watts, 2013; Wu et al., 2008) there is 
concern about the use of the RCA as a systemic method to improve patient safety and reduce 
advoidable patient harm. The literature points to noteworthy challenges (Nicolini & Waring, 
2011) that exist in the process of doing an RCA. Moreover, making sense of the RCA has 
been described as a “wicked problem” (Cassin & Barach, 2012, p. 103) because there is no 
easy fix due to the unpredictable and complex social context of healthcare. Thus, 
complexities associated with the RCA process are operationally and organisationally derived 
(Iedema et al., 2008; Iedema, Jorm, Braithwaite, Travaglia, & Lum, 2006; Iedema, Jorm, 
Long, et al., 2006; Nicolini et al., 2011b; Taitz et al., 2010).   The problem is that the 
literature supports the application of RCA to healthcare settings, the dynamic nature of harm 
and the absence of sustainable results to support organisational learning and improve patient 
safety (Iedema et al., 2008; Nicolini et al., 2011a) leaves uncertainty around the technique. 
More research is needed to understand why a systems approach that guides and informs the 
RCA and is internationally endorsed is so contentious. 
A gap exists in the literature, despite research into the application and conduct of the 
RCA, an analysis of the text of RCAs has not been performed.  More specifically, no 
research has examined Queensland Health’s RCAs and moreover no research has been 
conducted on RCA documents in their original format where the content is strictly legislated 
and privileged. It is important to note that RCA documents that comprise the research sample 
here have not undergone editing. Nor have the content or sections of the RCA been 
disqualified from the research in any way.  For the first time, this research sets out to explore 
rich contextual language that comprises RCA documents including the highly secured 
sections, the chain of event documents 1 and 2, to understand more about the RCA from the 
inside out. Thus, the highly controlled language adds to existing knowledge to understand 
more about the complexities of the RCA to improve patient safety. 
In closing this Chapter, in the event that patient death or permanent harm 
unexpectedly results, harm is the result of systemic failure. These events are SAC 1 clinical 
incidents and are disasters; the result of system failures not professional misconduct 
(Queensland Health, 2009). The view is that harm occurs when organisational defences are 
not in place. Barriers, otherwise known as organisational defences, are designed to ‘catch’ 
errors.  In the event of patient harm, organisational defences do not align and errors slip past 
one organisational defence after another. As a consequence, errors escape being ‘caught’ and 
an error trajectory forms causing patient harm (Reason, 1990). When patient is harmed in a 
serious way, an RCA is commissioned. An RCA is compiled by working groups of 
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healthcare professionals that form partnerships to determine cause(s) of harm and improve 
patient safety.  These ideas support a sociological perspective that informs the theoretical 
landscape. The theoretical view presented in the following Chapter draws on Vaughan’s 
(1999) systemic failure and disaster theory to provide structure and direction to the research.  
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 Theoretical Perspective Chapter 3:
The literature in the previous chapter identified how political processes, legislation 
and governance agencies interact with healthcare organisations in an effort to improve 
patient safety. The relationship of these factors shapes and influences the provision of patient 
safety. Significantly, the literature identified a clear relationship between the environment 
(governances, policies and legislation), the organisation (healthcare facilities) and 
individuals (healthcare workers and patients). These theoretical ideas inform this research. In 
particular, Vaughan (1996, 1999) argued the social dynamics of how disasters manifest in 
organisations which initiated the theoretical notion of normalisation of deviance. Briefly, 
normalisation of deviance defined how working patterns over time eroded organisational 
safety boundaries and opposed policy. Here, the concept of normalisation of deviance is 
identified as system failure and disaster theory. These ideas are explored in this chapter as it 
draws the theoretical framework of this research. 
The purpose of this chapter is to build a theoretical argument around the concept of 
system failure and disaster as it relates to harm and patient safety. In so doing, the theoretical 
foundation draws on Vaughan’s (1999) examination of system failures and disaster theory to 
build new theoretical propositions around the concept of patient safety. The chapter 
addresses patient safety as an integrated field that does not focus on the failings of 
individuals, but looks at the constructs of healthcare that influence patient safety.  
This chapter addresses Vaughan’s conceptualisation of system failure and disaster 
(1999). The ideas are grounded in the assumption that relationships exist within 
organisations and pressures are exerted between domains in the organisation that cause 
accidents to happen. For Vaughan (1999), these terms are causal domains because cause and 
effect pressures are exerted. Each causal domain exerts a co-dependant relationship on the 
other and within each, contributory elements exist. Internal and external forces exert 
pressures on the dynamics of co-dependent relationships and this disrupts the equilibrium. 
The disruption, if not attended to, manifests as a disaster. In healthcare, SAC 1 events are 
identified as the result of a series of factors that result in unexpected permanent harm or 
death. It is asserted that these ideas inform the healthcare relationships that cause accidents 
to happen. 
Section 4.1 provides a brief overview of the theory of system failure and disaster as 
it relates to the RCA in this research. The section establishes the context of system failure 
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and disaster and then turns to Vaughan’s causal ideas as the basis for preliminary theoretical 
argument. Section 4.2 situates healthcare within the context of Vaughan’s a priori 
categories, the environment, the organisation and the individual, by identifying patient safety 
elements as they relate to the categories. The ideas in each category are not exhaustive, but 
considered central to the influences of patient harm and the RCA. Section 4.6 introduces the 
theoretical argument identifying key factors that influence patient safety within Vaughan’s 
a priori categories to inform the emerging theory. Finally, section 4.7 draws on relevant 
contextual literature and Vaughan’s system failure and disaster theory to summarise the 
chapter. 
 
3.1 SYSTEM FAILURE AND DISASTER 
The concept of system failure and disaster argued that “linking a known theory or 
concept to patterns” (Vaughan, 2004, p. 319) enables the construction of new theoretical 
propositions. From this perspective, Vaughan (2004, p. 315) created “analogical theorising” 
as a method to compare events and/or actions to various social settings and to inform the 
development of a generalisable theoretical explanation.  
The theoretical journey of this research began with the assumption that SAC 1 harm 
disasters were the result of interactions between people working in systems (Reason, 2000). 
This is complex and challenging because incremental patterns of change occur within 
systems that subtly erode safety margins and this is called normalisation of deviance. To 
explore this concept, Vaughan (1996) articulated the term normalisation of deviance in her 
1986 work on the Challenger disaster. Normalisation of deviance explained how people who 
worked together developed patterns that blinded them to the consequences of their actions. 
These actions incrementally expanded normative boundaries. Small changes created new 
behaviours that were slight deviations from the normal course of events. Gradually, the new 
actions became the norm, providing a basis for accepting additional deviance. No rules were 
violated, there was no intent to harm and yet disaster was the result.  
More importantly where normalisation of deviance is concerned, the existence of a 
causal relationship “explained how things go wrong in socially organised settings” 
(Vaughan, 1999, p. 271) and made clear the association between the environment, the 
organisation and individuals to safety and disaster. What this means is, forces create new 
work patterns that form and organisational safety boundaries erode. In Vaughan’s (1996) 
work it was argued the dominant culture, rather than the deviant acts, expanded normative 
boundaries that contributed to the 1986 Challenger disaster. As such, normalisation of 
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deviance as a socially constructed phenomenon, forms within the culture of organisations 
and develops when social networks create new working cultures that progressively erode 
existing organisational processes. This was more clearly revealed in Vaughan’s (1999) work 
entitled “The dark side of organizations: Mistake, misconduct, and disaster” where reasons 
for these actions are rooted in sociological theories and concepts of routine non-conformity 
(Vaughan, 1999, p. 274).  
Thus, concepts that underpin “The dark side of organizations: Mistake, misconduct, 
and disaster” (Vaughan, 1999) provide an explicit theoretical base to expand the knowledge 
that surrounds healthcare’s RCA. As such, Vaughan’s theoretical ideas are considered 
valuable to this study because system failure and disaster theory provides a strong 
sociological link to the concept of preventable harm and informs the analytical approach.  
In this research, system failure and disaster are  generalisable concepts (Vaughan, 
2004, p. 342) that bring focus to an aspect of healthcare that is highly sensitive and 
controversial, to help address issues of significant preventable patient harm. While harm is 
rarely ever intended, it is essential to learn from error and to learn from healthcare accidents 
(IOM, 2000). Drawing on this analogy that takes a positive perspective from something 
negative such as patient harm events, Vaughan (1999) termed this phenomenon the dark 
side/bright side dichotomy. For healthcare, this means that the delivery of healthcare and 
patient outcomes have a bright side, where organisational processes and patient outcomes are 
optimal. The dark side is where avoidable patient harm occurred. The bright side/dark side 
principle in this research is fundamental to the constructs of healthcare avoidable harm. 
From this perspective and with cultural change, the expectation is that local organisational 
goals will reduce harm, the impetus for the research draws on Vaughan’s concepts as an 
analytical lens to explore the complexities of preventable patient harm as manifested in the 
RCA.  
The idea of unintended harm and the recurrence of serious events following 
thorough reviews and the implementation of strategies, training and education (Noble & 
Pronovost, 2010; Runciman, 2010) is concerning. Traditionally, where error had occurred, 
healthcare had adopted frameworks grounded in social psychology (Reason, 1990) when 
identifying factors that produced human error. Yet, these processes have been ineffective in 
improving patient safety and lowering harm counts in healthcare. Waring (2007c) argued 
that while the practice of normalising risk was a recent addition to healthcare literature, 
mainstream research needed to abolish the myopic focus and “broaden the analytical lens . . . 
for safety improvement[s] that extend beyond those that directly shape individual or group 
behaviour” (Waring, 2007c, p. 257). Waring (2007b) argued that harm, while not an 
  
Chapter 3: Theoretical Perspective 54 
intentional act, was a socially constructed process that stifled the plan to improve patient 
safety.  
According to Vaughan (2004), health professionals appeared to justify deviations 
from practice as necessary and not opposed to moral and ethical clinical discretion. This 
means that routine behaviours that intentionally defy clinical rules and regulations are 
justifiably condoned for the sake of the patient. An example is the failure to re-position a 
patient. From a systemic perspective, one failed re-positioning procedure does not warrant an 
organisational issue. However, as Vaughan (1999) identified, incremental working shortcuts 
become routine and organisationally systemic and normalised over time. In the case of 
failing to re-position a patient, these actions inevitably jeopardise patient safety, causing 
harm and sometimes death. Pressure injury prevention measurement counts reflect this 
phenomenon (Farmer, 2010). Nonetheless, reasons for this type of systemic deviance remain 
mostly unknown and represent one example of how frequency of deviant practice escalates 
and becomes so great that it is overseen and accepted as normal and routine. Thus, it is 
systemic in nature. Furthermore, concealment of work practices that do not comply with 
organisational policy and unsafe acts is considered deviant in healthcare, although not 
intentional, in nature (Banja, 2010; Runciman et al., 2007, p. 122). More recently, the term 
“deviantly innovative” (Rowley, 2011, p. 95) has been introduced to explain how healthcare 
promotes clinical autonomy, acknowledges professional identities, and generates new ideas 
that oppose organisational policy/guidelines. The idea of non-compliance to regulatory 
provisions is a socially constructed issue and this will be relevant to this research. The 
implication is that systemically unintentional acts involve human error that are 
organisationally condoned and influence SAC1 events. The result has been despite attempts, 
little attention or urgency was given to efforts to restructure the situation until disaster occurs 
(Bagian, 2006 ; Banja, 2010; Mascini, 2005; Vaughan, 1999).  
In support of the IOM’s sociological view and the notion that harm can be reduced 
(IOM, 2000), Vaughan’s theoretical explanation of system failure and disaster is not only 
relevant but significant to patient safety. The issue of preventable SAC 1 harm is considered 
systemic and mostly unchallenged by current theoretical ideas and remains obscure while the 
cost to society, risk to the organisation and organisational risk to employees as well as the 
public has been noted in the literature (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; 
Vaughan, 1999). Thus far, the social characteristics of healthcare systemic failures and how 
these are addressed through RCA remains unexplored.  
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3.1.2 Causal Domains 
At the beginning of this section Vaughan’s (1999) causal domains, the environment, 
the organisation and the individual, were identified as central constructs to system failure 
and disaster. In this research, the causal domains theoretically inform the structure and 
direction of the research and are identified as a priori categories. In healthcare, this research 
assumes that these a priori categories support a co-dependent relationship between the 
environment, the organisation and healthcare workers exerted on healthcare’s patient safety 
concepts and the RCA, but little is known about this relationship. As such, these categories 
provide a systemic level of analysis and are considered central to promoting change and 
improving patient safety (Longo, Hewett, Ge, & Schubert, 2005). Each category is informed 
by the next and is inter-connected thus, a blurring of distinction emerges (Vaughan, 1999).  
The a priori categories theoretically inform the research in several ways. First, the 
categories provide a frame to the research. Second, they provide an analytical lens and third, 
the categories, by definition, sort elements of patient safety that are central to the RCA and 
harm in healthcare into more manageable groupings for theorising. Each a priori category is 
defined next. It is important to note, that although the a priori categories are individually 
defined, each category is co-dependent and not mutually exclusive. A relationship is exerted 
between each. Moreover, not only does the relationship of the a priori categories contribute 
to system failure and disaster (Vaughan, 1999), the categories provide systemic levels of 
analysis to explore the function of the RCA to SAC 1 events.  
The environment of organisations 
According to Vaughan (1999), less was known about environmental factors than 
about the organisation or individual cognitive actions. Ironically, the same paradox featured 
within healthcare, with literature pointing out that research had focused on individuals and 
providers of healthcare (Kaissi, 2006), with less focus on the system (Sutcliffe, 2011) and 
less again on environmental factors (Healy, 2011).  
The environment includes settings of “political, competitive, regulatory and cultural 
environments” (Vaughan, 1999, p. 293). Thus, the definition herein asserts that the 
environment comprises networks and their social inter-organisational relationships such as 
the political context, economic and legislative conditions, and regulatory agencies, 
demographic, ecological and cultural conditions (Vaughan, 1999, p. 275). The environment 
comprises the macro-system in which healthcare operates and comprises the physical world 
that surrounds healthcare. These constructs are relevant and consistent to the healthcare 
environment. 
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The organisational characteristics (structure, processes, tasks): 
The organisation is a complex system (Perrow, 1986) where interactions between 
system parts occur. Within an organisation, relationships exist between the structure, process 
and tasks. While each aspect may operate independently, if any of the elements in an 
organisation become inefficient or improper, an adverse outcome results.  
Vaughan acknowledged that more is known about process than structure (1999, 
p. 285). Processes are generally informed by national and local environments that translate 
the delivery of actions into the organisation in the form of structured processes. Tasks are the 
skills of individuals necessary to do the job (Vaughan, 1999, p. 291). In this thesis actions 
are accumulative and with repetition have the possibility of compounding and generating a 
mistake. 
The individuals 
In this category the Individual refers to people and their actions and does not draw 
on Vaughan’s (1999) notion of cognition and choice as level of analysis. This is due to the 
design of the research as a document analysis rather than decision making processes that 
underpin methods of cognition and choice. In the Individual category social interactions of 
people are the focus that comprise the RCA team; a group of 4 to 5 healthcare staff members 
to investigate the event and the patient, the victim of the harm. The sociological view here is 
that harm is the outcome of complex social interactions from multiple levels within the 
healthcare system. Thus, actions of individuals which includes the patient, informs the social 
context of harm in the Individual category. From this view, Vaughan pointed out that the 
individual interprets situations, which involves a sense of flexibility that may dispute 
organisational agendas.  
The thesis drew on these conceptual definitions to sensitise the researcher to the data 
and to explore the interconnections between the environment, organisation, and the 
individual. The purpose was to determine whether the social interconnectedness of the 
concepts was taken into account in the RCA process.  
Vaughan’s idea of expanded normative boundaries, work routines, rule non-
compliance, and disaster, appear ignored in healthcare and yet are central issues in 
understanding the tensions and complexities around patient safety and SAC 1 harm events. 
In addition, Vaughan argued that mistake rather than misconduct contributed to the space 
shuttle Challenger tragedy. There are obvious parallels with the view posed in the IOM, 
(2000) report that error can be prevented.  
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The above has briefly outlined the notion of system failure and disaster as it relates 
to healthcare and has defined the a priori categories. The next section applies Vaughan’s 
three theoretical categories to healthcare’s organisational approach to identify the social 
dynamics of patient safety and the interrelationship of the categories.  
 
3.2 SITUATING HEALTHCARE WITH VAUGHAN’S A PRIORI 
CATEGORIES 
System failure and disaster theory provides a sensitising lens to explore patient 
safety documentation. From this perspective, the thesis asserts that more can be learned from 
healthcare processes designed to mitigate harm. 
As noted, this research draws on the work of Vaughan (1999) “The dark side of 
organizations: Mistake, misconduct, and disaster” where a social connection between the 
environment, the organisation and individual factors explained how things go wrong in 
organisations. The underpinning idea is that everything interacts with everything else. These 
ideas frame this research and are consistent with healthcare’s view of error and adverse 
events and the conceptual ideas that guide the RCA. As noted, the environment, the 
organisation and the individual are sensitising, and provide a way of organising the data in 
this research. Thus, the theoretical categories are a priori categories and are more than an 
analytical lens.  
The theoretical a priori categories of the environment, organisational structure, 
process and task, and the individual, provide organising elements around which the RCA is 
analysed and are systemic levels of analysis and are subtle enough to explore a connection 
and a relationship in and between each category. In the next section 3.3, the theoretical 
categories are addressed in reverse order because information on how the environment 
influences healthcare remains scarce (Vaughan, 1999). It is anticipated, when building on 
theory, as information is gathered from established sources that inform healthcare’s approach 
to patient safety, that new ideas will emerge to establish a connection between the categories 
and developing theory.  
This research exposes this idea by examining healthcare’s systemic relationship to 
the RCA to understand more about patient safety. The purpose is to identify the socially 
organised constructs that inform investigations into patient harm and the extent to which 
everything interacts with everything else (Vaughan, 1999). This research has drawn on the 
notion that in healthcare, the structure is informed by dominant groups such as political and 
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legislative, regulatory, medicine, nurses, unions and managers that apply methods of control 
and state-wide directives to inform organisational structure.  
 
3.3 THE INDIVIDUAL 
In this section, the individual refers to health professionals who work in healthcare 
facilities. These are employees of Queensland Health. In addition, the individual category 
refers to the patient and patient consequences because SAC 1 harm involves the patient and 
this information cannot be excluded. In this category, individual characteristics expose 
human error as a causal factor to harm in healthcare (IOM, 2000). To that end, the notion of 
error and harm is theoretically situated to inform the research.  
Error and Harm 
The development of the theory of patient harm originated within error and systems 
and complex organisational approaches designed to minimise patient harm (Reason, 1990). 
As noted, the Hippocratic Oath (Latin trans. 1595) called for Greek physicians to “Primum 
non nocere” or first, to do no harm (North, 2002). Today, this is a central tenet of patient 
safety principles (Flin, 2007). There is little doubt that issues of human error contributed to 
preventable deaths centuries ago and that the death of a patient instigated learning and the 
sharing of knowledge. However, in the contemporary context the Hippocratic Oath contains 
an element of irony: while healthcare providers have no intention to cause harm, over 300 
patients die or are permanently harmed annually in Queensland (Queensland Health, 2012). 
Furthermore, and regardless of the Hippocratic Oath’s long history, patient harm and human 
error have only recently been publicly acknowledged (Vincent, 2010). Since the release of 
the IOM report (2000) and the Australian Safety and Quality Health Care Study in 1995 on 
iatrogenic harm (Wilson et al., 1995), considerable resources have been allocated 
internationally to raise awareness of factors that underpin human error in the workplace, 
reduce harm and improve patient safety. The work of James Reason (1990), the most 
frequently applied taxonomy of human error in healthcare, described two categories of error, 
active and latent, which will be addressed later in this chapter.  
Added to the concept of error, the development of new health technologies prompted 
new processes for reporting and escalating incidents, new legislative provisions for analysis 
of patient harm events and the establishment of simulation units to support clinical 
application. This position has evoked a situation where harm in healthcare is not intentional 
but represented as an unfortunate result of error and supports the philosophical notion of a 
“just culture” (Marx, 2001).  
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As a result, patient safety has not improved because the focus has been on “provider 
and patient factors” rather than organisational system factors. However, it has been argued 
that there has been an over-reliance on reducing error which has prevented the progress of 
patient safety (Kaissi, 2006, p. 292). Vaughan posited that error was systemic and “not 
anomalous events” (Vaughan, 1999, p. 298) although notions of rationality and behaviours 
were integral to the conduct of the workforce and unanticipated outcomes. Vaughan’s 
argument was that individuals exert socially co-dependent relationships within an 
organisation. This means, as pressures were applied, the workforce was influenced in such a 
way that work was modified and old ways progressively eroded as subtle new ways of 
working emerged. Despite the recognition of the challenges in the application of error 
management safety models (Reason, 2000), the notion of the individual as an inter-
dependant element within the organisation was central to uncovering more about preventable 
harm and patient safety.  
 
3.4 THE ORGANISATION 
In this category, the organisation is Queensland’s public healthcare facilities. Within 
the organisation, patient safety draws on a number of theoretical and conceptual ideas that 
guide and inform the RCA in Queensland. These perspectives are important because disaster, 
that is, SAC 1 harm, is a systemically generated “by-product” of the characteristics of the 
system (Vaughan, 1999, p. 274). Moreover, the system is informed by different components 
and these comprise the social structure of healthcare. The problem is that unexpected 
consequences like patient harm are counterproductive to the system expectations (Merton, 
1968) and this is central to the theoretical ideas here. To that end, different theoretical 
components of the system are identified next. The research is informed by these theoretical 
ideas.  
The IOM report 
The IOM report advocated several sociological models to improve medical error and 
the safety of healthcare and acknowledged Vaughan’s ideas as significant to the area (IOM, 
2000). It was argued in the report (IOM, 2000) that aviation epitomised a high-risk industry 
and therefore the high reliability of contributions from that area were legitimately applied to 
healthcare. In Queensland however, high-reliability concepts are not clear in regulatory 
documents that frame the RCA.  Nonetheless, the notion that safety is a collective view and 
that standardisation as an approach to improve safety is acknowledged in healthcare’s key 
RCA documents. 
  
Chapter 3: Theoretical Perspective 60 
Returning to the theoretical perspectives, the IOM report recommended that the 
sociological perspectives of Charles Perrow and cognitive psychologist James Reason should 
underpin approaches to the mitigation of medical error and improvement of unsafe care and 
these are addressed shortly. First, “To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System” 
(IOM, 2000) notified the public of human error, systems and safety by etching the title into 
the readers’ psyche: The focus of the report was to reduce harm by 50%, remove individual 
blame by re-assigning the focus from the individual to the system and convert the culture of 
blame into a culture of safety (Jensen, 2008). Thus, the new approach would transform 
healthcare into an “interdependent system” (Jensen, 2008, p. 311).  
The IOM report proposed several recommendations on the issue of medical error 
and unsafe care. One recommendation was to learn from error and to improve the system to 
prevent similar events from recurring (IOM, 2000). A systems approach framed the new 
patient safety agenda that asserted to “modify conditions that contribute to errors” (IOM, 
2000 p. 49). However, Jensen (2008, p. 311) argued the IOM report contained a paradox 
where there was a deficit in translating knowledge into clinical practice. Since the report 
(IOM, 2000), the magnitude of patient safety and “unsafe care” (Jha et al., 2010, p. 42) in 
healthcare has raised public awareness and become an international healthcare priority 
(McGinnis, 2011; Nicolini et al., 2011b; Rowley & Waring, 2011; Runciman et al., 2007; 
Sutcliffe, 2011). Yet, although these processes have superficially attended to matters of 
organisational safety, they have not attended to the systemic reality of avoidable SAC 1 harm 
rates and they have conceptually confounded quality and safety principles (Cantor, 2002; 
Jeffs et al., 2010).  
Goals proposed in the report (IOM, 2000) aimed to understand more about errors in 
the workplace; to develop reporting practices accompanied by a non-punitive system for 
reporting; and to implement a culture of safety practices into healthcare (Clancy, 2009). The 
important underpinning principle was that harm was the result of shortcomings of system 
inadequacies rather than the blaming of an individual (Leape, 2009). That a reduction in 
preventable patient harm has not been achieved is, Jensen argued (2008, p. 311), because the 
conceptual structure of the IOM report had been lost. According to Leape (2009, p. 2), the 
difficulty resided in the magnitude of the required system change in that “systems include 
almost all of the processes and methods we use to organise and carry out virtually everything 
we do – whether simple or complex”. Moreover, it was argued that the slow progress to 
reducing avoidable patient harm was attributed to the complex environment of healthcare 
(Clancy, 2009).  
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Nonetheless, overcoming the difficulties in meeting the IOM targets remains the 
goal aspired to. The IOM report has had a beneficial impact on the public by raising 
awareness that medical error occurs and of the previously undisclosed of rates of harm that 
occur in healthcare. Further, the IOM report represents a sociological perspective (Perrow, 
1986; Reason, 1990; Vaughan, 1996) on developing a safer healthcare system. The difficulty 
is that the collective knowledge of patient safety including human error, latent error and 
expanded normative boundaries are lost in translation because the efforts to reduce human 
error have been focused on the individual rather than failures of the system (Kaissi, 2006). 
As Jensen (2008) pointed out, the issues of translation could be found in the IOM report. The 
human aspect of error could be ignored or excluded in the report because the report 
announced that the amount of error could be reduced which created a dichotomy between the 
ability to reduce harm and the assumption that human errors could not be eliminated. This 
set up a misunderstanding between the concepts of human error and the causality of harm 
and these constructs are relevant to this research. Added to this, Sagan (1994) argued that the 
ongoing establishment of regulatory agencies and the progression of the politics of blame 
supported this ambiguity or tension. A similar organisational course has progressed in 
Australia. The Wilson et al. (1995) Quality in Australian Health Care Study has been 
instrumental in moving the concept on, giving status to patient safety in Queensland (Wilson 
et al., 1995). Yet, the continuance of avoidable harm remains a challenging issue. What 
follows is an exploration of prevailing theoretical perspectives and these are components that 
inform the research and the area of patient safety and the RCA.  
Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 1986) 
It is assumed that the prevailing organisational view in healthcare, traced to the IOM 
report, draws on Perrow’s (1986) Normal Accident Theory. In Perrow’s work, the concept of 
Normal Accident Theory evolved from examining “risky technologies” (Sagan, 2004, p. 17) 
and did not specifically focus on healthcare. The IOM report, in pursuing the challenge for 
system change, embraced Perrow’s theory, amongst others. The theoretical framework not 
only provided leverage to the report by explaining the concept of error in systems, but 
moved the traditional medical model to one that was more organisationally centred and 
theoretically informed.  
Charles Perrow is an organisational macro-level sociologist and brings knowledge 
on how the social context of organisations influences individual behaviour (Sagan, 1994, 
p. 230). Briefly explained, Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory asserts that organisations are a 
set of complex and interactive systems involving tight coupling and high interdependence. 
From Perrow’s perspective, accidents are considered the inevitable result of a set of complex 
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socio-technical systems, or tight coupling, that do not operate independently of one another, 
but are interactively complex (Perrow, 1986). Tight coupling refers to the amount of 
dependence that the system components exert on each other (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006). The 
tight coupling and co-dependence means there is a high susceptibility for latent error. This 
means that system failures may be unforeseen. As such, incremental incidents evolve into 
catastrophes. In addition, the system components are interactive to a point where the 
collaborative effect is unexpected, unplanned and cannot be seen (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006). 
In this view, Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 1986) asserts that as events accumulate it is 
inevitable that an accident will unfold.  
Tamuz and Harrison (2006, p. 1658) argued that although hospitals are complex they 
are also loosely coupled. Loose coupling occurs when actions are taken before events unfold 
enabling problems to be identified and interventions put in place before a tragedy develops. 
Furthermore, they argue that in contrast to high reliability, hospitals are not considered 
“cohesive cultures of reliability” because many levels of cultures and subcultures exert 
differentiated pressures on the system and this means that safety is compromised by 
conflicting social expectations (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006). Importantly, this is an unfolding 
argument in this research. 
Sagan (2004, p. 16) argued that Perrow’s (1986) postulating of tightly coupled 
complex systems had influenced how organisations think about safety and accidents. 
However, Sagan (2004) went on to argue that to know how much Normal Accident Theory 
influenced safety remained unidentified. The challenge in healthcare is to unravel the 
complexity of adverse events caused by the organisations linear construct and issues of tight 
coupling (Perrow, 1986). The irony of this is that in a perfect world, healthcare is highly 
ordered, planned, structured and sequential and this is one aspect of tight coupling. On the 
other hand, the multi-layered influences involved in the provision of healthcare are complex 
and sometimes breakdowns will occur unexpectedly (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006). Added to 
this, another feature of healthcare’s tight coupling is that the system is characterised by 
centralised systems or governances, with performance measures, standards and processes. 
Or, in other words the system is firm as inputs and outputs are monitored. In this system, 
Perrow (1986) asserted that safety features were designed to facilitate the principals of 
human error. This supported Reason’s notion (1990) of people working in systems.  
In Queensland, there is an implicit notion that Perrow’s (1986) framework underpins 
policies around the RCA because of the emphasis on organisational processes and the human 
element within complex systems. However, the principle tenet of system safety in healthcare 
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in Queensland is informed by Reason’s (1990) system/person approach. This approach was 
adapted from the aviation model and is addressed below.  
Aviation model in healthcare  
The aviation model was endorsed within the IOM report (IOM, 2000). The idea 
behind endorsing the aviation model is complex but draws on the notion that healthcare 
safety is an area of high risk where safety was complex because risk was high, indeterminate 
and highly public. The parallel between aviation and healthcare is that complex systems are 
comparable and harm is not predictive. The departure is that healthcare is not akin to 
aviation organisations because aviation safety is achieved as human error is eliminated due 
to compliance with policies. In healthcare, it is argued safety draws on principles that give 
primacy to the individual (Kaissi, 2006) with little consideration to systemic latent factors. 
Despite this, aviation principles have been adopted to help healthcare workers learn from 
harm and recognise human factor elements. This has done little to improve patient safety. 
(Kaissi, 2006; Sutcliffe, 2011). Moreover, it may be argued that concepts from aviation have 
added to the complexity of patient safety. Rodger (2008) urged that similarities between 
aviation and healthcare remain remarkable, while Bagian (2006) argued that the focus on 
individual training and education in healthcare had been insufficient and did not accord with 
aviation principles. The difference is that high reliability organisations such as aviation have 
a preoccupation with the potential for disaster (Sutcliffe, 2011) and explicit human factor 
designs are accounted for to reduce harm and error (Bagian, 2006). Mascini (2005, p. 476) 
argued “the ability to learn from mistakes, the presence of political leaders and managers 
giving the highest priority to the safety and reliability of installations, the high levels of 
availability of personnel and technical safety devices as backups and a high reliability 
culture” was central. The notion was that effective policy prevented accidents (Sutcliffe, 
2011) and that if accidents were obsolete the human error component had been removed. The 
theory is that policy is supported and compliance to policy is a collective view. 
Pronovost and Faden (2009, p. 890) argued that while healthcare could learn from 
aviation, aviation offered “no guidance for setting priorities”. This is a fundamental 
difference between healthcare and aviation. In aviation, the risk is that the plane will crash 
and passengers may die. All the passengers in the plane share the same risk despite their 
individual risk (Pronovost & Faden, 2009). Further, the view is that if an organisation is free 
from disaster, the human error component is eliminated and policy is efficient (Mascini, 
2005). The conflict here is that all patients share the same risk of being in hospital but their 
individual risk is distinct. This is in conflict with the healthcare view of safety because SAC 
1 harm is an accepted risk. Thus, dissenting views prevail.  
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In terms of aviation and the high reliability approach, Tamuz and Harrison (2006) 
argued that patient safety benefited from the contributions of both theoretical notions, high 
reliability theory and Perrow’s (1986) Normal Accident Theory because both conceptual 
views included safety perspectives for healthcare to consider. Meanwhile Lillrank and 
Liukko (2004) argued that issues were complex because the variability and standardised 
rules and procedures, which were provisional and clinically discretionary, were modifiable 
for the good of the patient. Rowley (2011), as previously mentioned, termed this deviantly 
innovative. Thus, the unpredictability of patient care and the complexities associated with 
multiple conditions and/or practitioners means that the healthcare provider makes a choice 
between organisational convention and clinical discretion to improve patient care. Vaughan 
(1996, p. 294) argued this was characteristic of the causation of accidents. These 
characteristics remain a unique aspect of the culture of healthcare and support Helmreich’s 
(2000, p. 783) point of view that “aircraft are more predictable than patients”. 
It remains paradoxical that healthcare has applied concepts from aviation as an 
exemplar for organisational change with safety as a priority and yet healthcare’s attempts to 
mirror aviation’s safety principles have not produced the same results. The differences 
between aviation and healthcare are both theoretical and practical where “safety and 
reliability are different system properties” (Leveson, 2011, p. 55). Non-compliance of 
organisational policy is not condoned in high-reliability theory because risk exists and tactics 
are applied to mitigate the risk. Yet in Perrow’s (1986) Normal Accident Theory, the 
interactive tight coupling notion represents “political and personal interests” (Tamuz & 
Harrison, 2006, p. 1657) which influence how risk is interpreted and how error is 
operationally condoned. Clear differences are asserted between aviation’s high-reliability 
theory and healthcare’s normal accident theory and this is problematic for the conduct of an 
RCA. 
More specifically, the paradox resides between safety versus reliability (Leveson, 
2011). By way of example, reporting and analysing techniques may discourage blame in the 
face of patient harm, to learn from error and mitigate harm to prevent the recurrence. The 
difficulty is that the safety approach has relied on each individual healthcare provider to 
recognise and report; to investigate and correct the error as de-compartmentalised parts of 
the system. This is individual responsibility. Added to this, the complexity of clinical 
incidents means human error is lost in translation between organisational goals, system 
failings and human fallibilities, which become progressively more silenced as reports are 
progressed to governance level. This means that the tragic outcomes and magnitude of these 
events go mostly unexplained and uncorrected organisationally and remain dormant even in 
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the processes of open disclosure, independent review and National Inquiry (Queensland 
Public Hospitals Commission of Inquiry, 2005).  
It is argued that these constructs make setting patient safety priorities necessary for 
policy-making difficult because system safety in healthcare requires a distinctive framework 
to meet the needs of accountability and public engagement (Pronovost & Faden, 2009). 
These issues represent how the aviation model has failed healthcare and therefore challenge 
the RCA. In summarising, issues that prevail within Vaughan’s system failure and disaster 
theory are in the form of conceptual models that link individual acts with accident 
trajectories. In addition, a paradox unfolds as healthcare attempts to emulate the expectations 
of reliability theory when theoretical directions are unclear. In keeping with theoretical 
perspectives, James Reason’s (1990) system/person approach is addressed.  
The System/Person approach – The Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1990) 
James Reason’s (1990) system/person approach, commonly referred to in healthcare 
as the Healthcare Error Proliferation Model (HEPM) has been adapted from Reason’s Swiss 
Cheese Model (Reason, 1990) to represent the complexity of delivering healthcare in this 
setting. The HEPM model has been widely disseminated as a strategy for improving patient 
safety (Runciman et al., 2007). Reason’s (2000) model diagrammatically describes error 
causation and error management and provides a schematic representation of organisational 
safety defences that captures the causal sequence of human failures that contribute to an 
accident. The idea is that human failings are both active and latent. Active factors encompass 
the person approach of unsafe acts directly linked to the accident and this includes human 
error. The literature provides many definitions for organising error in healthcare and this 
exists as taxonomy (Runciman et al., 2007). Briefly, some examples of human error in 
healthcare include, errors of omission or the failure to act; a slip or an unintended execution; 
and a mistake which is an action that turns out to be incorrect (Runciman et al., 2007; 
Sheridan, 2008). Personal errors or procedural violations are the result of variable human 
behaviours and are not to be confused with negligence or the intent to harm. In healthcare, 
the issue of human fallibility (Reason, 1995) in complex systems is not associated with the 
intent to harm and has been widely addressed (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Grol, Bosch, 
Hulscher, Eccles, & Wensing, 2007). 
In Reason’s model (2000), contributing factors are often latent factors integral to the 
systemic processes, but a potential causative factor when combined with human elements. 
Latent factors are considered dormant and are precursors to the cause of an accident. This 
means latent factors have an influence on individual processes and tasks and if left 
unchecked will result in disaster. The Swiss Cheese Model comprises several defence layers 
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or safety layers. Each layer has holes similar to those found in Swiss cheese and is integral 
and co-reliant on people, procedures and processes. In the event of a clinical incident, the 
model depicts an accident trajectory pathway where contributing factors produce a trajectory 
through the holes in the layers, which line up in the case of a clinical incident and permit the 
error to slip through the defence layers. Vaughan (2005b, p. 34) termed this process a 
“trajectory of anomalies”. In healthcare, this is an adverse event. 
The assumption central to Reason’s work is that many factors contribute to an 
accident trajectory and this is consistent with RCA methodology (Latino, Latino, & Latino, 
2011). The culture of healthcare recognises this and acknowledges that harm is not the fault 
of an individual but a series of systemic failures (Flin, 1998). By way of example, in 
healthcare, adverse events are depicted as the result of an error trajectory that slips through 
many defence layers and through many skilled health professionals (Queensland Health, 
2010b). At times rules are violated and processes that are routine and informed by the 
situation are identified. This is consistent with Vaughan’s (1996) notion of normalisation of 
deviance: There is no intention to violate the rules.  
The issue in relation to healthcare adverse events is that rules are considered 
negotiable based on clinical decisions drawn from the patient review: a compilation of past 
experience, knowledge and education, intuition and patterns of attitudes and behaviours. 
These characteristics are unique to the safety approach particular to healthcare and central to 
error and harm in healthcare. To that end, the research assumes that the decision to negate 
and/or bend organisational rules is a clinical decision endorsed by governance structures 
rather than an organisational safety issue. For health professionals, making this decision 
negates the aspect of error and risk in favour of the probability that no harm will result 
(Banja, 2010; Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Phipps, Parker, Meakin, & Beatty, 2010; Rowley, 
2011). The impact of professional decisions versus organisational convention and SAC 1 
events remains untested. In the event of an SAC 1 incident, the above account raises concern 
regarding an organisational culture that shapes decision making by giving rise to a 
discretionary understanding of the situation that produces unanticipated sub-optimal 
outcomes (Vaughan, 1999, p. 280).  
In healthcare, deviations from normal practices are one type of error which lacks the 
intent to cause harm. These are a few of the complexities facing the RCA. The view has been 
that active errors cannot be eliminated and some of these errors are the result of system latent 
failures. Latent failures are identified in organisational review processes and become hidden 
between layers of other latent conditions and levels of human error that, in turn, become 
smothered within the same processes designed to capture and mitigate harm (Drach-Zahavy 
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& Somech, 2011). This makes patient harm complex and difficult to address from a 
system/person perspective. The difficulties are that mitigation is generally limited to the 
compounds of individual units and wards represented in local safety and quality reports 
(Queensland Health, 2012). The exception is that the complexity of the harm often expands 
beyond most local processes. Yet, harm is inter-related and as noted earlier, the 
characteristics of the system make harm “a regular by-product of the system itself ” and 
directly affect organisational safety (Vaughan, 2005a, p. 33). The implication is that the 
RCA, although designed as a systemic approach to improve safety, has difficulty in fulfilling 
this function.  
Root Cause Analysis 
The RCA is a legislative improvement technique to assist healthcare to review the 
incident and consider factors that contributed to the incident and recommend solutions to 
mitigate or prevent similar harm from occurring (Health and Other Legislation Amendment 
Act, 2007). This process affirms not only the regulatory approach of RCAs but socially 
legitimises the consequences of preventable patient harm for the public and for healthcare 
providers. Yet, the RCA process as a safety incentive was subject to criticism (Iedema et al., 
2008; Iedema, Jorm, Long, et al., 2006; Nicolini et al., 2011b; Wu et al., 2008). The issue 
has been that the RCA as a quality technique may also be problematic. Critics have argued 
that the RCA provides a transient fix and falls short as socio-cultural factors preclude the 
RCA team from disclosing information “across professional boundaries” (Iedema et al., 
2008, p. 571) and these issues are central to this thesis. 
 
3.5 THE ENVIRONMENT 
The environment refers to the infrastructures that support the organisation and 
inform how individuals operate. The environment provides overarching directives and 
authority. In healthcare the view is bureaucratic and legislatively controlled. Moreover, 
governances and authorities exert powers over healthcare. These social constructs regulate 
the environment of healthcare. In particular, quality processes are informed by national 
agencies that govern healthcare and are deemed to improve patient safety. This is arguably 
problematic. The following section argues the gap between quality and safety in that safety 
has become an ideology of quality. As such, patient safety is unaffected by quality 
improvement strategies.  
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3.5.1 Quality Not Safety 
Improving the quality of healthcare is not a new concept and many quality 
improvement activities have been introduced with the purpose of improving patient safety 
(Gordon, Darbyshire, & Baker, 2012). The idea here draws on the concept that quality 
methods are not safety methods (Sheps & Cardiff, 2011) despite the convention to improve 
quality. This is central to the developing argument. 
Internationally, the trend to improve quality has remained implicitly assigned to 
improve patient safety (Kovach, Revere, & Black, 2013). Arguably, the introduction and 
spread of national regulatory agencies and governances have maintained a quality focus. 
Accreditation initiatives support the quality focus. The traditional goal has long been to 
provide the “best possible medical care . . . but there are many hindrances in this direction” 
(McCombs, 1950, p. 349). In 1950, the practice of medical error was associated with 
regulations and misconduct and was believed to be “due to the black curses of all 
professions: unethical activities and frank malpractice” (McCombs, 1950, p. 349). Today, 
the issue of licensing, regulations and misconduct noted by McCombs is transparent and part 
of the complexity of the healthcare system captured within National Regulatory networks 
(Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act, 2009; Health Quality and Complaints 
Commission Act, 2006). These regulatory networks support and guide a minimum standard 
for the delivery of care within organisational quality processes to improve and provide a 
measure of the delivery of care (Henderson & O’Keefe, 2011). In relation to patient safety, 
this means that if quality improves safety, it will also improve as an inevitable consequence 
of quality. However, as noted, this has not been reflected in Queensland’s SAC 1 harm data 
(Queensland Health, 2012), nor has this been identified in current research or annual patient 
safety reports. 
Nonetheless, quality processes provide a way that defines what hospitals actually do 
compared with the original targets to identify opportunities for improvement (Shaw & 
Perkins, 1992). The challenge of this approach is to use quality methodologies to change 
safety outcomes. Legislative frameworks in Queensland assent a quality approach rather than 
an organisational safety approach. An example is the insertion of the RCA, Part 4B of the 
Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, (2007), which provides legislative consent to 
the conduct of the RCA as a quality improvement tool. From a legislative perspective, this 
leaves the concept of safety hidden within the legislation. Operationally, safety is addressed 
within the actions of National and Regulatory agencies documents. An example is the 
National Standards (ACSQHC, 2011) which provide a quality assurance mechanism to 
safety through the provision of accreditation and auditing processes. It is paradoxical that in 
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the event of an SAC 1 incident, improved organisational safety is the desired outcome and 
improved quality is of national, state and local importance. Yet, the constructs of patient 
safety have become ambiguous in governance structures, and the development of rule-based 
activities (Waring & Currie, 2009) and quality processes contradict original ideations of 
safety as a priority (IOM, 2000). These processes resemble “bureaucratisation . . . the 
rationalisation of work through procedural guidelines” (Waring & Currie, 2009, p. 755).  
In the Queensland health system, concepts of safety feature within the Safety and 
Quality section of the new health reform legislation of 2011 and within the Commonwealth’s 
new “one health” approach (COAG, 2012). In support of this approach, the overarching 
preamble of the new Health and Hospital Boards Act (Health and Hospitals Network and 
Other Legislation Amendment Regulation (No. 1), 2012) is to enforce the provision of 
quality services to Queenslanders. In healthcare, the legislative provisions conform to the 
constructs of social justice to investigate and mitigate harm as well as legislatively 
maintaining a culture of concealment that ubiquitously represents discourse in safety 
(Waring, 2007c). In other words, the concept of organisational patient safety is hidden 
beneath the ideologies of quality and within regulatory frameworks. Instead of improving 
safety in healthcare the processes appear to challenge the concept of safety. 
Further, the emphasis of the IOM report’s (IOM, 2000) recommendations focused on 
dissolving traditions of blame and building healthcare into a safety system, to implement 
safer practices to deliveries of care. Critics have agreed that the progress to provide safer 
healthcare has been slower than expected and complex (Gordon et al., 2012; Sheps & 
Cardiff, 2011). Herein, it is argued that the complexity has manifested from a paradox 
between the constructs of safety and quality because the traditional quality model has not 
worked and safety cannot be managed as a separate identity (Khatri, Brown, & Hicks, 2009). 
As noted, Sheps and Cardiff (2011, p. 149) argue “quality is not safety, and safety is not 
quality” because quality is a characteristic or an attribute that has individual meaning. It is 
argued that these underpinnings mean that the RCA as a quality incentive has not fulfilled 
the safety agenda because the organisational commitment has been on quality that implies a 
safety agenda. As such, Lillrank & Liukko stated that quality was “problematic” for 
healthcare (2004, p. 39). Lillrank and Liukko (2004) argued that the philosophical 
underpinnings of quality methods invoked predictability and that processes of healthcare 
coupled with the patients changing condition created variable and often uncertain 
environments.  
This leaves the safety margin of non-routine practices that result in patient harm 
unchallenged and a quality process like the RCA in a paradox. The absence of a clear 
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measurement of safety in healthcare is supported by the concept of knowledge translation. 
According to Jensen (2008) a gap existed between scholarship and applying this to clinical 
practice. Knowledge might be gained and disseminated, but converting the information 
became lost in the application. Grol and colleagues (2007) argued that healthcare needed a 
comprehensive theoretical structure and without it the translation of knowledge to practice 
was encumbered. From these perspectives, it is argued that the volumes of patient safety 
knowledge appear to have manifested as a disjuncture between the theoretical notions of 
safety and the application of a safer system.  
Khatri and colleagues (2009) argued safety was a matter concerning the culture of 
healthcare. The culture asserted that more quality methods would improve patient safety. 
While this may be correct in part, the problem emerges that safety is masked behind quality 
methods while quality methods are implemented. The reliance on establishing more 
standards of care, more guidelines, more procedures, in the name of patient safety (Sheps & 
Cardiff, 2011) is central to quality activities in Queensland Health. The point is safety issues 
stagnate in favour of an organisational response that remains bureaucratically authorised and 
economically supported through quality processes. Despite considerable efforts to improve 
safety using quality methods, the RCA is the preferred technique to assess and respond to 
safety issues such as reportable events (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 
2007). The RCA is recognised in the legislation as quality activity although safety is 
implicitly applied. In Australia the safety of healthcare as defined by AIHW (2013, 
paragraph 2), safety is defined as “the avoidance or reduction to acceptable limits of actual 
or potential harm from healthcare management or the environment in which healthcare is 
delivered”. This creates a dilemma in the application of safety techniques such as the RCA 
because safety appears secondary and this establishes an operational gap in translation 
between environmental and organisational views. 
3.5.2 Theory versus Practice Gap 
The past 20 years has produced an outpouring of scholarly contributions from health 
and non-health academic disciplines on patient safety (Grol et al., 2007). The multi-
disciplinary approach to reducing patient harm provided an invigorating contemporary 
approach to healthcare, supported by international agendas (Jha et al., 2010; Runciman et al., 
2007). It can be argued that medical error in the form of preventable patient harm is no 
longer concealed within the formal traditions of medicine but has transformed into a 
multifaceted and socially constructed issue of health and safety (Iedema, 2009). In so doing, 
the plethora of academic contributions have provided some valuable knowledge for 
healthcare. 
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Clinicians this decade have confronted the overabundance of information that has 
challenged the improvement of patient safety (Drach-Zahavy & Somech, 2011; Greenhalgh, 
Robert, Macfarlane, Bate, & Kyriakidou, 2004; Grol et al., 2007). One explanation is that 
because scholarly contributions each bring their own knowledge and expertise to patient 
safety, this adversely burdens the providers of care with so much information that health 
providers are unable to apply the information to practice (Murray, 2009). Hence, wide 
academic interests have created a chasm between theory and practice. Jensen (2008, p. 315) 
argued that the gap is partly due to patient safety being viewed as “amenable to methodical 
and technical improvement”. Nicolini and colleagues (2011b, p. 217) argued that a strong 
“policy and practice gap” existed as organisational agendas failed to meet organisational 
learning goals to reduce patient harm and improve patient safety. Grol and colleagues (2007) 
attributed the gap to the lack of explicitly applied theory that has historically been dominated 
by empirical evidence, and they cautioned that drawing on existing theories to promote 
healthcare organisational change and improve safety was complex and applying theories 
chaotically might not be suitable to the context being studied (Grol et al., 2007). Vincent 
(2009) argued that more social science input might bridge the gap between theory and 
practice to make sense of the complexities of patient safety.  
 
3.6 THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 
This research challenges the traditional approaches to patient safety and moves on to 
theoretically explore systemic failures and disaster and the relevance to SAC 1 patient harm 
events. This approach provides key dimensions where system failures are central to harm 
and provide more insights than previously understood about a systems approach (IOM, 
2000) where Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 1986) and Reason’s (1990) system/person 
approach are key theoretical ideas that inform RCA methodology.  
The evidence over the decades has been overwhelming that despite efforts, 
healthcare organisations continue to jeopardise patient safety and cause harm. Furthermore, 
learning from reported events through analysis has appeared to be slow and discretionary. 
The issues are complex and extend beyond the scope of this dissertation. Scholars from a 
variety of disciplines continue to debate the reasons why patient safety has been so difficult 
to achieve. All contribute to the knowledge and understanding of the complexities of patient 
safety. Differences aside, it is generally agreed that a gap exists between knowledge and 
clinical application on patient safety. Grol and colleagues (2007) argued that the gap 
manifested from the lack of an explicitly applied theory to patient safety. To that end, 
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Vaughan’s (1999) a priori categories provide a theoretical direction that is not only central 
to understanding more about patient safety but provides a framework for the development of 
patient safety theory. 
The central tenets of this dissertation are that SAC 1 harm is multifaceted and an 
accumulation of events that go undetected and frequently unattended. Furthermore, in 
healthcare, no harm is ever intended and system failure, not individual blame, is vital to the 
quest to mitigate harm and promote organisational learning. In this chapter, the ideas that 
emerge and the prevailing healthcare views help to understand more about system failure and 
serious harm in healthcare. At the forefront of the theoretical argument, the research is 
informed by the a priori concepts of the environment, the organisational structure, process 
and task and the individual which are deemed central to system failure and disaster. In 
particular, Vaughan (1999) argued that a causal relationship existed that explained how 
things went wrong in social organised systems and these ideas are central to SAC 1 harm in 
healthcare. In addition to the theoretical perspective, the research has also drawn on existing 
knowledge regarding the social characteristics of patient safety established in seminal reports 
on harm (IOM, 2000; Leape et al., 1991; Wilson et al., 1995) to understand more about 
patient safety and SAC 1 harm.  
The argument asserts that a relationship exists between the environment, the 
organisation and the individual. Internal and external forces create pressures on these 
elements which change the relationship between the environment, the organisation and 
individual categories and disrupt equilibrium and cause accidents to happen. While the 
system is responsible for the production of disasters (Vaughan, 1996, p. 274), the a priori 
categories are sufficiently broad enough to capture the social construction of harm and error 
in healthcare. Arguably, both Perrow (1986) and Reason (1990) identify that pressures exist 
in organisational systems and these complexities are central to patient safety. The difference 
here is that the a priori categories not only classify system failures and disasters but frame 
current healthcare policy and the social characteristics of no intention to harm. Thus, the 
theoretical perspective argues that prevailing healthcare views deviate from safety 
perspectives. These ideas differ from the broad postulates of Perrow (1986) and Reason 
(1990). Moreover, the a priori categories are central to promote change and improve patient 
safety because of the relationship between healthcare system failures; how these are 
addressed in the RCA is unexplored.  
The theoretical argument draws on the notion that there is no intent to harm, yet 
there are large numbers of avoidable patient harm events. Human error resides in complex 
organisations and cannot be eliminated entirely (Perrow, 1986). The assumption is that error 
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is central to the consequence of harm and everything interacts with everything else. While 
this is acknowledged, the perspective here is of more than individual error. The emphasis has 
moved because system analysis techniques, the process designed to investigate error and 
harm, have done little to prevent recurrence. The argument asserts that there is an awareness 
of avoidable patient harm. However, the ubiquitous nature of error appears central to the 
consequence of harm. Added to the organisational approach to learn from harm, root cause 
analysis has not improved safety in healthcare and harm prevails. It is assumed, as in other 
organisations that non-conforming acts hide within normalised processes of care and are 
systemically silenced.  
Herein, the argument looks beyond the traditional and hierarchical medical 
approaches, beyond individual clinician accountability and responsibility (Dekker, 2007b), 
beyond health reform agendas (Waring, 2007a) and beyond the confusion surrounding 
healthcare as a system (Jensen, 2008). Although these points are significant and relevant to 
the constructs of organisational safety, the developing theory draws on the sociological 
constructs of the environment, the organisation and individuals as theoretical categories 
rather than error and harm. The point is that individuals interact with individuals and within 
healthcare, and healthcare interacts with broader organisations informed by theoretical safety 
agendas. These notions are central to the investigation of harmful outcomes and central to 
building a new theoretical approach for patient safety.  
 
3.7 SUMMARY 
In summary, the theoretical perspective provides a further dimension to existing 
works on the constructs of patient safety. The prevailing issue is that patient harm is linked 
to unsafe care practices (WHO, 2008), harm is recurring and it is systemic in origin. 
Attempts to improve unsafe care have directed effort at healthcare professionals and less at 
organisational system issues (Kaissi, 2006) and this appears problematic. From the time of 
the release of seminal reports on harm (IOM, 2000; Leape et al., 1991; Wilson et al., 1995) 
scholars have contributed to improving patient safety by drawing on the notion of error rates 
(IOM, 2000; Leape et al., 1991; Wilson et al., 1995), human error (Reason, 1990, 2000), 
systems (Dupree & Lin, 2008; Jensen, 2008; Leape, 1997; Perrow, 1986, 1994) and 
organisational culture (British Department of Health, 2000; Flin, 2007; Gheradi, 1998). 
These ideas inform the concept of patient safety and have guided the development of 
national policy and localised goals for patient safety (Queensland Health, 2009a, 2010). 
  
Chapter 3: Theoretical Perspective 74 
However, the literature asserts that there have been challenges in achieving the espoused 
goals to improve patient safety (Clancy, 2009).  
In addition to policy making, advanced practices have influenced healthcare 
professionals to report clinical incidents, to learn about human factors in the workplace and 
to understand more about the culture of healthcare and other factors which jeopardise patient 
outcomes. Yet, after more than 10 years of international patient safety reform and eight years 
of effort in Queensland, no research has explored the theoretical relationship between 
systemic issues and the investigation of SAC 1 events with the view to understanding more 
about patient safety and the RCA in Queensland.  
It is important to note that in the pursuit to learn from harm, the thesis is not about 
isolating human error, violation or deviant behaviour as the focus of attention. Nor is the 
focus on judging accountability or culpability or criticising the RCA team’s analysis of the 
event (Gosbee & Anderson, 2003; Iedema, Jorm, Long, et al., 2006; Noble & Pronovost, 
2010). Each of these elements, however, contains valuable information relevant to this 
research the privacy of which will not be breached. Significantly, violations, accountability, 
errors, and active and latent failures are pieces of a very intricate social puzzle and the 
components of our healthcare system and these are relevant in the conduct of the RCA.  
The thesis sets out to learn more about patient safety and the RCA in Queensland, as 
there is little evidence to support an improvement in avoidable harm despite the plethora of 
scholarly contributions designed to mitigate harm or make positive efforts in healthcare. The 
concept of theoretical safety agendas and system failures and disasters are central to this 
research in providing factors that frame, co-exist and exert pressures on an organisation and 
thus influence the RCA. Theoretical safety agendas as defined by the IOM report (IOM, 
2000) are central here because patient safety is compromised when actions become routines 
that do not conform to expected organisational rules and produce sub-optimal outcomes. In 
this research, sub-optimal outcomes are SAC 1 harm, death or permanent disability. 
Moreover, the concept of harm draws on the notion of routines that depart from safety 
principles (Vaughan, 1999). From this point of view, Vaughan’s concepts, although 
complex, are integral to the RCA and to patient safety policy making.  
The following chapter describes and justifies in detail the methods and their 
theoretical underpinnings that were applied in the exploration and analysis of the RCA 
report.  
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 Research Methods Chapter 4:
This research was qualitative in design to investigate the social structure of 
Queensland Health’s root cause analysis via an analysis of documents.  The approach was 
iterative that drew on several theoretical approaches that, in combination, provided a 
comprehensive frame for the application of methods. Vaughan’s (1999) disaster theory 
where theoretical ideas of the environment, the organisation and the individual are 
embedded, provide an overarching perspective to shape the thesis and an analytical lens to 
organise the data. In addition, a number of complementary theoretical ideas inform the 
design of the research to support the document analysis. The reason for multiple theoretical 
approaches is to support the document analysis as a robust and transferable technique to 
investigate highly confidential legislated documents such as RCAs’. As such, this research 
sought to add to the existing body of knowledge on patient safety acknowledging that, in the 
quest for knowledge, an interpretation of the relationship between science and society was 
the object of inquiry (Merton, 1968).  
The research sets out to explore the social function of the RCA in an investigation of 
SAC harm events in Queensland public health services. The RCA is a document protected by 
state legislation. As noted previously, the RCA is highly legislatively protected. This 
research has been granted ethical clearance to use text from protected sections of the RCA. 
Thus, whole and unedited RCAs inform the sample frame. This chapter describes and 
justifies the research methods as theoretically informed and as applied to data analysis in this 
research. Section 4.1 explores five theoretical concepts which underpin the methods. Section 
4.2 to 4.5 details the sample, frames the inclusion criteria and the RCA process and the data 
collection process. Section 4.6 defines the phases of data sorting and data analysis, which are 
organised around Vaughan’s (1999) three data management categories as the data frames. In 
this section, a table is provided to illustrate the process of data sorting and data analysis 
applied in Chapter 5. Section 4.7 comprises ethical considerations and the terms and 
conditions of the conduct of the research under governing legislative provisions. Lastly, 
section 4.8 addresses the conditions that underlie research rigour. 
 
4.1 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The research design recognised that in any form of qualitative inquiry, theoretical or 
conceptual ideas were always in the mind of the researcher and could not be disregarded 
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(Vaughan, 2004). For this reason, the nature of this inquiry was iterative in that it moved 
between and beyond the conceptual ideas of the researcher and the data to yield new insights 
that prompted further investigation (Blumer, 1954). The theoretical approach underlying the 
methods drew on a number of conceptual ideas. The first was Prior’s (2008) notion of 
documents, in this research the RCAs, to be viewed as complete social informants. Second, 
Crabtree and Miller’s (1992) data template was adapted to form a data management frame 
for categorising the data to demonstrate rigour through the provision of an audit trail. Third 
was Vaughan’s (1999) argument that the social origins of systemic failure and disaster exist 
as causal relationships between environment, the organisation and the individual. In this 
research, these concepts formed a priori categories to provide structure and direction to the 
analysis. Thus, Vaughan’s a priori concepts were not only theoretically sensitising but 
provided an analytical lens for data analysis. Fourth, Merton’s (1968) manifest and latent 
functions provided a frame for sorting frequency of text and generating analytical ideas that 
resided within the text. Finally, Blumer’s (1954) sensitising concepts established the basis 
for the iterative analytical approach. These conceptual ideas are discussed further below. 
4.1.1 Documents as social informants 
The RCA documents, although protected by legislative provisions, provided what 
Smith (1984) referred to as “preserved traces” which “speak in the absence of speakers” 
(cited in Miller & Alvarado, 2005, p. 349). Some have argued that there is some reticence to 
engage in document analysis in research (Prior, 2008). This is because documents have been 
largely used as supplementary sources of data where the focus is on what is contained within 
the document (content) rather than on the primary source of information (context) and the 
surrounding networks (Miller & Alvarado, 2005). Despite this, analysis of documents can 
complement existing knowledge and contribute to new knowledge. This research explored 
documents as complete entities that were interconnected with the social and cultural research 
environment and provided access to events that were not distanced from the real world or 
real people (Miller & Alvarado, 2005; Prior, 2003). 
As such, documents are understood as more than containers of information (Prior, 
2003). They are the result of social input and are real and alive. The words in documents 
reflect real time, real people and real situations and therefore provide a real worldview of 
social life and interactions. Furthermore, document analysis in social research is regarded as 
“akin to . . . a sociologist’s interviewee” (Prior, 2008, p. 821). In other words, documents can 
provide as much if not more information about a situation as actively engaging in an 
interview.  
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A traditional criticism of document analysis as a research method is its strong 
connection with content or thematic analysis (Prior, 2008). According to Prior (2008, 
p. 833), these methods have positioned documents unfairly whereby “documents [were used] 
as a ‘resource’ – wherein text and documentation exist so as to be scoured for evidence or for 
facts”. The view has been that documents are inert and an isolated source of evidence, which 
implies a positivist approach that constrains the scope and diversity of this source where 
documents are viewed as merely containers for part of the data.  
On the contrary, the purpose of document data analysis is to interpret language, gain 
understanding and derive meaning. From this perspective, Prior (2008) claims that 
documents in data analysis become “vita activa” (Prior, 2008, p. 826, italics original). The 
documents are alive and become actors associated with active functions within the social 
context. As such, documents are vital objects that drive rather than are driven. Such is the 
case with RCA reports. Herein, the RCA reports provided language as a portal to enable the 
researcher to explore patient harm as a socially constructed phenomenon. Therefore, in this 
research, data analysis extended beyond a focus on what was solely in the text (Elo & 
Kyngäs, 2008; Prior, 2008) to consider the underlying meaning of how the documents 
functioned within an organisation and influenced patient safety.  
In addition to the above, the theoretical underpinnings of this research recognise that 
a researcher brings his or her own perspective to a research process. This may be the 
researcher’s knowledge of the topic, personal experience or contextual literature. These 
constitute, in Blumer’s terms, sensitising concepts. According to Charmaz (2006, p. 259), 
“sensitising concepts offer ways of seeing, organising and understanding experience; they 
are embedded in our disciplinary emphases and perspectival proclivities”. As such, 
sensitising concepts in this research drew on knowledge gained from interpreting the data as 
well as the literature to sensitise the researcher to more abundant lines of inquiry.  
It is clear that data are more than the text of the RCAs. Ultimately, each report has 
the potential to influence and positively contribute to patient outcomes in every healthcare 
facility, which involves the meaning and intent of the RCA. Further, the RCA document is 
socially informed to mitigate harm and as such is constructed for the purpose of investigating 
events and promoting organisational learning from harm.  
4.1.2 Data Management Tool  
To support the research methods and demonstrate research rigour, the Crabtree and 
Miller (1992) template approach was modified to form a data management tool for the 
analysis of RCA text. Crabtree and Miller (1992) recommend that the researcher develop an 
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instrument with pre-defined concepts prior to commencing data analysis rather than 
producing a template of codes during or after analysis. Hence, the approach of these authors 
provided a clear method to align Vaughan’s a priori concepts with the development of 
theoretical propositions. The data management tool also produced a clear audit trail that 
made the findings visible, durable, reproducible and accessible to others.  
In this research the data management tool was informed by Vaughan’s a priori 
categories to guide the sorting of data and to lead to more lines of inquiry. As the data sorted 
into one of three a priori categories, ideas were generated and entered into another column in 
the data management tool. Following the entry of new ideas into the frame, the data were re-
read and the literature re-engaged to form further analytical ideas and to generate latent 
concepts. Although the methods of data analysis are presented here as linear, the process was 
iterative and reflexive (Blumer, 1954).  
4.1.3 Systemic failures and disaster  
In this research, the knowledge that harm is causal, that is, one event triggers another 
and another and that causal events are not intended incremental changes to work routines go 
unnoticed and unattended; that subtle routines manifest to cause disaster and that SAC 1 
harm is considered avoidable: all these matters were in the mind of this researcher and 
identified in the literature. Therefore, Vaughan’s system failure and disaster work provided 
the theoretical concepts in the form of a priori categories. These categories are 
characteristically sensitising and grounded within Vaughan’s (1999) “dark side of 
organisations”. In other words, Vaughan’s a priori categories informed the research as 
sensitising concepts. The a priori brought focus to the cultural, social and organisational 
processes related to the RCAs and to this research. The sensitising characteristics of the 
a priori categories allowed for the emergence of new ideas. As the data were read and re-
read, a process of seeing, organising and understanding was constantly being processed in 
the mind of the researcher (Charmaz, 2006). In so doing, as the initial a priori categories 
faded and the generation of other ideas and concepts arose, old concepts were invalidated or 
refined. Thus, Vaughan’s system failure and disaster theory was not only an analytical lens, 
but iterative and reflexive in sensitising the researcher to engage with the generation of new 
theoretical ideas.  
4.1.4 Manifest and Latent functions  
The application of manifest and latent functions was the method of analysis applied 
to the text of the RCA. Manifest analysis counted the frequency of recurring text to expose 
the use of text in the RCA. Latent analysis, referred to as hidden text, explored the meaning 
of the language that resides within the text of the RCA Manifest and latent functions are 
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social scientific devices developed by Robert K Merton and were “devised to preclude the 
inadvertent confusion . . . between conscious motivations for social behaviour and its 
objective consequences (Merton, 1968, p. 114, italics in original). In this research, Merton’s 
manifest and latent functions were not only central to the research design but also vital to the 
quest to learn more about the function of the RCA. Manifest function refers to the 
consequences or actions that people expect and/or observe and may represent the motive for 
social action. Latent functions are unrecognised and unintended functions, often with 
unrecognised effects on society. Thus, latent functions are often hidden constructs that are 
dormant and influence the course of manifest functions. Merton’s idea of latent function 
aims to increase the understanding of society and the social consequences of the way society 
works.  
In addition to manifest and latent functions, Merton’s view of social consequences is 
grounded in the assumption that society constantly balances function and dysfunction. The 
notion of dysfunction is represented in the title of Vaughan’s work, The Dark Side of 
Organisation: Mistake, Misconduct and Disaster (Vaughan, 1999). In that publication the 
concept of routine non-conformity explained how things go wrong in socially organised 
settings (Vaughan, 1999, p. 273). It should be noted here that Vaughan’s theory was not 
isolated to one sociological perspective. However, the connection between Vaughan’s 
theoretical frame and Merton’s notion of latent functions was that acts do not always go as 
originally planned and hence produce unexpected results. Further, drawing on this 
knowledge and information about mistakes, error and harm in healthcare,healthcare harm 
events occur in places where healing and treatments are performed yet, there is limited 
evidence of explict acts of routine non-conformity.  
The idea of latent function, according to Merton (1968), is to uncover hidden 
meaning which may reveal information that is perplexing and creates a paradox for the 
researcher. As such, latent analysis is an approach that not only clarifies the expected but 
may also uncover the unexpected which invites further investigation. These ideas inform the 
social view of the research.  The view draws on the ideas of function and dysfunction where 
the RCA as a socially constructed instrument is applied to investigate events of patient death 
and permanent injury that result as an unexpected consequence of healthcare. Ideas of 
function and dysfunction are tightly connected and this relationship informs the social 
function of the RCA. By way of example, there is social expectation that patients attend 
hospital to be treated and not harmed. Yet, approximately 300 Queensland patients sustain 
SAC 1 harm annually. This harm is a form of dysfunction where expectations of 
improvement to health are not always as anticipated. To that end, Merton’s (1968) latent 
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function provided a way of exploring the meaning of unexpected events such as SAC 1 
incidents by moving beyond observing standardised practice (Merton, 1968) to explain 
hidden concepts and to yield “theoretical fruitful fields of inquiry” (Merton, 1968, p. 119). 
Manifest and latent function analysis was central to understanding more about the function 
of the RCA. 
4.1.5 Sensitising concepts  
Blumer’s (1969) notion of sensitising concepts is grounded in symbolic 
interactionism which holds that meanings are understood and derived from social 
interactions between and among individuals (Blumer, 1969). Blumer (1969, p. 44) termed 
this “close shifting scrutiny”. This means that as questions were raised the researcher moved 
back and forth to interpret the data and examine them more closely.  
Blumer’s method of sensitising concepts (1969) was applied to the data analysis to 
provide rich guidance to the research. Sensitising concepts drew on language from the 
research data to sensitise the researcher to more fruitful lines of inquiry and to provide a 
general sense of reference and guidance to the experience (Bowen, 2006; Hammersely, 
2004; Vaughan 1999). According to Blumer (1969, p. 151), sensitising concepts have been 
viewed as “the great vice” because in social theory concepts are “intrinsically sensitizing and 
not definitive” (Blumer 1969, p. 152). However, Blumer (1969) argued that the value of 
sensitising concepts was that they could be improved and refined in line with what a study 
revealed rather than simply imposed upon data.  
 
4.2 RESEARCH SITE 
The research sites included anonymous Queensland public healthcare facilities 
where RCA documents were completed and lodged with Queensland Health’s former Patient 
Safety Quality Improvement Service. Analysis of the RCAs was conducted on site at the 
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Service, Level 14, Block 7 of the Royal Brisbane 
and Women’s Hospital, Brisbane, Queensland. This location supported the legislative 
conditions prohibiting the removal of the RCAs from the legal custodian.  
 
4.3 SAMPLE 
The sample comprised completed RCA documents (hard-copies). The RCAs were 
extracted from various Queensland Health facilities that utilise the PRIME CI to report 
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incidents. Only SAC 1 events formally commissioned to RCA and completed and lodged 
with the PSQ custodian were included. The total sample size comprised 48 RCAs.  
Eight RCAs were purposively selected from each of the years 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
It was expected that each RCA would consist of 10 to 20 pages of text. On examination of 
the sample, the average document comprised 4 to 8 pages. Therefore, because the numbers 
of pages of data were less than expected, a further twenty-four RCAs, eight per year, were 
therefore added to the sample to comprise a total sample of 48.  This sample of approximate 
10% of completed RCA annually was deemed appropriate by the supervisory team in 
response to a declining rate of completed RCAs annually One document was excluded from 
the second sample because the analysis technique applied Human Error and Patient Safety 
analysis and not RCA. 
The sample was determined purposeful because RCA documents completed prior to 
2007 may not have yielded consistently presented data or descriptive detail as deemed by the 
2007 amendments of the Health Service Act (1991). In addition, the Health and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act (2007) required the inclusion of a 4B Root Cause section. For 
these reasons and a new quality checking process established by the Patient Safety Centre, 
RCAs from 2009 to 2011 were selected. As analysis proceeded and where indicated, further 
RCAs were sampled within the same timeframe to address theoretical developments. 
According to the Learning to Action Report 2012, ‘summary data’, 657 SAC 1 
incidents were recorded for the period 2009 to 2011(Queensland Health, 2012, p. 12-13).  Of 
these SAC 1 events, 291 proceeded to RCA (Queensland Health, 2012, p. 17-18). From this 
data, the sample comprises 16.49% of completed RCAs; date ranges for the selection of 
RCAs for the research may be inconsistent with the Queensland Health, 2012 report. The 
researcher and supervisory team determined the sample size sufficient for an in-depth 
theoretical analysis and the formatting of the RCA reports consistent and compliant within 
legislative conditions.  
4.3.1 Inclusion criteria 
A number of inclusion criteria informed the sample. An RCA may be commissioned 
on any event. In this study, the focus was SAC 1 events and therefore only SAC 1 clinical 
incidents that complied with the legislative definitions and criteria established by the 
Queensland Health Services Act 1991, the Queensland Health & Other Legislation 
Amendments Act, 2007 and the CIMIS (Queensland Health, 2009a), constituted the sample. 
The selection criteria determined that the RCA sample comprised the following: 
 Chapter 4: Research Methods 82 
• SAC 1 clinical incidents; 
• Accompanying RIB and Commissioning authority modus operandi;  
• Representative of the time frame from the Reportable Event date to inclusive of 
2009–2011;  
• The completed RCA, lodged with PSQ. 
• A completed RCA document may comprise three sections (Health and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act, 2007)  
• Root Cause Analysis report pages 1–4 (description of event, causal statement, 
recommendations, lessons learned).  
• Chain of Events Document 1 (Final flow diagram) (Health and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act, 2007, Part 4B, s38M). 
• Chain of Events Document 2 (Contributing factors diagram) (Health and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act, 2007, Part 4B, s38M). 
All sections of the RCAs were included in the analysis. The legislative conditions 
established that the Patient Safety and Quality Unit clinical incident management team 
applied a random data collection process to the RCA sample. 
4.3.2 Legislative conditions  
In this study, only RCAs that had formally progressed to the commission authority 
with an endorsed Reportable Incident Brief (RIB) and complied with state-wide legislative 
processes were included. The selection of these RCA documents served to reflect a 
consistent level of harm according to Queensland legislation and provided some rigour and 
consistency given that an RCA may be conducted on SAC 2 or SAC 3 events.  
The RCA sample was retrieved by the RCA custodian and from the PSQ data 
archive. These documents were not accessible by the researcher due to legislative provisions. 
The RCA documents remained in the original hard copy format and were not copied in part 
or in full (Health Services Act, 1991). The RCA documents could not be removed from PSQ, 
Block 7, Level 14, RBWH. Therefore, the researcher was required to analyse all data on-site 
within the PSQ unit.  
The RCA is legislated under the Health Services Act (Qld) (1991) Part 4B. Access to 
RCA reports is regulated under the Health Services Regulation (2002). The researcher signed 
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an agreement to comply with the legislative statutes of the Queensland government prior to 
undertaking the research as well as compliance to ethical/legal considerations, inclusive of 
the chain of event documents part 1 and 2.  
The researcher and the principal supervisor were appointed as honorary employees 
(unpaid) to the PSQ to meet the legislative requirements set out in the Health Services 
Regulation (2002). 
4.3.3 Supplementary sample information 
Only Queensland Health public healthcare facilities that engaged the PRIME clinical 
incident management system were sources of data. The voluntary lodgement of these 
incidents (SAC 1) occurred on the sites of Queensland Health facilities participating with 
PRIME CI.  
Queensland Health staff voluntarily report approximately 300 SAC 1 incidents each 
year. An SAC 1 clinical incident is defined by the CIMIS (Queensland Health, 2009a, p. 29) 
as “death or likely permanent harm, which is not reasonably expected as an outcome of 
healthcare”. “Not reasonably expected” is explicitly understood to include the reasonable 
expectation of treating clinicians, the patient or family (Queensland Health, 2012, p. 15). In 
the event of an SAC 1 incident, each healthcare facility has an authorised delegate to 
‘commission’ the SAC 1 incidents. This person is called the ‘Commissioning Authority’. 
When an SAC 1 clinical incident is lodged into PRIME CI the Commissioning Authority 
may or may not commission the incident to proceed to RCA.  
Of approximately 300 SAC 1 events reported annually, in 2009-2010, 49% SAC 1 
events proceeded to RCA. In 2010-2011, 41% of SAC 1 events proceeded to RCA 
(Queensland Health, 2012) and “a trend away from using RCA” is acknowledged 
(Queensland Health, 2012, p. 18). Despite this, completed RCAs are filed electronically by 
the PSQ according to a Reportable Event (RE) number which is drawn from a numeric 
system, established in 2005, of ascending numbers. This number is identifiable only to the 
PSQ reportable event team. The RE numbers were irrelevant to the researcher and the 
research. The RE number has been applied by PSQ to RCA documents as a method of 
identifying the reports and does not name the health service district or provide location 
information, patient details, or the RCA team membership. However, should issues have 
arisen through the analysis of the text the researcher would have escalated the concern 
through the appropriate organisational channels. 
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4.4 THE RCA PROCESS 
As noted, the RCA process commences with a reporting of the SAC 1 clinical 
incident where death or permanent harm has occurred and was not the expected outcome of 
healthcare. A Reportable Incident Brief (RIB) establishes the SAC 1 incident with the 
pathway that defines the process of doing an RCA. On approval of an RIB by the 
Commissioning Authority, local organisational governances request a voluntary RCA team, 
the membership of which is made up of multidisciplinary healthcare personnel. The team 
members are selected on the basis of clinical knowledge, experience, skills and not having 
been involved in the relevant patient’s care. As noted, the team of multidisciplinary 
healthcare staff assigned to the RCA asks three primary questions: what happened, why it 
happened and what can be done to prevent the incident from occurring again. With this 
information, the RCA report constitutes two distinct sections (refer appendix A):  
1. The RCA report that provides an identifiable event number, the reported incident 
number, dates that the RCA was commissioned and completed and a description of 
the actual event, feedback status and references. In this section recommendations 
(education, policies, procedures, communication skills, financial input, team 
building programmes, Human error education etc.) constructed and entered onto the 
RCA report for endorsement by the Commissioning authority before being actioned 
at an organisational level. Recommendations are also termed ‘lessons learned’ to 
support organisational change in the circumstance of an adverse event. 
2. The chain of event document, part 1 (a narrative describing each event or activity 
during the patients’ admission) and the chain of event document, part 2 (a 
contributing factor diagram depicting themes and/or concepts and the root cause). 
Concepts are gathered from part 1 to identify the progression of the incident from 
the problem statement 
 
immediate causes  intermediate causes  root causes. 
Completion of the chain of event document section is optional (Health and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act, 2007). 
The completed and signed RCA report and chain of event documents part 1 and2 are 
forwarded to the Patient Safety and Quality (PSQ) unit. 
To provide an example of the RCA report or a chain of event document is not 
possible due to legislative restrictions. However, to provide the reader with some context and 
to gather a sense of gravity that surrounds SAC 1 harm, a hypothetical example of a 
Description of an Event is provided. The scenario is compiled drawing on a number of 
clinical events from my experience as a Patient Safety officer and the RCA research text as a 
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whole meet legislative conditions and ethical confidentiality requirements of the research. As 
such, the scenario is a compilation of multiple examples I have assembled to represent a 
description of an event. Again, disclosure sections of the legislation prevent genuine RCAs 
from being used in complete form (Health Services Amendment Regulation (No. 1), 2008). 
Thus, the hypothetical example represents a typical ‘Description of an Event’ and is 
fictitious.   
A Hypothetical Description of an Event  
A 62 year old male sustained major trauma while logging in an isolated rural area of 
Queensland on Saturday evening. Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) arrived at the 
scene about one hour later. QAS assessed the injuries as bilateral lower limb fractures, crush 
injuries, lacerations to both legs and a pulseless leg. QAS requested air retrieval however the 
pilot was unable to land due to the location, the rugged terrain and time of night. As a result, 
road transfer was arranged to take the patient to the nearest local hospital.  
After arranging QAS road transport it was more than 5 hours before the patient 
arrived at the nearest rural facility. On arrival the patient was triaged as Category 1 and 
stabilised for ongoing transfer. The pulseless limb was noted as having poor perfusion. 
Clinical observations identified no difference between nursing and medical circulatory 
observations and neurovascular findings. Also, it was identified that the patient’s circulation 
improved with the removal of the traction splint on the leg. 
An Orthopaedic review was established 8 hours after arriving at the rural facility. 
The patient’s limb remained pulseless and arterial and nerve injury was suspected. Specialist 
vascular advice was consulted from the rural facility. Following this, the patient was 
transferred by road for tertiary vascular care. The patient arrived at the tertiary facility 19 
hours after the initial injury. The patient underwent extensive vascular surgery comprising 
Embolectomy, Femoral popliteal bypass graft and Fasciotomy 11 hours after arriving at the 
tertiary facility. Over the next few days functional capacity of the limb was deemed not 
viable. In addition the patient was considered high risk for life threatening sepsis. The patient 
underwent an above knee amputation. 
As noted, the hypothetical case above represents a typical description of an event to 
include a situational description, a chronology of events and identified risks. These details 
frame the RCAs investigation to which a systematic process of analysis is applied. 
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4.5 DATA COLLECTION 
In research such as this, it is assumed that data collection and data analysis proceed 
simultaneously. Here, data collection involved the PSQ data management team because 
Queensland’s RCA data were not accessible by the researcher due to legislative protections. 
This meant that the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement RCA custodian extracted data 
from an electronic server and the researcher was blind to this process. A partly manual, 
partly electronic process to select the data was applied. As such, the sampling was deemed 
random because the number of RCAs for the study was selected without involvement from 
the researcher but by the data team and PSQ electronic processes. According to PSQ, the 
data extraction process comprised the following steps:  
All Reportable Events reported to the Patient Safety Unit for 2009/2010/2011;  
Only Reportable Events that had an RCA commissioned were included; 
Only Reportable Events that had an RCA completed and the RCA had been sent to 
the Patient Safety Unit were included; 
For each year, the fifth numerical report was sampled and then every 10th report 
from that point was sampled. These Reportable Event Numbers are called the primarily 
selected Reportable Event Numbers; 
Only Reportable Events where the RCA reports were saved electronically were 
included. Where a Reportable Event Number was selected (according to the formulae above) 
and the RCA report was not saved electronically, the previous Reportable Event (in a 
numerically sorted list) called an alternate was sampled until the next selected Reportable 
Event Number was reached and so on. This meant that if, for example, RE 1248 was not 
available then RE 1227 was selected. Where an alternate Reportable Event Number was 
selected using the above methodology and there was no RCA report saved electronically and 
the numerically sorted list prior to the next primarily selected Reportable Event Number was 
exhausted, then the next available higher Reportable Event Number was selected (i.e. if RE 
1638 was not available, RE 1639 was selected). 
At the end of this process, 10 Reportable Event Numbers with RCA reports were 
sampled and saved electronically for each of the requested years. The request for 8 RCA 
reports and not 10 as mentioned above meant that every third and sixth Reportable Event 
Number of the numerically sorted list was placed in reserve. The reports were checked for 
completeness by the PSQ custodian and logged with the researcher. Further data extraction 
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of 24 RCAs was undertaken using the same process above so that the total sample frame 
contained 48 RCAs. 
 
4.6 ANALYSIS  
“Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be 
counted” (Attributed to Albert Einstein, 1879–1955). 
The method of analysis involved a number of theoretical phases specifically 
designed to meet the sensitive and multifaceted nature of the RCA (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). 
The process of data analysis was organised around five complementary frameworks. The 
first was Prior’s (2008) conceptualisation of documents as complete informants in social 
research. In this research, the documents are the RCAs and the text of the RCA was 
analysed. The second framework supports the sorting of the text and iterative nature of the 
data analysis. This framework is the organising structure that constituted an adaptation of 
Crabtree and Miller’s (1992) template to form a data management frame to support the 
stages of analysis and the research rigour. The third framework drew on Merton’s (1968) 
manifest and latent functions. Manifest functions were important to enumerate or count the 
frequency of specific words or actions. The fourth phase of the analysis then moved to 
explore the latent function of the text. The latent function analysis identified hidden 
constructs and referred to what may be concealed within the language. The fifth and final 
overarching framework converged with Vaughan’s (1996) assertion that the social origins of 
system failure and disaster rest in the connection between the environment; organisational 
characteristics such as structure, process and tasks; and individual decisions that drive 
practice. These ideas constituted a priori categories and were both sensitising and 
theoretically framed. This meant that the generation of new ideas and concepts came forward 
from both the data and existing concepts.  
4.6.1 Legal considerations 
In this study, the Queensland Health Legal Advice Law Unit advised that all 
legislative conditions set out in the Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act (2007) and 
the Health Services Regulation (2002) applied to the research. This meant that only 
individual words, excerpts of text, or parts of sentences, were entered into the data 
management frame by hand. In addition, the text of the RCA was not photocopied or 
scanned or sorted using coding software. This ensured not only that healthcare worker(s), 
patients, hospitals, or the names of Health Service Districts, RCA team members, Patient 
Safety Officers and District Chief Executive Officer(s) were not identifiable, but that 
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confidential information was not electronically uploaded. Further, no case comparison or 
identifiable individual incident cases, no isolation of categories of error derived from the 
Reportable Event list, no dates of clinical incidents, no professional issues nor any Health 
Service District identities have been intentionally divulged. In this approach, the findings 
represented the data as a whole and not as individual cases. 
Ensuring both adherence to the above legislative provisions and a clear audit trail 
posed an obvious challenge. To accommodate both, the data management frame (Crabtree & 
Miller, 1992) contained words and small excerpts of text to support the findings and the 
generation of new ideas. The phases of analysis are discussed further as follows.  
4.6.2 Phases of Analysis 
While the five phases of analysis are presented here in a step-wise progression, the 
analysis was iterative and reflexive. It involved a concurrent process of data analysis and 
return to the literature to ensure that emerging ideas were consistent with theoretical 
underpinnings and also grounded in the data.  
Phase 1: Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis (Prior, 2003, 2008) is the text of the RCA documents. As 
discussed previously, due to the confidentiality and legislative conditions that surround the 
RCA, only words or a short sequence of words relevant to the categories were entered. Full 
sentences do not appear. This approach preserved the confidentiality of information 
contained within the RCAs. In addition, these word(s)/text were mutually exclusive. This 
meant that as word(s)/text were categorised, the words that ‘best fit’ each category were 
entered into the frame. The same words or sequences of text were not applied to two 
categories. However, recurring words/text from different RCAs were applied to the 
appropriate category despite the similar recurring text. As such, text was not duplicated.  
As the text was read, an unsystematic approach of adding the text to the data frame 
was applied to reduce the chance that incident information be pieced together and eliminated 
any intuitive link of events or instinctive link to a health service facility or individual to 
ensure data confidentiality.  
To ensure a systematic approach and to show replicability each RCA is numbered 1 
to 48. Numbered RCAs are applied to each excerpt of text to the research in the provision of 
a clear audit trail and trustworthiness. Appendix B provides the list of numbered de-
identified RCAs. In addition, appendix B provides a breakdown of each RCA section 
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completed in the sample. One RCA was excluded from the data because it did not fit the 
inclusion criteria and was a Human Error and Patient Safety analysis, not an RCA.  
Phase 2: Data Management Frame 
As the text of the RCAs was read, data were entered into an adapted Crabtree and 
Miller’s (1992) data fame to facilitate the identification of meaningful units of text. The 
RCA text was organised into the frame guided by Vaughan’s (1999) predefined concepts to 
provide initial theoretical direction to data analysis. Vaughan’s (1999) a priori categories 
around system failure and disaster informed the structure of the frame and were established 
to define and help sort the text.  
Vaughan’s a priori categories formed three broad groups to establish a sorting guide 
to support the direction of data analysis. The a priori categories were sensitising. The 
categories were importantly viewed as provisional and tentative and thus could have been 
modified or deleted during the analysis. Vaughan’s a priori categories comprise the 
environment, organisation (structure, processes, and tasks) and individual. The data were 
organised to be able to see recurring words or related text and to assist further interpretation.  
The sensitising nature of the a priori categories provided a point of reference to 
guide the application of the text to each category (Blumer, 1954). The definitions of each 
a priori category are explained below. 
a. The ENVIRONMENT is the framework in which healthcare organisations 
operate. The conduct of the RCA is informed by environment, national 
regulatory agencies and state-wide legislation. In this research, Vaughan’s 
environmental category draws on international patient safety trends – the IOM 
report (reporting, culture change, and learning from harm). From the data, the 
words or short phrases from the RCA applied in this category reflect language 
that contains state-wide, political, or regulatory influences. 
b. The ORGANISATION comprises public healthcare facilities in Queensland. 
Vaughan (1999) asserts that in organisations, the structure, process and tasks are 
constructs that support the operations of the organisation. These are inter-related, 
co-dependent and systemic. If the structure, process or tasks become unbalanced, 
an adverse event occurs (Vaughan, 1999). Drawing on these constructs, the 
words or short phrases from the text of the RCA that support the structure of 
healthcare facilities, include local policy, standards, procedures and guidelines. 
 Chapter 4: Research Methods 90 
These words, or synonymous words, were sorted into the organisation category. 
The task is the action of delivering care.  
(i) To the organisation, the development of recommendations are central to 
harm minimisation. Therefore, words or short phrases used in the 
recommendation/corrective active section of the RCA were identified as 
data. 
c. The INDIVIDUAL comprises the acts of people as presented in the RCA. The 
people work in the organisation supported by an environmental framework. 
Words or short phrases from the RCAs applied in this category reflected 
language that supports the actions of healthcare workers in the RCA. 
Data entry 
Excerpts of text were entered into the frame manually because photocopying the 
RCAs was legislatively prohibited. From the RCA hard copies, the text was identified by the 
numbering system to know where each segment of text, applied to the frame, began and 
ended. This helped with identifying and sorting of text (Crabtree & Miller, 1992, p. 102). 
This created long lists of categorised textual data. The text was not duplicated in or between 
categories.  
Data entry was checked by the supervising team to ensure the reliability of data 
entry and the sorting of raw data into the frame. Data that best fit the defined category were 
entered through a process of sorting by theoretical category. Table 4.1 to follow, illustrates 
the development of the data frame and the establishment of the a priori categories informing 
each section. 
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Table 4.1 
Data Management Frame Guided by Vaughan’s (1996) A priori Categories 
Data Management 
Environment:  
The framework in which healthcare organisations operate. This includes the organisation, 
associated networks and inter-organisational agencies that inform the social context of 
healthcare. 
Organisation:  
This category comprises public healthcare facilities in Queensland. Vaughan (1999) asserts 
that in organisations structure, process and tasks are constructs that support and inform the 
operations of the organisation. These constructs are inter-related and co-dependant and 
systemic. 
The structure, process and task are sub-categories of the organisation. The sub-categories 
include the following components: 
Structure – state-wide and local policies, procedures, guidelines. 
Processes – the systematic delivery of care. 
Tasks – delivery of care. 
Individual:  
This comprises the acts of people within the RCA. The text in the category defines the 
person or the acts or actions of individuals. The people work in the organisation supported 
by an environmental framework. 
Phase 3: Manifest data 
Phase 3 drew on Merton’s (1968) notion of manifest analysis. This phase involved 
reading and counting the frequency of the text. The purpose of this was to understand the 
contextual use of the language (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) by exploring the frequency of 
recurring text. At this point, counting of text did not explore the meaning (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005). As the data entry proceeded, patterns of the use of words manifested. To aid this 
process, text colour was added to code and to more clearly identify common patterns in the 
text. 
As the text was repeatedly read, the generation of new ideas was taking form. The 
process of sorting and organising the text into the ‘best fit’ category meant that a deeper 
meaning of the words/text or short excerpts was emerging that connected the text to the 
theoretical constructs of Vaughan’s a priori categories. According to Dey (1993), the 
researcher knows which data applies to the most relevant category as a result of the 
sensitising experience.  
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In addition, the data entry revealed that some text contained synonymous meaning. 
For example, words such as ‘inappropriate’ and ‘insufficient’ although not identical, were 
sorted and grouped together for further interpretation because the meanings of the words 
were fundamentally shared.  
Data entry also revealed that some text contained words that belonged together but 
did not contain the same recurring text. For example, “misinterpretation of ECG” (RCA 
#25), and “no record of weight” (RCA #28) were sorted and grouped together because of the 
sense that they belonged to the organisation rather than the individual category because the 
data revealed that the delivery of types of care was supported by the group and 
organisational rules, policy and procedures rather than human error. 
An example of the development of the data frame is below. The example illustrates 
textual use of transport delays that best fitted the environment category. By Vaughan’s 
definition, healthcare transport is central to the infrastructure of health. Excerpts of text were 
colour coded to make the frequency of recurring text more visible and to aid the subsequent 
interpretive phase.  
Recurring words, combined with the iterative movement from the data to the data 
frame, further sensitised the researcher to aspects of existing knowledge in the literature and 
emerging patterns in the text. As such, data analysis was iterative and reflective. Table 4.2 
provides an example using words that were not part of the data set to illustrate the manifest 
phase of counting and patterning of text. Table 4.2 on the next page, provides illustration of 
the colour coding process, a numbering system to track the data source and emerging ideas. 
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Table 4.2 
Manifest Data Management Frame 
Data Management Frame 
Environment 
Definition: The framework in which healthcare organisations operate. It includes the 
organisation, associated networks and inter-organisational agencies that inform the social context 
of healthcare.  
 
Hypothetical textual Data and sources: 
1. This is precisely the call (53) 
2. Despite clear evidence (171) 
3. An examination of.(185) 
4. Difficult site location (310) 
5. Life expectancy (27) 
6. Some tools and techniques. (119) 
7. Location  delay.(332) 
8. Might think of (212) 
 
KEY: (emerging ideas and totals)  
Yellow = ideas (4). 
Green = source (2) 
Pink = Place(3) 
 
Phase 4: Generate provisional analytical propositions 
As data were read, new ideas were generated and the sensitising approach invited 
new directions of thought that were iterative and reflexive. These new ideas were refined and 
summarised as key points. The new ideas were recorded in an adjacent column for more 
advanced sorting to create more abstract concepts and categories. The process of sorting and 
re-sorting, sensitising and interpreting generated a developing theoretical view. This process 
informed the latent phase.  
The generation of analytical propositions was influenced by the manifest data. As 
the text was theoretically sorted, patterns of recurring text became visible which invited 
more reading to get closer to the data. As a result, words that belonged together and/or had 
the same meaning prompted new ideas, which generated provisional analytical propositions 
from existing knowledge and the data. This back and forth approach was sensitising and 
insightful.  
This approach involved exploring the data as a whole and not merely line-by-line 
and prepared the data for further lines of inquiry and the generation of new ideas (Merton, 
1968). The generation of new analytical propositions were mapped on to the data frame in 
bold text to guide and inform latent analysis. From this, keywords became central to 
generating emergent latent ideas (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  
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It is important to note again that a blurring of the categories challenged the sorting 
process and engagement with the development of new ideas. This was particularly noticeable 
between the individual and organisation task categories. By definition, excerpts of text that 
sorted into the task category included the tasks of the group influenced by organisational 
governance. The challenge in these categories was in differentiating tasks of groups and 
actions of individuals. The distinctive challenges to the interpretation of data were the use of 
language in the RCA. The interpretive difficulty was to identify the difference between 
group activities and actions of individuals. To that end, the language acknowledged the 
actions of individuals by naming. These issues sensitised the researcher to go further into the 
data and existing knowledge to generate the analytical propositions.  
Phase 5: Explore Latent ideas 
The final phase involved supporting or “corroborating” the findings by interpreting 
the data within existing knowledge (Crabtree & Miller, 1992, p 93-109). At this phase, core 
analytical ideas could be generated from the data. These ideas were the most salient although 
not exhaustive of the data. 
Through weekly supervisor meetings, the development of key ideas was subject to 
ongoing analytical and theoretical scrutiny. In these sessions and beyond, key ideas were 
explored by drawing on the relationship between sensitising characteristics and theory 
(Vaughan, 1996). In so doing, interpretation of data were generated from a deep 
understanding of the data reflected in theoretical ideas from the literature and the social 
context. Added to this, personal reflexivity as a Patient Safety Officer and through using the 
literature and data to guide the latent analysis, interpretation of the key ideas moved beyond 
extant concepts (Bowen, 2006) to an exploration of theoretical ideas that underpinned the 
RCAs. Table 4.3 next, represents the theoretical phases of analysis: 
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Table 4.3 
Phases of Analysis 
 
Phases of Analysis 
1. Define the unit of analysis (Prior, 2008) 
2. Develop the data management frame (Crabtree & Miller, 1992) around 
a priori categories (Vaughan, 1999). 
3. Explore the manifest data and generate new concepts from the data 
around a priori categories (Merton, 1968; Vaughan, 1999) 
4. Generate analytical ideas at the latent level (Blumer, 1954; Merton, 
1968) 
5. Explore latent concepts and ground in existing knowledge (Blumer, 
1954, Merton, 1968; Vaughan, 1999). 
 
Table 4.4 provides an illustration of the phases of analysis and how provisional 
analytical propositions were generated from the manifest data through reading, sensitising 
and interpreting and the development of emerging latent concepts. Hypothetical examples of 
text and emerging theoretical ideas are applied to the table on the following page. 
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Table 4.3 
Emerging New Concepts and Developing Latent Ideas 
Data Management Frame 
Environment: The framework in which healthcare organisations operate. It includes the 
organisation, associated networks and inter-organisational agencies that inform the social 
context of healthcare. 
Data with RCA code New 
Concepts 
Analytical Propositions Latent concepts 
To take systems 
seriously (xi) 
Organisational 
systems. 
Improve 
Leadership, communicating 
- concerns 
Safety improvement 
(X-Man, 2013) 
KEY: 
Yellow = systems (x, xi, xii). 
Green = (xx, xxxi) 
Pink = concerns(xiii, xiv) 
Key idea generated from the data:  
Continuous improvement requires systems to address concerns. 
4.6.3 Data 
In this section, the texts of data were entered into the data management frames. 
Information that informed each a priori category was initially defined to lead into the frame 
to help guide and sort the text into manageable issues. Additionally, this supported ethical 
considerations and facilitated manual data sorting of excerpts of text. 
The mutually exclusive approach to data entry meant than excerpts of text did not 
appear in more than one a priori category even though some text readily merged with more 
than one category. Vaughan terms this a distinctive blurring within the data as interpretation 
of the language moves between environmental influences that create structural pressures on 
an organisation and generate opportunities for routine non-conforming conduct to occur 
(Vaughan, 1999). 
The Environment Category 
The ENVIRONMENT is the framework in which healthcare organisations operate. 
It includes the organisation, associated networks and inter-organisational agencies that 
inform the social context of healthcare (Vaughan, 1999, p. 275). The environment includes 
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external governances that bureaucratically and economically inform healthcare. Further, the 
social frame of the environment category includes legal, cultural and demographic sources. 
These external pressures shape the organisation and create opportunities to breach 
organisational rules (Vaughan, 2004, p. 340). An example of this is the RCA’s 
environmental influences as an organisational tool for harm mitigation.  
The RCA is externally created, defined by legislation and informs the way 
healthcare conducts investigations into SAC 1 harm. The environmental influence has 
enforced strong political and regulatory power on the RCA linked to economic 
reimbursements. In addition, the RCA is supported by national regulatory agencies such as 
the ACSQHC and accreditation agencies. As such, the merging of external agencies, 
governances, the legislation and local committees such as health boards, supports the 
environmental construct.  
The words or short phrases from the RCA applied in this category reflected language 
that depicted state-wide, political, or regulatory influence 
The Organisation Category 
The ORGANISATION comprises public healthcare facilities in Queensland. 
Vaughan (1999) asserts that in organisational structures, process and tasks are constructs that 
support the operations of the organisation influenced by operational rules. Drawing on these 
meanings, the words or short phrases from the text of the RCA were applied to the 
organisation category.  
In this category, text applied to the recommendation section of the RCA was sorted 
into the frame because corrective actions support and inform the organisational approach to 
patient safety. Three data frames comprise the organisation category and include the 
structure, the process and task subcategories 
The Individual Category 
The INDIVIDUAL comprises the acts of people within the RCA. The text in the 
category defines the person or the acts or actions of individual’s patients and health 
professionals. The organisation and environmental frameworks inform the individual 
category and this establishes a relationship between the person and the system. From the 
data, words or short phrases of text are applied that support this definition. That is, language 
is used that supports the acts of healthcare workers in the RCA. 
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4.7 ETHICS  
Ethical considerations of the research complied with the academic requirements for a 
PhD and endorsed the QUT course specifications for academic supervision. The research is 
presented as a monograph. Results from the research will be published and undergo peer 
review. There was no third party, Queensland University of Technology or Queensland 
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Service, claim to any intellectual property or 
authorship created in the course of this research. In addition to the above requirements, the 
progress of the PhD was supported through regular communication between the researcher, 
PSQ and QUT to ensure legal requirements and regulatory provisions were not breached. To 
that end, the former Queensland Health, Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Service as 
a separate entity from QUT will be acknowledged as a collaborative entity involved in the 
research. 
The research received ethical approval from the Queensland Office of Health and 
Medical Research Human Research Ethics committee on 16 April, 2012. Refer to Appendix 
H. 
The QUT Human Research Ethics Committee (UHREC) deemed the research 
exempt from UHREC review, approval and monitoring in accordance with sections 5.1.22 
and 5.1.23 of the National Statement of Ethical conduct in Human Research (2007), see 
Appendix I. Prior to these approvals support from the Queensland Health Law Unit was 
required to seek permission to use the RCAs as data.  
4.7.1 Queensland Health ethical approval 
Access to the RCA documents for the purposes of the PhD, was confirmed on 05 
March, 2012 by the Queensland Health Legal Advice Law Unit. The Queensland Health 
Legal Unit granted legislative consent to access the RCAs according to the Health Services 
Act (1991), Part 1, s4 “Objects of the Act” (p.18–19) and s4A, “Guiding Principles” (p.19–
20), as the Health Services Act does not exclude research within the Act, 1991. In particular 
and in accordance with Part 1 of the Health Services Act (1991), the relevance of Part 4B, 
“Root Cause Analysis” (p.48–71), prohibits access to the RCA report and COE documents 
other than for authorised purposes. To enable access, the researcher and the supervisor were 
appointed honorary researchers to meet the legislative conditions to establish the authorised 
purpose. 
The appointments of the researcher and the principal supervisor were granted as 
‘PSQ, Research assistants’ (unpaid) to meet legislative requirements for data access, see 
Appendix J. This complied with the Queensland Health and Other Legislation Amendment 
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Act (2007), part 4B. The research assistant status granted the researcher and the principal 
supervisor access to the RCA documents and complied with legislative provisions set in the 
aforementioned Queensland Health Services Amendment Regulation (2008, p. 5) s38X as 
"Patient Safety Entity". In addition, the researcher and supervisor were advised of the 
sensitive nature and legislative confidentiality of the content of the RCA documents and 
were invited to consult the legal unit if any issues arose in relation to the data. 
4.7.2 PSQ Project management 
The management of the project required that the RCA documents were not to be 
removed from the PSQ, RBWH, Block 7, Level 14, during data analysis and were stored in 
the Researchers locked cupboard within the PSQ unit, RBWH, Block 7, Level 14. 
The legislative conditions prohibited removal of the RCA documents from PSQ, 
RBWH, Block 7, Level 14 and were not photocopied or scanned in full or in part. The RCA 
documents were de-identified using a PSQ coding process – the Reportable event number. 
Further, the names of the Health Service Districts, RCA team members, Patient Safety 
Officer details and endorsement by the District Chief Executive Officer were not required or 
relevant to this study. The data analysis did not include this information. 
The legislative conditions also asserted that data analysis contained only small 
excerpts of text to support the findings. Complete RCA statements were reduced to meet the 
legislative conditions. This meant that full data from the RCAs was analysed as a whole and 
the data excerpts, as a result, were completely de-contextualised. The confidentiality of data 
were closely monitored by the principal supervisor and conformed to the legislative 
principles established (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007; Health Services 
Amendment Regulation (No. 1), 2008).  
Dissemination of research findings were subject to the legislative provisions (Health 
and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007) surrounding access to the RCA including the 
COE documents. The researcher will take all reasonable steps to ensure that the findings are 
accurate, properly reported, and transmissible to others without breaching legislative 
protections of the RCA (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007). 
At the completion of the research, the RCA reports were to be returned by the 
researcher to the Measurement and Monitoring team, PSQ, for archiving. 
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4.8 RESEARCH RIGOUR 
Miller and Alvarado (2005, p. 349) concur that “documents are distinctive in one 
respect . . ., unlike interview and observational episodes documents exist before the 
researchers seeks to use them as data . . ., research using documents involves a post-hoc 
account of previously generated social data”.  
In this study, the issue of research rigour acknowledges trustworthiness as a credible 
and valuable contribution to research and knowledge (McGloin, 2008, p. 45). Research 
rigour means the demonstration of how theory provides a foundation to guide synthesis and 
integration in analysis from the data (Chamberlain, 2000). In other words, theory is not a 
model to provide verification as the positivist approach dictates. Rather, theory is applied to 
provide structure and to derive an explanation or to explore contextual issues (Chamberlain, 
2000, p. 292).  
Trustworthy techniques used in the dissertation are supported by qualitative inquiry. 
It is presumed that the researcher’s analysis of the document(s) text will involve multiple 
meanings and the degree of interpretation is individual and subjective (Miller & Alvarado, 
2005). To ensure research rigour, research techniques of trustworthiness and rigour included 
academic critical review, thick description of the research phenomena and an audit trail of 
the processes and methodologies to enable the outcomes to be reproducible, accessible to 
others and transmissible by discourse (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). 
Due to the highly protective nature of the RCA report and inherent risks of reporting 
the research findings, the researcher is respectful of the sensitive and complex nature that the 
RCAs bring to data analysis. As such, reporting the research findings rigorously complied 
with the RCA legislative provisions, ethical considerations and the Queensland Health Code 
of Conduct principles. Furthermore, the findings and evidence in the thesis reflected 
systemic issues rather than a focus on an incident, a clinical error, or professional issues. 
This chapter has provided a detailed explanation of the methods applied in the thesis 
including a complexity of phases and levels of exploration. The process and outcomes of the 
manifest phase of analysis are the focus of the following chapter. 
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 Manifest Analysis Chapter 5:
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of a manifest analysis of the 
RCA data. Manifest analysis involved enumerating words and recurring patterns of words in 
the RCA text. The process was not solely the quantification of words. As the words were 
counted and usage of the text was uncovered, the manifest analysis identified frequencies 
and patterns of words. 
Hence, the structure of this chapter centres on identifying recurring text and groups 
of text that share meaning and the organisation and representation of the frequency and use 
of the words around each a priori category. In Section 5.1 the sample and characteristics are 
revisited including the sample size and distribution of RCAs across Queensland Health’s 
service divisions. Sections 5.2 to 5.4 present the manifest analysis outcomes for each a priori 
category; environment, organisation and individual. To close, section 5.5 provides a 
summary of the chapter. 
 
5.1 SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS 
In Queensland approximately 320 SAC 1 clinical incidents were recorded annually 
and this represents 0.4% of total reported clinical incidents (Queensland Health, 2012). In 
addition, 320 SAC 1 events comprise more than the number of Reportable Events recorded 
for 2010-2011 (Queensland Health, 2012) because Queensland Health has expanded the 
collection of data to include the national Reportable Event list and SAC 1 events 
(Queensland Health, 2012, p. 10). It is important to note again that all Reportable Events are 
SAC 1 events but not all SAC 1 events are Reportable Events in Queensland. This is an 
important aspect of the sample and to issues of counts of harm and patient safety.  
The exclusion of community mental health suicides from the reportable events list is 
supported by the CIMIS (Queensland Health, 2009a) which decrees that an RCA is not 
mandatory. However, this approach is not consistently applied to reportable events because 
some mental health community suicides continue to undergo an RCA and such events were 
included in the sample.  
In 2011, the PSQ data indicated a decline in the rate of SAC 1 events commissioned 
for RCA (Queensland Health, 2012; 2013). During this period, 33% of SAC 1 events did not 
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proceed to RCA and since 2009 this has been a widening trend. The reasons for this are 
unclear. Bureaucratic influences and economic pressures (Nicolini et al., 2011b; Taitz et al., 
2010) may prompt the data to be camouflaged through lowering the number of SAC 1 rates. 
Keeping SAC 1 events as low as possible not only preserves government funding but also 
minimises RCA operational costs and staff resources. 
5.1.1 RCAs by divisions of care 
The research sample (48 RCAs) comprised 13 medical SAC 1 clinical events, 17 
surgical SAC 1 clinical events, 5 obstetric and gynaecological SAC 1 clinical events and 12 
mental health SAC 1 clinical events. As noted, the RCA is exempt in the event of 
community suicide. However, the sample contained 8 RCAs involving community suicides 
and one RCA was an inpatient mental health death. With the exception of one mental health 
RCA, no root causes were identified in the mental health RCAs. Lessons learned were 
identified in 10 of the 12 mental health RCAs. One RCA was excluded because it contained 
a HEAPS analysis and not RCA. Figure 5.1 represents the proportion of RCAs by healthcare 
divisions. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. RCAs by divisions of care. 
RCA sections 
The structure of the RCA was explained in Chapter 2. According to the Health and 
Other Legislation Amendment Act (2007), it is not compulsory for an RCA report to contain 
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Legislation Amendment Act (2007) asserts that the RCA team must prepare a report 
although the COE component is optional and is represented in the data. The report template 
comprises three parts: a description of the event; causal statements; and recommendations to 
change or improve policy, procedure or practice relating to the provision of health service 
(Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007, s5). The composition of the chain of 
events diagram(s) is at the discretion of the RCA team as the Act asserts that “the RCA team 
may prepare the chain of events diagram . . . ” (Health and Other Legislation Amendment 
Act, 2007, s5) 
All sampled RCAs (100%) contained a descriptive narrative report (N = 47). Of the 
sample, 80% (n = 39) completed the chain of event document part 1. Of these, 31% (n = 22) 
identified barriers where latent causality appears and corrective actions may be considered. 
Nine, or 18%, did not complete the chain of events document part 1. Of those without the 
chain of events document part 1, most identified lessons learned and 1 RCA made 
recommendations. Nineteen or 40% developed root causes; 48% (n = 19) provided solutions 
in the form of recommendations and 79% (n = 37) provided solutions in the form of lessons 
learned. 
As noted, the approach to completion of an RCA is legislatively supported (Health 
and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007). Figure 5.2 depicts an overview of these 
characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Percentage of RCAs with completed chain of event document, part 1. 
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Of the RCAs that completed chain of events documents part 1, 43% (n = 19) 
completed chain of events document part 2 and identified root causes. Of the sample, 57% 
(n = 19) of the RCAs did not complete a chain of events document, part 2 and no root causes 
were identified. Figure 5.3 represents the proportion of RCAs that completed a chain of 
events document part 2.  
 
Figure 5.3. Percentage of RCAs with completed chain of events documents, part 2. 
 
5.2 THE ENVIRONMENT  
The category of the environment refers to the social and political dimensions of 
healthcare. This includes regulatory frameworks, legislation, associated networks and inter-
organisational agencies that inform the perspective of healthcare (Vaughan, 1999, p. 275). 
Twenty-nine RCA excerpts were sorted into this category and five groups of text emerged. 
There was no text that referred to external governances that bureaucratically and 
economically inform healthcare such as legal or political influences. One RCA 
recommended that relocation of services would improve the timeliness of healthcare. 
The text sorted into this category used language that was associated with the culture 
of healthcare. For excerpts of text and the theoretical sorting processes in this category refer 
to Appendices D for full data frames. From 5 RCAs 8 excerpts of text were sourced that 
applied cultural inferences to describe issues of non-compliance or lack of teamwork. 
Examples are “staff do not routinely escalate concerns to after hour’s manager or 
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consultant” (RCA #20), “Differences between divisional practices” (RCA #24). Of these, 
two RCAs used exclusive cultural inferences: “A culture of not using the system” (RCA 
#16), “A culture that pressure areas are a nurses domain” (RCA #6), “Culture for nurses to 
re-position (RCA #6)” and “Culture of non-compliance” (RCA #12). The analysis also 
extracted groups of words that acknowledged gaps in healthcare infrastructure such as 
“external programs not linked to inpatient services” (RCA #38) and “managed by part-time 
clinicians” (RCA #33). The text in the RCAs also identified infrastructure deficits, 30% 
(n = 6) such as a lack of inter-organisational agencies to support patients following 
discharge. Examples include: “no off-site services” (RCA #47), “sent home for follow-up”, 
“external programs not linked to inpatient services” (RCA #37), “lack of client booking and 
allocation system” (RCA #45) and “Stress test not available” (RCA # 25). 
From the text in this category, 17% (n = 4) of excerpts acknowledged Queensland 
Health’s vast geographical catchment as a source of concern. Two RCAs identified the 
complexities of patient care in outback Queensland where a lack of remote services was 
complicated by transportation difficulties. Examples include “Lack of roads and resources”, 
“Pilot could not land in terrain”, “Remote geographical location of injury” and “Trauma in 
isolated region” (all from RCA #3). Following the issue of transport, the RCA was 
concerned with delays related to remote areas of Queensland especially in relation to getting 
patients from rural areas to tertiary services in an efficient manner. Examples include 
“Transfer delay” (RCAs #3, #17) and “Length of time for retrieval” (RCA #3). Delays in 
treatment were attributed to location, development of sepsis and complex treatment regimes. 
Further, the RCAs identified considerable time was spent communicating between services. 
This combined with emergency care in rural health services was described as complex. 
Patient care was compromised due to isolation in rural parts of Queensland. The distance 
between healthcare services was not only limited by the terrain but the scope of the nearest 
service and the availability of transport. The proportion of text is represented in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4. Environment category – proportions of text and groups of text. 
 
5.3 THE ORGANISATION 
The category of the organisation comprises Queensland Health’s public healthcare 
facilities. In this category, three sub-components inform the organisation category including 
structure, process and tasks. The sub-components operate as inter-dependent elements that 
are distinctly balanced. If one element becomes unbalanced, an adverse trajectory develops 
(Vaughan, 1999). One hundred and nineteen statements were sorted into this category. 
Manifest analysis of the sub-categories was applied to enumerate and identify patterns of text 
although it became clear during the enumerative stage that the sub-categories structure, 
process and task were closely interrelated. While some text clearly fitted best into a sub-
category other text was sorted from the meaning of the sentence. Parts of text were entered 
into the sub-category. In this category, each sub-component data is described individually. 
Refer to appendices E – the organisation category, for full data frames. Appendix F contains 
RCA recommendations that were sorted into another data frame. This data acknowledges 
solutions generated from the RCA that best fit to the organisation category. 
5.3.1 Structure 
The RCA statements referring to the structure of healthcare facilities reflected a 
state-wide focus and included local policy, procedures, guidelines and healthcare 
infrastructure issues. Thirty-eight RCA statements were sorted into this category. The RCA 
data revealed a lack of organisational directives such as policy, procedures and guidelines. 
For example, excerpts of text included: “No standard for implants” (RCA #14), “No current 
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guidelines” (RCA #35), “Minimum guidelines for the initiation” (RCA #25), “Procedure 
does not clearly identify” (RCA #30), “No standardised practices” (RCA #35), “No district 
specific assessment (RCA #34)”, “Theatre scheduling did not allow time” (RCA #12) and 
“No district specific assessment tool” (RCAs #35, #18, #43). In 58% (n = 21) of the text 
sorted into this category, the statements identified absent or deficient organisational 
structures. 
The RCA statements identified issues of staff training and recruitment that 
influenced the structure of healthcare. Here, 19% (n = 7) of the data identified detrimental 
levels of skill, skill mix and shifts. Examples included “Poor skill mix” (RCA #4), “Staffing 
skill mix lower than...” (RCA #15), “Agency and casual staff” (RCA #22), “Inadequate 
staffing levels” (RCA #25) and “Review roles of staff” (RCA #19). 
The statements linked issues of communication with deficient healthcare structures 
such as regional and rural facilities and interdepartmental IT communications. Examples of 
these statements include “information systems not consistent” (RCA #37), “Failure to 
communicate between teams” (RCA #24) and “No interdepartmental communication” 
(RCA #37). Lastly, a group of statements (17%, n = 6) identified infrastructure, or lack of 
resources issues such as “Distance from ward to OT” (RCA #29) and “Limited inpatient 
resources” (RCAs #34, #47). Figure 5.5 as follows, represents the proportion of statements 
identified in the structure sub-category.  
 
Figure 5.5. Organisation category – structure sub-category: percentage of textual groups. 
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5.3.2 Process 
This category was evident in 32 RCA statements that identified lack of 
organisational processes. From the excerpts, 76% (n = 26) of statements referred to a deficit 
or absence of organisational processes. Excerpts of text in this sub-category included “No 
process led to loss of limb” (RCA #3), “Inadequate process for accurate counting” (RCA 
#14), “No clear process for communication” (RCA #42), “No VTE prophylaxis measures 
taken” (RCA #22), “No guidelines to manage event” (RCA #35), “No workplace 
instruction” (RCA #30), “consent form doesn’t mention” (RCA #10),“absence of practice 
compliance monitoring” (RCA #12), “absence of spinal observation chart” (RCA #11) and 
“No process to notify the relevant clinical team of results” (RCA #16). These data also 
included statements such as ‘inadequate or insufficient’ and included excerpts such as 
“Inadequate process to escalate” (RCA #15), “Insufficient supervision” (RCAs #2, #9, 
#34), “Ineffective follow-up process” (RCA #25), “Inadequate medical and nursing 
education” (RCA #4) and “In-adequate process for ensuring accurate counting” (RCA 
#14).  
Next, RCA text identified a lack of compliance with documentation processes 
occurring in 12% (n = 4) of the statements. Examples include: “No documentation” (RCA 
#7) and “Standards of documentation not maintained” (RCAs #42, #9, #17). Documentation 
in healthcare is an integral form of communication and RCA text identified that 
communication processes were deficient. Examples of these statements include “No clear 
process for communication” (RCA #13) and “Communication breakdown” (RCA #33). 
Excerpts that contained communication and documentation issues appeared in 12% (n = 4) 
of these statements and these issues related to deficiencies in organisational process. Figure 
5.6 represents the excerpts as proportions of text grouped to the process sub-category. 
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Figure 5.6. Organisation category – process sub-category: percentage of textual groups. 
5.3.3 Task 
The task sub-category involved acts of delivering care. Here, 57 RCA statements 
were sorted into the task category. The statements were associated with a failure or error in 
the process of doing a task. This recurred in 61% (n = 35) of the text in this category. The 
RCA statements acknowledged human factor issues and the unsuccessful delivery of the 
operational tasks but did not individualise the act. Examples included wording such as 
“Principles of life support not applied” (RCAs #44, #25), “Tracings not reviewed shift by 
shift” (RCA #33), “Delay in aggressive intervention” (RCA #24), “Suite of forms not used 
consistently” (RCA #31), “Failure to document” (RCA #23) and “No documentation of an 
Acute Resuscitation plan” (RCAs #44, #25). In these statements, failures were identified at 
multiple levels such as “Limited experience for level of activity” and “Unclear care 
provision for undergraduates”.  
A significant finding in this category was that 14% (n = 8) of the RCA statements 
revealed teamwork tasks compromised the effective delivery of care. Excerpts included 
“team dynamic irritable”, “difficult and complex workloads” (RCAs #18, #9, #4, #2, #15), 
“breakdown at handover between teams” (RCA #26) and “no clinical team identified” 
(RCA #23).  
Adding to the suggestion of multiple failure, delay was identified in 11% (n = 6) of 
the RCA statements in this category. These excerpts included “Delay to notify patient” 
(RCA #1), “delay in administering Lysis” (RCA #18), “delay in securing airway” (RCA 
#24), “delay in diagnosis” (RCA #17),“delay in communication, delay in medical imaging” 
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(RCA #19), “delay in treatment” (RCA #2) and “delay to transfer” (RCAs #3, #5, #29, 
#17).  
RCA statements relating to equipment issues that compromised an operational task 
comprised 9% (n = 5) of the sorted statements in this category. These statements referred to 
matters of equipment that limited the effective delivery of care such as “poor device design” 
(RCA #30), “equipment failure” (RCA #26) and “equipment not available” (RCAs #28, 
#44).  
Finally, two statements identified staff-related concerns that influenced the task of 
delivering care. An example was “insufficient senior supervision” (RCAs #9, #4). Figure 5.7 
represents excerpts of text as proportionately grouped to the task sub-category. 
 
Figure 5.7. Organisation category – task sub-category: percentage of textual groups. 
5.3.4 Corrective actions 
Recommendations and lessons learned provide organisational “solutions to prevent 
the event from happening again” (Queensland Government, 2010, p. 27). The 
recommendations aim to support system change and mitigation of harm by correcting the 
systemic failures that contributed to the event. The recommendations are compiled by the 
RCA team and are subject to endorsement by the Commissioning Authority and release of 
information protections is enforced (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007). 
While it is rare that the Commissioning Authority scrutinises the recommendations, 
organisational approval is required for the RCA recommendations to be actioned. According 
to the CIMIS (Queensland Health, 2009a), “the Commissioning Authority is accountable for 
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the approval/non approval/escalation of recommended corrective actions from the RCA 
Report” (Queensland Health, 2009a, p. 19, italics original).  
In addition to recommendations, the RCA addresses a further section called ‘lessons 
learned’. Specifically, these are other system problems not directly related to the incident but 
contributing to system vulnerabilities identified during the RCA process (Queensland 
Government, 2010). From the sample, a combined total of 153 recommendations and lessons 
learned were extracted. On average, 3.2 corrective actions were developed in every RCA. 
Five RCAs (9%) did not provide either recommendations or lessons learned.  
Of the sample, 89% (n = 42) of the RCAs provided either lessons learned and/or 
recommendations. Yet, there appears no determination as to how the RCA defines the 
construction of lessons learned or root causes. Nor is there any connection between the 
construction of lessons learned and recommendations to COE documents. For example, three 
root causes identified with three recommendations and one lesson learned applied. Or, 6 root 
causes identified and 5 recommendations and 3 lessons learned applied. Forty-two of forty-
seven RCAs constructed recommendations or lessons learned. Figure 5.8 represents this 
data. 
 
Figure 5.8. Organisation category – percentage of RCAs that assigned corrective actions or 
recommendations/lessons learned. 
One RCA contained no recommendations because the patient’s death was secondary 
to an underlying condition. In this event, the RCA identified lessons learned. Two of 47 
RCAs provided no COE and no corrective actions. 
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Frequency of recurring corrective action text 
Within the corrective actions, the frequency of words identified six distinct groups of 
statements. Several of the corrective actions involved one or more of the groups of 
statements. For example, the words “review and develop” were applied to the one corrective 
action statement. For the purpose of the manifest analysis these terms have been counted 
individually as they require two actions, to review the current process and then to develop a 
new process. The approach was separately applied when one or more actions were stated. In 
25% (n = 44) of corrective actions, the statements suggested the development of additional 
organisational processes, policies, procedures, guidelines or standards. Examples of some 
statements include “Development of sedation guidelines” (RCA #20), “Implement the QH 
state wide cardiac pathways” (RCA #18), “Implement a current booking” (RCA #45), 
“Implement minimum guidelines to initiate” (RCA #25), “Implement a patient education 
program” (RCA #2), “Research and develop a process…” (RCA #15), “Develop a 
comprehensive…” (RCA #17) and “Implement a process for escalation of deteriorating 
patient” (RCA #24) and “District wide implementation of” (RCA #35).  
In a further 22% (n = 38), corrective actions statements did not explicitly support 
system change but suggested to“review” current processes. Examples of some corrective 
excerpts include: “Review ED sedation protocol” (RCA #27), “Review staff establishment” 
(RCA #4), “Review the nurse manager role” (RCA #24), “Review access to” (RCA #20), 
“Review processes” (RCA #16) and “Review fall procedure” (RCA #22). A paradox 
appears in corrective actions where the focus of correcting the failure is linked to various 
policies rather than investigating the point of harm. As such, the RCA requires a further 
review. Moreover, it remains unknown how the action to “review” improves patient safety.  
Next analysed were RCA statements that centred on styles of communication. 
Statements in this group included “Staff to communicate” (RCA #26), “Ward round notes” 
(RCA #22),“Corresponds with” (RCA #39) and “Practice escalation and graded 
assertiveness” (RCAs #13, #14) and “Nursing handover from evening to night shift” (RCA 
#33). These typical excerpts recurred in 20% (n = 34) of the text.  
Further, 16% (n = 28) of the text centred on recommendations used the words, 
“Educate”, “train”, “Increase staff knowledge” (RCA #18). and “Drills” which belonged 
with the development of new processes (local or state-wide) and procedures. Two examples 
of education/training recommendations included “Consider ECG interpretation workshop” 
(RCA #33), and “Train all ED staff with triage categories” (RCA #18). 
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Of the corrective action text, “Role definition” and “Description” recurred in 5% 
(n = 9) of the sorted statements in this section. Statements that suggested clarification of role 
definitions were assigned to both medical and nursing personnel. Examples include: “Review 
the role and definition of SMO to specify responsibility” (RCA #9), “Describe roles and 
responsibilities of medical officers and midwives” (RCA #32), “Allocate tasks as roles in the 
recognition of experience” (RCA #4) and “Develop a learning package for nursing staff” 
(RCA #11). The term “Ensure” applied to 10% (n = 17) of corrective action statements and 
was followed invariably by recommendations to develop new processes. In this group, 
auditing measures ‘ensured’ organisational application of the recommendation to healthcare 
workers. An example is “Ensure all staff are orientated to state wide cardiac pathway” 
(RCA #18) and “Ensure all temporary and permanent medical officers” (RCA #23). 
Corrective actions statements that described “a clear process” or “effective process” 
applied to 1% (n = 2) of the sorted text. An example was “There is no clear process” (RCA 
#24) and “The service needs to develop effective process for the implementation of” (RCA 
#16). This suggests that previous processes were unclear and inefficient. Further, the use of 
deontic terms, such as should, may, must and consider, is language that is open to 
interpretation and is “concerned with notions of obligation and permission” (Lomotan, 
Michel, Lin, & Shiffman, 2010, p. 509). An example of deontic terms from the text was 
“Clinicians should have appropriate training and supervision” (RCA #12). This 
recommendation applied two deontic terms; should and appropriate. Both terms are open to 
interpretation and lack organisational obligation. Further examples included “Exc Director 
corresponds with QH medical advisory to consider trauma service” (RCA #26) and “The 
Exc should consider relocating the ward closer” (RCA #29). The proportion of this type of 
language is low at 1%. However, it is interesting that these examples adopt softer language 
than recommendations in other RCAs and a “weak action” (Percarpio & Watts, 2013; 
Queensland Health, 2009b). Not only is a softer tone and deontic language (Lomotan et al., 
2010) represented in two examples, the RCAs here directed the recommendation at executive 
level. It appears that despite the RCA providing recommendations executives are asked to 
consider the action while other staff are advised of the action. It appears that the RCA 
appears challenged by directing the corrective action to higher levels of authority and this 
may influence the tone, action and use of deontic language. Figure 5.9 represents the 
proportionate groups of recurring words. 
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Figure 5.9. Percentage of recurring words used in the Recommendation section of the RCA. 
 
5.4  THE INDIVIDUAL 
In this category, RCA text referred to individuals and their actions. Here, 128 
statements were generated, the most of any category. Refer to appendix G for full data 
frames. In this category the complexity of system analysis became visible. The text of the 
RCA attempted to unravel multiple layers of individualised errors but failed to identify how 
the system contributed to the failure. 
The analysis revealed a consistent finding with the term “no” repeatedly appearing 
in the RCA language. These statements concentrated on individuals and largely on individual 
errors in practice as a contributing factor to the event. In addition to individualised acts, the 
statements identified contributing issues such as delays, communication and non-compliance 
as secondary to the statement of blame. Examples include: “SWC did not escalate concerns 
to the neurosurgical Registrar” (RCA #11) and “Delay in medical imaging” (RCA #14). 
These statements note the delay but at the same time attribute blame within the context of the 
RCA report. Further, RCA statements identified human error issues such as “Report 
interpretation was inconsistent” (RCA #7), “Registrar did not escalate” (RCA #2), 
“Antibiotics not administered” (RCA #10) and “Incorrect site surgery” (RCAs #10, #12). 
Significantly, the examples above identify blame associated with individual’s actions. RCA 
statements such as these recurred in 69% (n = 79) of the excerpts sorted into this category.  
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The second finding in the individual category was that the SAC 1 classification was 
restated in the problem statement of the RCA. These statements recurred in 21% (n = 24) of 
the sorted statements. Examples include “Suicide in community” (RCA #42), “Unexpected 
death post operatively” (RCA #29), “Subdural haemorrhage leading to death” (RCA #22), 
“Permanent brain damage” and “Patient is quadriplegic” (RCA #11). The statements like 
the ones above define SAC 1 harm and were confined to the protected chain of events 
documents, part 2. This is relevant to this category because of the individualised nature of 
the harm, and by definition the individual act was the patient’s adverse event. Moreover, the 
SAC 1 problem statement introduced the concept of causality—the chain of events which 
inform the development of root cause(s).  
A further finding was a group of statements that identified issues of culture within 
the individual category. These statements occurred in 6% (n = 7) of the text. An example of 
this text is “Discordance between clinical and investigative regimes” (RCA #18) and “No 
observations overnight recorded” (RCA #27). These excerpts contained no recurring text, 
although a pattern emerges from the text that represents the behaviour of a group, which 
influences safety. These excerpts, although minimal, were grouped together. 
Finally, 4% (n = 4) of the statements in the individual category did not contain 
recurring text but were grouped together because the excerpts contained suggestions of non-
compliance. An example is, “suite of forms not used” (RCAs #38, #10). This statement, 
although not in context, declared that a group of workers had not completed necessary forms 
and that the RCA revealed that the practice was routine and normal. A further textual 
example of the culture of a group of individuals was “No documentation of incorrect site 
surgery” (RCAs #10, #2, #12, #11). These excerpts not only declare a group of surgical 
professionals and the absence of clinical documentation, but show recurring non-compliance 
that has impact on safety culture. Figure 5.10 represents the proportion of individualised 
statements that attribute blame and identify issues that underpin individualised blame.  
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Figure 5.10. Individual category – proportion of text and groups of text. 
 
5.5 SUMMARY OF MANIFEST ANALYSIS 
From the manifest analysis, the use and frequency of words has been identified. A 
recurring pattern of terms emerged from the categories and these are summarised within this 
section. In summary, sections 5.5.1 to 5.5.3 detail the findings organised around each of the 
three a priori categories. Here the findings of the manifest analysis are concluded and key 
theoretical propositions are exposed. Each theoretical proposition is presented at the end of 
the relevant a priori category. These key ideas are explored in more depth in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7. Therefore, four theoretical propositions are identified in this section to be the 
grounding for further analysis. 
The a priori categories complement each other and are inter-related. The manifest 
analysis reveals a distinctive integration and merging of text that streams from one category 
to another. For example, “There is a culture for nurses not to re-position” (RCA #6) fitted 
best by definition in the environment category although the task of re-positioning may sort, 
at first glance, into the organisation category where a group of nurses are the focus. The 
interconnected language challenges the sorting process into distinctive categories but by re-
visiting the text and grouping common language/words, the manifest analysis exposes key 
information. These key ideas inform the development of latent analysis as explored in the 
following chapter.  
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Environment 
The manifest analysis revealed “culture” as the most salient term that recurred in 
33% of the text. Since the IOM report (IOM, 2000) the focus of mitigating patient harm has 
been to move to a culture of safety (Kadzielski & Martin, 2002). “Culture” in the text 
acknowledged a wider concept by identifying healthcare attitudes and beliefs that was 
central to the lessening of harm. The culture in healthcare has been described as the way we 
do things (Furnham, 1997) and equally criticised as instrumental in healthcare harm. 
Contextually, the manifest analysis indicates that healthcare culture statements are used to 
depict issues where a lack of collaborative teamwork or “discourse” of teamwork exists 
(Finn, Learmonth, & Reedy, 2010, p. 1148). From the RCA statements, a distinguishing 
feature is the construction of the culture of teams. The distinction is not just between the 
roles or divisions of teams such as nurses, doctors or the wider healthcare team, although 
these are apparent in the text. The issue of culture extends from unit to unit and facility to 
facility. For example, it is “A culture of rural facilities...” (RCA #18) and the “Differences 
between divisional practices” (RCA #4); these describe a lack of integration and a 
fragmentation across the healthcare groups which adds to the complexity of delivering care 
in remote areas of Queensland. In these statements, the complexity of care is revealed 
relative to the issue of remoteness but the connection between how the culture of rural 
facilities and remoteness in the text exacerbated timely delivery of care was difficult to 
determine. For instance, the text determines vascular trauma was complicated because 
retrieval services could not land and road transport links were flooded with no little reference 
to culture. The RCA went on to expose issues that compromised timeliness of surgery and 
later exacerbated the integrity of the limb, provoking widespread sepsis and the loss of the 
limb. The contextual use of terms such, as “Pilot could not land in terrain” (RCA #3) 
exposes the difficulties and challenges of healthcare delivery in parts of Queensland yet 
these were not explored. Rather, the intricacies and complexities of investigating SAC 1 
events were one-dimensional and linear in construction. Manifest analysis revealed complex 
issues facing the RCA team to amalgamate the causal chain of events.  
In this category, the environment, the analysis revealed some latent factors in the 
language (Reason, 1990) but as the process proceeded, the latent issues disappeared from the 
RCA report. By way of example, the text identified latent contributing issues such as “Test 
not available, no low risk unit” (RCA #25) and “Service not available at hospital” (RCA 
#13). As a causal chain trajectory evolved, the issues of culture and infrastructure were lost 
from the language in the RCA. As more contributing factors were identified, original latent 
factors appeared to be discounted and disappeared from the RCA statements. The layering 
effect that seeks active then latent failures within causal chains is a familiar concept to 
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healthcare. Yet, the contributory chain appears greater than the scope of the RCA. A clearer 
example was where the focus of the RCA shifted from the terrain which made plane landing 
difficult, to the complexities of communicating neurovascular status across multiple services 
and multiple facilities. Despite the RCA identifying active errors in the report, failures such 
as communication issues and documentation mistakes, the RCA report concluded “No health 
care system or processes could be identified” and “no root causes were found” (RCAs #2, 
#5, #18, #26, #27, #28, #38, #39, #42, #44). The lessons learned, not recommendations, 
centred on improving communication and the introduction of neurovascular assessment tools 
to improve documentation. Thus, the actions were directed at local improvements that did 
not address the primary factors identified in the report but provided a secondary solution to 
concerns. The point here is not to undervalue issues of communication, documentation and 
handover, which are essential to the error trajectory and contribute to the analysis by 
applying human factor principles. Nonetheless, the RCA identified no link between human 
error and how human factors connect within the broader organisational context (Reason, 
1990). More specifically, there was no link between corrective actions that acknowledged 
geographical and infrastructure matters identified in earlier parts of the RCA. These are 
significant latent concerns which disappear from the analysis and yet appeared to directly 
contribute to a patient’s death. Nicolini and colleagues (2011a, p. 37) argue that 
“discounting” root causes occurs because latent factors are too hard to fix. To that end, the 
theoretical proposition generated from this category asserts that: 
The language of the RCA becomes diluted as complex issues fade from the analysis 
and are discounted and ignored from organisational learning.  
Organisation 
The organisation category comprises three sub-categories; structure, process and 
task. The RCA statements sorted into these three categories revealed gaps within the 
organisation that failed to support healthcare operations across all three sub-categories. The 
gaps identified deficiencies or voids in the organisation and were poised for clarification of 
latent deficiencies.  For example, the excerpt “No sedation guidelines” (RCA #20) 
recognised that a procedure lacked essential directives in the language which, when applied 
over multiple shifts, helped establish a potential error trajectory. Yet, these ideas were not 
attended in the RCA. Gaps, according to Cook and colleagues (2000, p. 792), rarely result in 
accidents because the gap is bridged by alternative means that prevent bad consequences. 
However, from the RCA the statements implied that the loose coupling effect (Perrow, 1984) 
of correcting the issue before catastrophe, is not occurring. Gaps, according to the RCA 
statements, were not anticipated prior to SAC 1 events. As such, familiar and recurring 
 Chapter 5: Manifest Analysis 119 
language appears in the RCAs for the period 2009, 2010 and 2011. Further, the frequency of 
multilayered organisational deficiencies suggested that the gaps in workplace operations 
were recurring and not corrected.  
The complexity and volume of organisational gaps was not captured by the RCA. 
Many issues, although identified, appeared to go unacknowledged. In addition, the language 
of the RCA from section to section was disjointed and this was due to the legislative 
framework and this will be discussed in the next chapter. Division 5, “Disclosure or release 
of information” of the Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act (2007) (Qld) covers the 
legislative provisions that privilege the release of information. The conflict for the RCA is 
that the language in the report varies from one section to another. It is important to note here 
that it is not the purpose of this research to compare each section of the RCA. However, the 
language in the first section describes the event narratively. Then a blow-by-blow account 
and sometimes a timeline of catastrophic events through the chain of events comprised the 
mid-section of the RCA. Yet, the ‘description of the event’ and the ‘chain of event 
documents’ imposed a disjuncture in the approach to the analysis. Rarely does the language 
merge these two distinctions and this will be discussed in more detail in following chapters. 
The unscientific constructs of the RCA influence the purpose of the RCA quality and ignore 
safety and this challenges the language in the RCA. To that end, the theoretical proposition 
generated from this category asserts that : 
There is a disconnect between the conduct of the RCA and the rhetoric of 
organisational goals. 
Individual 
In this category, the RCA statements defined the person or individual and their acts. 
In summarising this category, the most frequently appearing statements implied 
individualised blame. The statements sorted into this category identified blame. Names of 
people involved in the incident were not disclosed but designation and clinical stream, for 
example doctor or nurse, appeared in the text of the RCAs. While the manifest analysis did 
not uncover why this occurred, blame is contraindicated in organisational policy and the 
legislation (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007; Queensland Health, 
2009a). The point here is that issues of human error in the RCA are identified but appear to 
go un-recognised as system failures and these are left unattended in the analysis.  
According to West (2000) individualised failures are identified and reflected as 
statements of individual behaviours or acts (West, 2000) and this appeared in the RCA. The 
complexity however, is to move individualised failure back onto the system, but this was not 
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clear in the text of the RCA. Nor was it clear that the culture of healthcare contributed to 
harm, despite textual descriptions to address the collective acts of nurses, doctors, or units. 
What appeared was the text directing the language back to the system in the corrective 
actions section of the RCA This served two purposes. The first is that individuals were  not 
blamed or scrutinised for the cause of the harm and the second is that corrective actions 
focused on system change and not professional error. The most overt discovery regarding 
individualised failure was found within different sections of the RCA. Individualised 
language was explicitly applied in the chain of event documents. This finding was not 
consistent in the description of the event or in the main report. Thus, each section of the 
RCA applies inconsistent methodologies. By way of illustration, individualised failure may 
be identified as a hypothetical surgical incorrect site surgery scenario. The scenario is that a 
patient “inadvertently” had an un-consented appendage removed. The contributing factors 
recognised that the side was not identified on the consent form and although the surgery was 
difficult, the surgeon did not escalate concerns at the time. The recommended corrective 
action was to review the medical orientation program to improve communication. While this 
example did not comprise the sample, the point here is that the orientation program appears 
unrelated to the incident, unrelated to the description of the event and unrelated to the 
problem statement. The recurring frequency of this text became clear in the individual 
section where human error was confined to specific work areas such as the operating suite. 
The focus of this complexity will be discussed further in the next section.  
Individualised blame is flourishing in the RCA and was identified as multiple textual 
counts of individual acts where errors occurred. Individual failures combined with a 
profusion of organisational deficits, such as operational processes, presents a complex and 
challenging encounter for the RCA. The difficulty appears to resonate between discerning 
between what human error is and how to describe it without attributing blame. The use of 
human failure statements in the individual category showed that Reason’s (1990) approach 
of active/latent errors were hard to find in the RCA as the RCA attempted to unravel 
multiple layers of human errors but failed to analyse these in relation to the system. The 
theoretical proposition generated from this category asserts that: 
The RCA identifies multiple layers of individualised blame. 
Overall 
Thirty-five per cent of the RCAs contained all three sections of the report. 
According to Latino et al. (2011), the inconsistent approach to the RCA limits the 
methodological capacity of an analysis. In Queensland, however, the legislative provisions 
support a discretionary approach to the RCA methodology. There is inconsistency in the 
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development of an RCA; the chain of events documents part 2, are infrequently submitted; 
errors are identified as individualised error statements and latent contributing factors are hard 
to find in the RCA and appear unsupported by analysis.  
In closing, distinctive issues appear from the data. First, there was an abundance of 
RCA statements that identified individual blame that showed how individual acts construct 
accident trajectories, even though this was not the intent of the RCA. With these individual 
failings identified, corrective actions do not link to latent system failures. A gap appears in 
the RCA that fails to link individualised error to organisational latent failures.  
Second, the chain of events framework is applied in the data but fails to identify 
latent system failures errors and organisational defence failures. The purpose of the chain of 
event (COE) documents is to break down the events into manageable ideas that show system 
failures to inform the root cause. In the absence of latent COE the RCA has failed to closely 
examine the deeper constructs of the errors. The COE documents comprises a suite of 
protected documents, while the main report containing the descriptive narrative, causal 
statements and corrective actions is available under authorisation. The recurring pattern of 
language in the RCA identifies the complexities to compile a report that conforms to the 
organisational rigours of safety and quality, meets organisational demands of harm 
mitigation and to learn from error, while maintaining legislative and administrative 
sanctions. Without the COE documents that identify latent cause and effect the RCA lacks 
methodological rigour and this is central to the disconnect between operational and 
organisational conducts. 
The third point was that as the RCA attempts to construct recommendations and 
discern lessons learned, to mitigate harm, the construction of the report is bewildered by 
language that is not analytical. The language in the RCA is distractive and fragmentary to a 
point where organisational factors are ignored and issues of error are discounted.  
Despite the knowledge that adverse events are due to failures of the system rather 
than the individual and the knowledge that culture of healthcare is a characteristic that 
contributes to harm (IOM 2000) culture as a group dynamic was not translated in the RCA.  
Harm was directed at individuals with little or no reference to patterns of harm. As such, 
culture was mostly ignored in the RCA or reduced to an individual level and concealed as 
blame in strictly regulated sections of the RCA, the chain of event documents that do not 
form part of the overall RCA report. The point is that the RCA fails to identify a culture of 
harm. A type of tunnel vision appears within the text of the RCA where this viewpoint urges 
to apply solutions In this manner, corrective actions are constructed that are legislatively 
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compliant with regard to the system not the person, but organisationally weak (Atkins et al., 
2004) providing only a “remedial measure” (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 
2007, s5) that attends to the public discourse of healthcare SAC 1 events. This course of 
action has a typically linear approach but lacks analytical significance and directs the RCA 
to seek a certain course of action because it is an imperative. In addition, legislation 
represents the reasons why the RCAs have centred on identifying organisational deficits, 
because legislative provisions state the course of action. 
The focus of the RCA should be on identifying and improving the policies, 
procedures or practices relating to the provision of health services that contribute to the 
happening of the event (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007, s38J). Further, 
the legislation suggests why many corrective actions go unattended, because the process is 
about quality improvement and not safety. The Health and Other Legislation Amendment 
Act, (2007, s38I) asserts the purpose of the RCA is “to facilitate the use of root cause 
analysis by health services facilities as a quality improvement technique to assess and 
respond to reportable events that happen while health services are being provided at the 
facilities”. Ironically, the process of doing an RCA is derived from “a systematic process of 
analysis” (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007, s5) but this appears to fall 
short from the data in the manifest analysis. From this chapter, it remains unknown how the 
current processes applied to the RCA prevent the recurrence of similar events and provide 
organisational leaning.  
The point is that there is  bureaucratic and legislative influence in the conduct of the 
RCA, which although essential, is also overt and complex and deconstructs analysis of an 
event. Added to this, the scholarship that supports patient safety is abundant (Carayon, 2006; 
Carpenter et al., 2010; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009; Jha et al., 2010; Morath et al., 2009; 
Runciman et al., 2007; Sheps & Cardiff, 2011) while the complexities of the RCA as a 
process to improve patient safety appear discordant. At the frontline, the connection between 
theory, regulation and organisational bureaucracy has created a safety inequality between 
operational goals and reducing harm and this will be argued further in the next chapter. To 
that end, it is not surprising that although the literature supports the notion of learning from 
harm (Morath & Turnbull, 2005), organisational learning is not shared between facilities 
because the RCA appears to support a composition of individualised and operational failures 
that localise harm and fail to address systemic analysis (Nicolini et al., 2011a). This means 
the information gathered from the RCA is not transferrable inter-organisationally as a 
learning device. Further, the legislative conditions of the RCA do little more than cover 
organisational harm, which limits organisational safety. 
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As an overall result, aspects of safety and harm mitigation in the RCA are 
incomplete, although this is not intended. A further theoretical proposition is generated to 
assert that: The RCA is not grounded in the theory underpinning healthcare’s systematic 
process of analysis. 
In closing, four key propositions were generated from the manifest analyses and these 
require further understanding: 
• The language of the RCA becomes diluted as complex issues fade from the analysis 
and are discounted and ignored from organisational learning. 
• There is a disconnect between the conduct of the RCA and the rhetoric of 
organisational goals. 
• The RCA identifies multiple layers of individualised blame 
• The RCA is not grounded in the theory underpinning in healthcare’s systematic 
process of analysis. 
Each of the theoretical propositions will be addressed in the following Chapter as the 
analysis expands to explore latent characteristics of the above key propositions. 
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 Latent Analysis Chapter 6:
The purpose of Chapter 6 is to apply Merton’s (1968) latent functions to the key 
theoretical propositions generated from the manifest analysis in Chapter 5. Merton’s latent 
functions explore dormant characteristics that are often unrecognised and unintended 
meanings concealed within the RCA. The challenge here is to apply theory to argue in 
favour the RCA as a way of exploring unexpected harm events to improve patient safety and 
to mitigate harm.  
Latent functions underpin Merton’s idea of “social engineering” where new 
knowledge is created. According to Merton, both manifest and latent functions are 
“indispensable elements in the theoretical repertoire of the social engineer” (Merton, 1968, 
p. 135). The previous chapter, manifest analysis, exposed key theoretical ideas through 
enumerating the frequency of text. The view in this chapter is to go deeper into the text of 
the RCA with the knowledge that SAC 1 harm is not expected nor intended. The idea of 
harm in healthcare organisations draws on Merton’s (1968) notion of function and 
dysfunction. To these events, the RCA sets out to analyse organisational dysfunctions that 
have resulted in patient death or permanent harm. From this perspective, the chapter explores 
further the previously identified analytical propositions from chapter 5 to uncover more 
meaning and related theorising around the function of the RCA.  
More specifically, the chapter explores in depth the function of the RCA in relation 
to each key theoretical proposition. As a result, the focus is not purely on error, mistake or 
misconduct, even though these are integral to the production of adverse events and were 
identified in the text of the RCAs. Nor does this chapter embark on a critical discourse of the 
RCA (Iedema, Jorm, Long, et al., 2006). Rather, this chapter draws on shared views that the 
RCA as an international approach applies a systems approach to investigate healthcare’s 
serious harm events. Moreover, the shared view recognises that exposing latent system 
failures are central to improving patient safety in healthcare. From this perspective, the RCA 
identifies root causes and develops recommendations to improve patient safety. In this 
chapter the argument is more than a particular “intellectual territory” of shared views 
(Turner, 1995, p. 280). Here, the social engineer (Merton, 1968) engages with the shared 
view to move beyond what is known to understand more about the function of the RCA.  
According to Merton (1968), latent functions “represent significant increments in 
sociological knowledge” because latent findings depart from “common sense knowledge 
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about life” and produce more than manifest functions (Merton, 1968, p. 122). As such, latent 
analysis is a process of identifying and classifying the “thrust or intent” of text (Morse & 
Field, 1995, p. 136). In other words, latent findings produce collateral results that are 
extraneous to standard social consequences (Merton, 1968) and are often paradoxical. The 
contradictory nature of latent results may initially complicate interpretation but, as Merton 
argues, these results are essential in learning more about a phenomenon and social 
understanding. This chapter, therefore, sets out to engage in greater depth with the 
theoretical propositions generated from the manifest findings. As theoretical propositions are 
argued, each proposition is inter-related and informs another and thus, the argument is not 
linear.  
The focus of the RCA is to improve patient safety and to learn from harm. The RCA 
is a socially constructed document compiled by a team of health professionals who 
organisationally reflect shared views of healthcare (British Department of Health, 2000; Flin, 
2007; Zohar, 1980). Moreover, the RCA is shaped by competing elements that influence the 
function of the RCA such as theoretical knowledge around high reliability and normal 
accident theories, legislation and operational expectations. Therefore, with a theoretical base 
grounding the RCA and theoretical propositions generated from the manifest analysis, 
section 6.1 explores the first theoretical propositions that the language of the RCA becomes 
diluted as complex issues fade from the analysis and are discounted and ignored from 
organisational learning. This section argues that Turner’s (1976) concepts of “decoy 
problem” and “variables of disjunction” characterise this phenomenon.  The following 
section, 6.2, addresses a disconnection that appears between the operational conduct of the 
RCA and organisational perspectives. Language decoys cannot be excluded because the 
language in the RCA affirms the existence of a disconnection between organisational and 
operational goals. The focus of this section is on environmental and organisational factors 
such as reform agendas, legislative, regulatory influences and theoretical assumptions and 
how these have created a tension between the operational and organisational constructs of 
the RCA.  
In section 6.3, the focus turns to the third theoretical proposition; the RCA identified 
multiple layers of individualised blame. While it is not the intention of the RCA to identify 
blame, which is contrary to the organisational perspective, responsibility for wrong-doing 
appears in the text of the RCA. These characteristics are exposed through existing 
knowledge such as “accusations of responsibility” (Williams, 2003, p. 431) where the 
allocation of blame in the RCA is challenged by issues of reasoning, of how reality is 
perceived and then compiled (Pollner, 1974). Section 6.4 draws on the ideas of language 
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decoys, the difficulty to transform organisational goals into practice and multiple layers of 
blame to explore the fourth theoretical proposition; the RCA is not grounded in the theory 
underpinning healthcare’s systemic process of analysis. In this section, organisational 
policies that explicitly define the conduct of the RCA in Queensland (IOM, 2000, ACSQHC, 
2011) are explored. The apriori categories frame this argument as levels of analysis to reveal 
a systemic relationship that creates opportunities for the RCA to depart from agendas. The 
Chapter is summarised in section 6.5. 
 
6.1  FRAGMENTED LANGUAGE: DECOYS AND DISTRACTION  
In this section the more understanding is provided to explain the first theoretical 
proposition; the language of the RCA becomes diluted as complex issues fade from the 
analysis and are discounted and ignored from organisational learning.  
Turner’s perspective on organisational disasters is significant here because the 
Social Aetiology of Disasters (Turner, 1979) and Man-made Disasters (1978) are considered 
theoretical maps of the culture of disasters (Vaughan, 1996) and this is central to patient 
safety and the RCA. Importantly, this work initiated the concept of organisational learning 
(Gheradi, 1998) and this has relevance to the RCA and patient safety. According to Turner 
(1976), language decoys appear in disaster reports where issues are identified but, as the 
process proceeds, issues are lost from the report. “Variables of disjunctions” occur when 
people re-construct information from different perspectives (Turner, 1976, p. 382). The 
result of both processes is a report that contains disconnected information (Turner, 1976). 
Hence decoys as described in the section heading, are language that move from one issue to 
another and variables of disjunctions explain the perspectives of the RCA team members that 
socially shape the approach to the RCA. These ideas inform the fragmentary language in the 
text of the RCA and this is problematic to the function of the RCA and the notion that 
organisational learning is an expected outcome of the RCA. 
The RCA report comprises of sections. Each section has a defined purpose to 
support the logical construction of the analysis. In addition, the RCA report provides a 
summation of the findings of the analysis contains recommendations and identifies personnel 
responsible for actioning corrective actions. Yet, between each of the sections of the report a 
disconnection appeared where the language appeared different and lacked flow. The link 
between human error and system failure became blurred and lost from the analysis while 
new errors/risks in the later stages of the RCA report appeared disconnected from original 
ideas. 
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 To represent this phenomenon in the absence of a real RCA and in accordance with 
legislative conditions, a hypothetical example of one section of the RCA a description of an 
event was provided in section 4.1.1. Although the example was fictitious, the purpose was to 
closely resemble a real report. In so doing, the hypothetical example represented an 
arrangement of language to show-case how language changed from being clear and ordered 
to fragmented and to provide an illustration of the development of initial concerns, active 
errors and the absence of latent causality. These ideas are not only central to the analysis of 
harm but are central to this Chapter. 
Returning to the data, over the past decade, there has been growing recognition of 
the complexities associated with the use of RCAs in healthcare (Bagian et al., 2002; Bowie 
et al., 2013; Braithwaite et al., 2006; Iedema et al., 2008; Nicolini et al., 2011b). One such 
complexity is that, as issues or errors are identified in the RCA, some are dismissed or 
ignored while others prevail. The data revealed that all RCAs completed the description of 
the event and the RCA report section. Yet, there was departure from this process. Turner’s 
notion of language decoys and distraction becomes clearer in each of the RCA sections 
below.  
The chain of events documents is one such example where not only is the language 
fragmented but legislation provides the option to construct the chain of event documents. 
Thus, in some cases the development of chain of event documents was dismissed which 
makes the process of doing an RCA shortened and simplified. It is argued here, these 
simplified practices challenge the complexity of healthcare causality because the 
“propagation of events” (Leveson, 2011, p. 59) as causation chains is not considered. 
According to Leveson (2011), this is problematic in accident causation models. As Leveson 
asserts:  
The problem with the chain-of-events model of accident causation is that it 
oversimplifies causality and the accident process and excludes many of the 
systemic factors in accident and indirect or non-linear interaction among 
events (Leveson, 2011, p. 59).  
In other occasions where chains of event documents are compiled, error chains were 
constructed to identify root causes. Yet, this approach was not clearly articulated in the data. 
In the absence of clearly represented error chains it is difficult to see cause and effect 
because the narrative moved from issue to issue, or provided a chronology of a patient’s 
admission with no relationship between ideas. As a result, the language in the RCA was 
fragmented and disjointed and this shows use of language decoys. Thus, in the construction 
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of the chain of event documents, the language shifted from one idea to another rather than 
showing a sequential flow of active errors and systemic latent failures.  
6.1.1 The RCA report  
With or without the chain of event documents, in the RCA report section, language 
decoys and distraction were revealed. In this section, another perspective of the description 
of the event is revealed. Drawing on the scenario again, trauma caused arterial and nerve 
damage. This, combined with a remote geographical location and transport difficulties, 
meant a delay in surgery that contributed to tissue hypoxia. As such, the language shifts 
where initial information about the event refers to remoteness and delays and then disappears 
and does not progress in the RCA. In the data, despite a description of the event that 
appeared to reveal system failures, more than half indicated no recommendations were 
provided because the decision of the team was “no system or process issues were identified 
”(RCAs #36, #39) or “no root causes have been identified though there have been lessons 
learnt” (RCAs #36, #39) 
It is not until reading through the ‘report section’ that secondary risks are revealed. 
For the reader, there is no relationship between cause and effect nor between the problem 
statement and recommendations. The point is that the language in each section of the RCA 
report is not progressive and does not flow to identify principal issues of causality. This 
means that recommendations appear disconnected and constructed from information not 
contained in the RCA. At times, secondary risks were identified and constructed within the 
lessons learned section headed “what other issues were identified”. In the recommendations/ 
lessons learned section of the data, additional system vulnerabilities that contributed to the 
event were identified and solutions applied. For example: 
Recommendations/Lessons Learned  
• Communication including briefings on the roles and responsibilities of teams. 20% 
of the research RCAs suggested reformed communication processes. 
• Develop an assessment tool. 25% of solutions suggested the development of another 
process or procedure despite non-compliance with current processes.  
• Review current procedure.  22% of the solutions suggested an additional review of 
processes.  
The point is that language decoys shift from one idea to another and no relationship 
exists in the language between each of the RCA sections which made the construction of 
recommendations/lessons learned difficult to understand.  This is distractive language. 
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Systemic risks, related to environmental issues such as infrastructure and treatment delays 
disappeared from the final report and this is a consistent finding. Lessons learned and 
recommendations focused on correcting issues but these were not identified in the 
description of the event that set the scene and provided a human component to the event.  
Decoys in the language diverted attention from errors/risks to the extent that no relationship 
between active or latent failures and causal factors could be identified. The result is that 
corrective actions appear ambiguous. This outcome, although not intended, obscures error 
identification and fails to support organisational learning. The result is an RCA that provides 
a set of disconnected solutions because the relationship between the harm, risk and root 
cause(s) has not been sequentially identified.  
In the research data, as the RCA sets out to establish clear error chains, the 
multifaceted nature of harm becomes problematic because SAC 1 error chains involve 
multiple people in multiple situations sometimes across a number of health services. The 
significance of this is that causal chains and their relationships grow exponentially (Nicolini 
et al., 2011b) and addressing all issues falls outside the scope of local RCA teams. The report 
produces one or two issues that became the focus of the RCA and these function to decoy 
underlying factors. In other words, language decoys shift the focus of the RCA from human 
errors to latent failures when no latent causality has been revealed in previous sections of the 
report. This challenges the integrity of the RCA by obscuring systems thinking. The problem 
appears to be grounded in the unsystematic nature of the development of causal chains. As 
noted, the chain of event documents are optional because the legislation provides a choice to 
complete the chain of events documents (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 
2007, s38M).This peculiarity is legislatively sanctioned and these are addressed in greater 
depth in the following section.  
Notwithstanding legislative conditions, organisational policy requires the RCA to be 
commissioned within seven days of the reporting of an event. In addition, the 
“commissioning authority must be provided with the RCA report within forty-five (45) 
working days of commissioning” (Queensland Health, 2009a, p. 15). These conditions 
provide timelines around the completion of the RCA and are important to patient safety. Yet, 
tensions of time and clinical demands (Iedema, Jorm, Long, et al., 2006; Nicolini et al., 
2011b) are instrumental in the use of language decoys in the RCA because not completing a 
portion of the document, such as the chain of event document, may ease tension surrounding 
deadlines. In other words, decoy strategies become a means for simplifying the RCA 
process. It is important to note that this is not the intention of the RCA team and nor does the 
RCA set out to compile an abridged analysis. 
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Organisational processes also assert the 5 Whys processes and theoretical 
perspectives to inform incident analysis (Queensland Government, 2010). The 5 Whys 
constitute the analytical tool that asks ‘why’ five times to uncover the root cause. Arguably, 
this is a simplified approach and produces the “least learning” in incident analysis (Leveson, 
2011, p. 59). In application, the challenge is to amalgamate the 5 Whys to identify 
contributory factors and causal relationships between organisational risks and harm. This is 
complex because the legislation dictates that the compilation of the chain of events document 
is optional for RCA teams. The research data suggested that the practice was to compile 
chain of events part 1 as a chronological representation of the patient’s hospitalisation (80% 
of the data) rather than a contributing factors diagram (Queensland Health, 2009b) that 
contained systems-level analysis using Reason’s system defences.  Further, the chain of 
events document part 2 was constructed in 50% of the data. With an inconsistent approach to 
the compilation of the chain of events documents 1 and 2, the sequence of latent system 
failures is not clear. Rather, what appears are reports that focus predominantly on human 
error without causal connection. As such, the growing organisational complexities associated 
with the legislation and the 5 Whys disconnect operational processes from organisational 
perspectives. This creates an incongruity between systems analysis (Bagian et al., 2002) and 
practice because the focus is on human error rather than humans working in systems 
(Dekker, 2011).  
As the language shifted from one idea to another, RCA reports became fragmented 
with multiple views surrounding the cause of harm. While this in part, underpins the 
principals of RCA, clear cause and effect was absent. The result is a disjointed report where 
the accumulation of ideas was distractive and causation could not be identified. Thus, 
language decoys appeared (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007) that shaped 
and re-shaped the report. Language decoys are not the intention of the RCA but moulded by 
regulatory factors that appear in the form of legislation and internal governances. As noted, it 
was not the intention of the RCA to superficially examine adverse events but the complexity 
of SAC 1 events and time and resource constraints (Braithwaite et al., 2006) and hierarchical 
pressures (Nicolini et al., 2011b) encouraged the use of language decoys in the completion of 
a report. By way of example, Queensland Health’s SAC 1 data on harm events 
acknowledged a flexible approach to the commissioning of RCAs. This meant that not all 
SAC 1 events underwent commissioning approval and proceeded to RCA. These 
discretionary decisions are consistent with Perrow’s (1984) Normal Accident Theory 
(Tamuz & Harrison, 2006) and the regulatory frameworks supported by Queensland Health’s 
commissioning authorities. It has been argued elsewhere that a discretionary approach to the 
commissioning of SAC 1 events is associated with operational issues of resource expenditure 
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(Braithwaite et al., 2006; Iedema et al., 2008). Tamuz and Harrison (2006, p. 1669) pointed 
out, for example, that regulatory statutes are characterised by “ambiguity and politics” and 
that “political considerations can affect critical choices about (1) the events to be considered 
in an RCA, (2) investigation and interpretation of what went wrong, and (3) corrective 
actions”. As a result, language decoy strategies appeared to be inherent to healthcare’s safety 
approach. 
It was thus recognised that the framework for the selection of SAC 1 events that 
proceeded to RCA was influenced by bureaucratic governances and the organisational 
approach to safety (Queensland Health, 2009a). These structures exerted an authority that 
influenced not only the conduct of but the selective and fragmentary language found in the 
RCA. As noted, RCAs are conducted by a team of healthcare professionals selected by local 
commissioning authorities. When an RCA was completed, it was ‘approved’ or ‘not 
approved’ by the commissioning authority prior to being endorsed by local safety and quality 
committees. This is consistent with political processes (Tasca, 1990). These factors influence 
the construction of the content of the RCA and have a way of changing the language in the 
RCA (Berlinger, 2003).  
The content of the RCA is derived from sources of information and the combined 
views of the RCA team. Nicolini et al., (2011b, p. 222) term this predicament “consensus” 
and argue that “the effort of maintaining consensus amongst participants. . . [has] a visible 
effect on the content of the document”. In extending this notion, Berlinger (2003) points out, 
practices which influence the function of the RCA are ethical constructs that underpin the 
disclosure of information and this introduces the next idea. The idea is the “hidden 
curriculum” (Berlinger, 2003, p. 2). This idea is central to the evasion of latent analysis in 
the RCA process. According to Berlinger (2003), the hidden curriculum teaches medicine 
how to conceal errors legitimately because adverse events are complex and there are many 
confounding issues. The result is that error “morphs into a complication” (Berlinger, 2003, 
p. 82). This is problematic for the RCA because accident causation is complex and learning 
from accidents is central to its function. As the complexity of investigating adverse events 
reveals multiple errors, errors transform into more complex issues. At this point, the RCA 
language separates and becomes fragmented to include some ideas and exclude others. This 
approach unintentionally filters errors in an attempt to reveal a predetermined cause of the 
event and thus reduces complexity.  
The risk here is that the RCA is rendered powerless to move from human error to 
systemic underlying issues because the initial events evolve into a network of obstacles that 
cannot be disconnected from the system. To protect the RCA and healthcare, the RCA 
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selectively uses language that does not overtly disclose sources of error. Influences that 
shape and inform the RCA, also sensitise the language of the RCA to a point where latent 
risks and errors are hard to find. This introduces another idea. According to Bok (1984), 
there is fear that uncovering risk, error and/or issues, even though the RCA is legislatively 
protected, will incriminate healthcare by disclosing too much and lead to “judicial 
proceedings into safety” (Dekker, 2011, p. 110). The relationship between harm, human 
error and system failures means that the RCA is unable to comply with organisational 
expectations of analysing events and learning from harm because internal and external 
factors shape the analysis away from methodological principles.  
A further factor associated with language decoys centres around Turner’s (1976, 
p. 382) “variable disjunctions” and this is fundamental to the idea of consensus as discussed 
by Nicolini and colleagues (2011b). As information is re-constructed, variables or 
differences in the interpretation of information are shared. These shared views are significant 
in the construction of the RCA. The concept of shared views converges with Turner’s notion 
of a worldview (1976). In addition to the shared views of the RCA team, professional 
experiences, organisational expectations, operational processes and legislative conditions are 
central in the construction of the RCA. The amount of information combined with 
professional experiences and worldviews means that pieces of information are traded-off. 
Again, without intent, there is omission of some events in favour of others. The point here is 
that trade-off ensures consensus is reached and the report is completed. For example, “pilot 
could not land in terrain” (RCA #3) was traded off and excluded from analysis while the 
secondary factor of communication was re-constructed as the root cause. The complexity of 
analysis appears to be too great and so causality is abridged. In other words, systemic issues 
are excluded because they are too complex to be explored within the confines of the RCA. 
Turner (1976) argued that these conditions establish variables of disjunction and occur in the 
construction of disaster reports. RCA language decoys function to exclude pieces of events 
and assemble others without situational context (Pollner, 1976). Assembling and re-
assembling information asserts disjunctive qualities by changing focus which prevents the 
organisation from seeing what is really there (Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Vaughan, 1999). 
Weick acknowledges Turner’s (1976) view of variables of disjunction in this statement: 
Accidents happen when attempts are made to assemble disjunctions. When 
people attempt to reconcile separate, self-contained, non-overlapping 
interpretations, these efforts may make sense to no-one which . . . represents 
a social origin of incomprehension (Weick, 1998, p. 74).  
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This appears consistent with the RCA where the displacement and thus disregard of 
error or risk was not the intent of incident analysis but existed as a selective approach in 
order to reach consensus and produce a report. This leaves the RCA disjointed and without a 
clear analytical process. As Turner puts it, the “decoy problem” exists when a problem is 
identified and the action taken to deal with the problem detracts from the accumulative 
problems contributing to the event (Turner, 1976, p. 388).  
In summary, the difficulty is that healthcare “is an unusually complex system” 
(Runciman, Merry, & Tito, 2003, p. 974) and this informs the challenges of the language in 
the RCA. Language decoys distort the analysis process to the extent that systemic 
contributing factors are avoided and escape investigation. Without the identification of these 
systemic factors, the “building blocks” (Fahlbruch & Schöbel, 2011, p. 28) of the analysis 
become invisible and the reasoning underpinning the development of RCA solutions 
becomes unclear. The product becomes an RCA that randomly turns to solutions with little 
or no relevance to the situational description. To that end, language decoys limit the function 
of the RCA because in the formation of knowledge from harm, causality becomes obscured 
by disjunctive information that selectively blinds the organisation to risks and errors and 
jeopardises the concept of patient safety (Pidgeon, 1998; Vaughan, 1999).  
 
6.2 DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE CONDUCT OF THE RCA AND THE 
REHETORIC OF ORGANSATIONAL GOALS. 
In this section, the second theoretical proposition is argued; the RCA contains a 
paradox where the structural conditions that define the RCA are disengaged from broader 
social forces which shape and promote organisational safety. This leaves the RCA 
challenged as an organisational safety instrument. The discussion addresses tensions between 
organisational views and the operational conduct of the RCA. 
Organisational documents, which shape and inform the RCA, include the legislation, 
local documents and theoretical perspectives of Perrow (1984) and Reason (1990). First, the 
Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act (2007), Part 4B the Root Cause Analysis, 
legislatively informs the conduct of the RCA. Part 4B of the legislation is not fully disclosed 
but relevant sections are identified to help address the discordance in operational and 
organisational views. Second, Queensland Health’s regulatory documents, such as the 
CIMIS (Queensland Health, 2009a) and other local operational procedures, inform local 
RCA processes. In addition to these, in Queensland, the RCA draws on international trends 
and patient safety reform agendas to frame the conduct of the RCA. This takes into account 
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adapted techniques sourced from the U.S. Veterans Affairs RCA model (Bagian et al., 2002). 
These techniques support the methodological approach to the RCA. Third, safety 
perspectives draw on Perrow’s (1984) Normal Accident Theory and Reason’s (Reason, 
1990) system/person approach to contextually map the RCA. In combination, these 
organisational constructs establish the conduct of the RCA.  
To briefly review, the objective of the RCA is to identify system failings through 
methods of cause and effect to generate organisational solutions for harm mitigation. The 
organisational view is the RCA identifies errors and provides solutions to improve patient 
safety. The approach is “based on the assumption that events can be traced back to root 
causes” (Carroll, 1995, p. 180) despite knowledge that multiple causality and interactions 
exist (Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1990; Vaughan, 1996). Importantly, these ideas are based 
on the patient safety reform agendas initiated from the IOM report. In Queensland, the RCA 
is informed by state legislation and governance documents and these are addressed as 
follows.  
Between 2009 and 2011, the Davies inquiry (Queensland Public Hospitals 
Commission of Inquiry, 2005) gave rise to a wave of local health reforms and was the 
instigator of change to legislation. The Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act (2007) 
modified the Health Services Act, 1991, in relation to safety, quality and governance 
provisions that were deemed inadequate by the Davies inquiry. The Health and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act (2007) inserted a new Clause 5, Part 4B (Root Cause Analysis). 
Part 4B created a new regulatory framework for the conduct of the RCA of a reportable 
event that occurs as a result of providing a public sector health service. Specifications that 
define the conduct of the RCA included section 38H which defines the meaning of the RCA 
as:  
a systematic process of analysis under which—(a) factors that contributed to 
the happening of the event may be identified; and (b) remedial measures that 
could be implemented to prevent a recurrence of a similar event may be 
identified (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007, s5, p. 10). 
 
This definition is applied to the research. To support the Acts (Health and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act, 2007; Health Services Act, 1991), the Health Services 
Amendment Regulation (No.1) (2008) provides a regulatory framework for the conduct of 
RCA. The legislation is “enabling legislation” that “does not mandate that an RCA be 
conducted for a reportable event” but defines the organisational and operational conditions to 
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support the conduct of the RCA (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, 2007, p. 2). 
The ‘enabling’ definition of the legislation provides the option to proceed to RCA for a 
reportable event. However, these legislative provisions contest organisational constructs 
defined in the CIMIS (Queensland Health, 2009a). The CIMIS (2009a, p. 29) requires that 
all SAC 1 events undergo mandatory RCA with the exception of suspected community 
suicides.  
The Health Services Act (1991) and the Health and Other Legislation Amendment 
Act (2007) protect the RCA to enable clinical information to be collected, analysed and 
interpreted. The Act (2007): 
provides statutory privilege to information and documents produced for 
RCA purposes. While new information produced as a result of an RCA will 
be privileged, the legislation will not prevent pre-existing information being 
used as evidence in civil, criminal, coronial or disciplinary proceedings 
(Health and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, 2007, p. 2).  
In addition, the RCA team is also protected within the legislative framework. The 
RCA team has a unique relationship with the system, the legislation and regulatory 
documents, colleagues and networks. The legislation determined that the RCA will not 
investigate the professional competence of a person in relation to the event, or seek to blame 
someone for the event (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007). This protects 
healthcare professionals from identifying fault in individual performance that may be used in 
legal or disciplinary matters. Furthermore, as information is gathered to compile the RCA, 
provisions within the legislation (2007) protect the disclosure and release of information. 
Sections 38R to 38Z define the disclosure and release of information gathered during the 
conduct of an RCA. The information may include the chain of event documents, interviews, 
case notes and other clinical sources. Section 38S (Health and Other Legislation Amendment 
Act, 2007) defines as an offence a disclosure by an RCA team member of information or a 
breach of confidentiality other than for an “authorised purpose” (Health Services 
Amendment Regulation (No. 1), 2008, s33D). The Health Services Amendment Regulation 
(No. 1) (2008) defines the operational conditions that support the legislation. For example, 
an authorised purpose defines giving a copy of the RCA or the chain of event documents to 
no other than the “patient safety entity” (Health Services Amendment Regulation (No. 1), 
2008, s33C). The patient safety entity was assigned to the former Queensland Health Patient 
Safety Centre. These constructs ensure the distribution of the RCA and restriction of release 
of information. 
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The challenge for the RCA was not only to investigate the event but to produce a 
document that conforms to legislative and organisational expectations without the disclosure 
of professional liabilities. Parliamentary debate has acknowledged the intricate nature of the 
RCA and the complexity of the legislation (Queensland Parliament, 2007a, p. 1775). 
However, the extent of this could not have been predicted at the time. To that end, section 
38J of the Act (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007) guides the conduct of 
the RCA. Although six principles inform the conduct of the RCA, not all are relevant in this 
discussion. Principle 3 states that the “focus of the RCA should be on identifying and 
improving the policies, procedures or practices relating to the provision of the health 
service” (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007, s5). The data shows 22% of 
the RCA recommendations refer to the development of another procedural document. The 
construction of new documents appears to correct failures at the organisational level and the 
development of new documents adds to healthcare’s improvement pool (Schöbel & Manzey, 
2011).  
The organisational view that constructing new documents influences the conduct of 
work and improves safety does have theoretical grounding. In Normal Accident Theory 
(Perrow, 1984) the safety focus is on risk as inevitable and the system as a tightly coupled 
and politically influenced environment (Sagan, 1994). This framework is consistent in 
healthcare. In Normal Accident Theory, as documents are developed, compliance with 
policy is expected although not compulsory because human errors and system failures are 
routine and accepted. This means compliance with policy is discernible because the 
relationship between the system, the patient and the practitioner is dynamic and interactive. 
Despite this view, the RCA constructs new documents to mitigate harm. This may be a result 
of legislative agendas where the legislation supports a focus to improve policy, procedures 
and guidelines. Yet, the creation of new documents appears to have done little to influence 
SAC 1 harm rates. According to Tamuz and Harrison (2006), developing documents 
attempts to enforce rules and standardised practice and this is seen as counterproductive in 
Normal Accident Theory. High reliability theory however, argues that safety improvement is 
directly related to the development of standards and these improve reliability. Moreover 
accidents are avoided in high reliability theory because the organisation is focused on safety 
(Leape et al., 2009). These approaches have distinctive differences. As such, Normal 
Accident Theory, which implicitly informs healthcare, has “competing objectives guided by 
divergent safety goals” (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006, p. 1656) and this is significant to the 
RCA.  
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Principle 4 of the Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, (2007) asserts that 
participation in the RCA is voluntary and the commissioning authority approves of this. As 
noted above, these constructs are consistent with governance decisions. Moreover, there are 
expectations that “voluntary participation” (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 
2007, s5, ss38J) is in addition to clinical demands and these pressures cannot be excluded 
from the conduct of the RCA. Competing clinical demands may be a constant source of 
frustration for the RCA (Nicolini et al., 2011a, p. 36). Braithwaite and colleagues (2006) 
acknowledged a similar concern, arguing professional demands compete with clinical 
expectations and these pressures influence participation in “doing an RCA” (Iedema, Jorm, 
Long, et al., 2006, p. 1608).  
Principle 6 focuses on fostering a teamwork approach that embraces sharing and 
information dissemination (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007). It is in 
relation to this principle that the RCA appears most discordant. As noted, the RCA is 
prepared by a team and the report is organisationally intended for information sharing. 
However, legislative constraints combined with organisational provisions restrict the intent 
of principle 6 because information is avoided or excluded. As such, information is not 
available for dissemination. 
In particular, the legislation states that “the RCA team may prepare a document (the 
chain of event document) that details or pictorially represents, the chain of events . . . having 
led to the happening of the reportable event” (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 
2007, s5, bold italics original). Yet, these legislative conditions set up a paradox where 
sharing information is difficult because latent failures remain concealed in language that 
applies decoy strategies but risks and errors central to harm are not identified or challenged 
by the analysis (Nicolini et al., 2011a). The chain of event documents, or flow diagrams, 
existed in 80% of the sample but only 43% of these produce root cause documents. The 
contradiction is that 89% of the sample developed corrective strategies without clear latent 
cause and effect and infrequent development of root causes. In the chain of event documents, 
systemic latent cause and effect is difficult to interpret because the focus is on the 
chronology of the patient’s admission, which encouraged the isolation of immediate causes, 
rather than systems issues that underpinned the event. This constrains the capacity of the 
RCA to reconcile practice improvements (Iedema et al., 2008).  
The legislative option to compile a chain of events renders the RCA unable to share 
information because the analysis fails to represent systemic causality. The result is a shallow 
analysis (Latino et al., 2011) and restricted to local health facilities and the outcome is a 
report that fails to “understand the causes of system breakdowns” (Runciman et al., 2003, 
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p. 974). It is unclear why, in the research context, chain of event documents were not 
completed. Without a statement of clear systemic causality, the RCA lacks methodological 
rigour (Latino et al., 2011). According to Latino et al. (2011), the overall problem is that the 
RCA lacks standardisation and this influences the application of the RCA across 
organisations. In Queensland, although a clear process for the conduct and template for the 
compilation of the report is available, a lack of standardised methodology appears. 
The language is a further challenging aspect of the legislation. In the chain of events 
legislation the statement that the “RCA team may prepare a document” is central to this 
predicament. The use of the term ‘may’ applies deontic terminology or language that permits 
interpretation (Lomotan et al., 2010) and provides a discretionary approach. Deontic 
language is customarily applied to policy documents and is common in documents of public 
concern (Georg, Colombet, & Jaulent, 2005). It is argued that deontic language in the 
legislation is a safety concern and renders principle 6, which defines issues of teamwork and 
sharing information, discordant with organisational expectations. Thus, organisational and 
operational objectives do not necessarily converge because an option exists to discount a 
portion of the RCA. The point, aside from the benefits of time when not completing the 
chain of event documents, raises concern about flexible methodologies associated with the 
RCA. The flexible approach renders the organisational commitment to learn from harm 
events and safety open to question (Georg et al., 2005). In view of resource commitments 
associated with compiling the RCA, it appears that the optional approach to the chain of 
events documents may not only speed up completion of the report but simplify the process.  
Furthermore, ‘soft’ language, another form of interpretive language that promotes 
flexibility, was used in the RCA. Soft language refers to words that make a request rather 
than providing a clear direction in the recommendation statement. An example of deontic 
soft language is “Exc Director corresponds with . . . to consider trauma service” (RCA 
#26). In this example, authority gradients cannot be excluded because the recommendation is 
directed to the Executive Director but he/she, is given the option to consider an alternative. 
Legislative conditions that surround the conduct of the RCA have a unique social 
value that also cannot be disregarded. The RCA brings to the community the knowledge that 
in the event of an adverse event, learning will occur and harm will be minimised. To that 
end, the RCA report offers society an approach and an explanation that reviews the incident 
and provides a commitment to answer healthcare errors. This approach conforms to the 
social wellbeing of healthcare. The underlying assumption is that the RCA fulfils a social 
expectation by investigating unexpected adverse events. Moreover, the RCA acknowledges 
that corrective procedure(s) have been considered by the organisation. Added to this, the 
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open disclosure process (Queensland Health, 2009a) informs patients, families and carers of 
particulars within the RCA and appeals to recognised principles of social justice. 
It is argued that the conduct of the RCA needs direction, because current practices 
are flexible to the point of undermining the objective of the RCA process. Legislative 
conditions direct and inform the RCA but in so doing the process is complex and these 
influences disconnect organisational views from the operational processes. The discord 
manifests as a document which shows little resemblance to analysis and fails to identify 
organisational harms (Latino et al., 2011) because superficial investigative techniques are 
applied. Notably, these techniques are enabled by legislative conditions. Thus, processes and 
practices of the RCA are produced and reproduced by both legislation and organisational 
imperatives to a point where operational shortcuts are made that separate organisational 
goals from the operational conduct of the RCA. As a result, information sharing is not 
available because the RCA lacks analytical processes (Nicolini et al., 2011a). Studdert and 
Brennan (2001, p. 271) argue that, “addressing error in medicine through the RCA demands 
a thorough reconsideration of the legal mechanisms currently used to deal with harms in 
healthcare”. In Queensland, a disconnect occurs between the conduct of the RCA and 
organisational goals because of a combination of the complexity of harm and layers of 
regulatory oversight engender a flexibility in the conduct of a patient harm event analysis. A 
systemic relationship appears and will be addressed later in the Chapter.  
 
6.3 MULTI-LAYERED INDIVIDUALISED BLAME 
The third theoretical proposition asserted that the RCA identified multiple layers of 
individualised blame.  Blame is active in the RCA which is contrary to legislative, 
organisational and operational views. The analysis revealed multiple accounts of individual 
blame and moreover blame was multi-layered. In other words, at times doctors, nurses, allied 
health and ancillary staff were at times all assigned blame. Section 6.3 sets out to understand 
more about the contradictory nature of identification of blame in the RCA. 
The concept of medical error and harm in healthcare following the release of the 
QAHCS report (Wilson et al., 1995) and the IOM report (IOM, 2000) prompted the 
development of government policies and patient safety initiatives to make care safer 
(Iedema, Jorm, Braithwaite, et al., 2006). The approach was to identify healthcare errors as 
system failures rather than individual carelessness (O’Connor, Kotze, & Wright, 2011). This 
approach was a significant departure from the traditional medico-legal structure of 
malpractice and negligence. At this point, it is important to note that elements of malpractice 
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and negligence are not the focus of blame in this discussion. In particular, Queensland’s 
legislative provisions assert no allegations of blameworthy acts in excerpts of text used in 
this thesis (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007). To that end, no issues of 
negligence, malpractice or proximate cause are determined, implied, or intuitively linked to 
the excerpts of text used as exemplars.  
The concept of blame in healthcare has been given focus where blame was 
acknowledged as a legacy of the medical tradition (IOM, 2000). The report noted that a large 
number of preventable clinical adverse events were the result of individual poor practices 
which were considered the result of system inadequacies rather than individual malpractice. 
This idea was new to healthcare and involved system variables such as deficiencies in 
information systems, technology, or a lack of co-ordinated teams (Mengis & Nicolini, 2010). 
Hence, there was an imperative to change the culture of blame to address latent failures 
within a system. In response, guidelines were developed to report clinical incidents and to 
learn from events. As such, the RCA appeared as a technique to investigate clinical harm and 
to provide solutions to systemic failures. In Queensland, RCA technique draws on the U.S. 
Veterans Affairs model of the RCA as articulated by Bagian et al. (2002). 
The new approach encouraged healthcare organisations to be more open about errors 
and to learn from harm rather than conceal incidents. According to Runciman et al. (2007), 
adverse events were “unusually complex” and “some features that predispose to error and 
aggravate their consequences coexist and interact to a degree that is seldom found in other 
human endeavours” (Runciman et al., 2003, p. 974). This is relevant to the RCA as the 
“challenges of undertaking root cause analysis” were acknowledged (Nicolini et al., 2011a, 
p. 34). During the process of doing an RCA, it is assumed it is not the intention of the RCA 
to blame health professionals and yet the research analysis indicated that blaming individuals 
was a significant feature of the process. Further, blame in the RCA implied a sense of 
imbalance between the language in the RCA and the legislative conditions (Walton, 2004).  
The concepts of blame and penalty are well established in Western cultures 
(O’Connor et al., 2011; Williams, 2003). Historically, negligence is implied where there is 
fault (Wong & Balasingam, 2013); or a failure to “exercise reasonable knowledge, skill and 
care” in healthcare (Runciman et al., 2007, p. 86). These circumstances are traditionally dealt 
with through tort systems. In addition to the legal system, medical errors attract disciplinary 
actions determined through health regulatory bodies that deal with allegations of 
blameworthy conduct and through medical councils (Health and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act, 2007, Division 4). Regulation discourages the RCA from apportioning 
blame (Wakefield & Rashford, 2011, p. 6). The intent is to avoid judicial proceedings and to 
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focus on the system to reduce error and improve safety. The assumption is that such an 
approach will encourage disclosure and the sharing of information where blame is not 
assigned. This represented a shift in the pathology of blame (O’Connor et al., 2011) from a 
focus on the apportioning of blame, and the seeking of retribution and compensation 
(Runciman et al., 2007, p. 83), to an approach which sought to identify system deficits that 
prompted human error. In Queensland, a no-blame approach was endorsed which meant, in 
short, that it was the system and not human error that caused harm. More specifically, while 
error contributed to harm in healthcare the focus of harm investigations was system failures. 
Yet, this was more complex than first anticipated. 
The no-blame approach was introduced to Queensland Health in 2005 together with 
voluntary reporting techniques and the RCA. To support and inform these processes, 
legislative frameworks were introduced by Queensland Health. The legislation most relevant 
to blame is section 38O of the Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act (2007) which 
defines a blameworthy act as an intentionally unsafe act or deliberate patient abuse and 
conduct that constitutes a criminal offence. In Queensland, 3% of annual RCAs are stopped 
until allegations of blameworthiness can be determined (Queensland Health, 2013). 
Blameworthy acts are defined in the legislation, in particular, in section 38Q entitled, 
“Stopping the conduct of RCA of reportable event – commission authority” (Health and 
Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007, division 4). In some situations where an RCA has 
begun, internal processes are actioned to stop the RCA process until the allegations of 
blameworthiness are determined.  
In relation to the legislation, the conduct of the RCA and blame, section 38J (Health 
and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007) guides the conduct of the RCA and here the 
discussion focuses on two distinctive principles. Principle one acknowledges healthcare 
errors and a no-blame or reprisal position and principle two identifies that healthcare 
professionals are accountable for their actions (Health and Other Legislation Amendment 
Act, 2007). The legislative provisions in section 38J (Health and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act, 2007) seek to protect the RCA document and to alleviate professional fears 
of litigious action. As noted previously, legislative conditions are complex and these appear 
problematic in the construction of blame in the RCA.  
To briefly return to the peculiarities of the construction of the RCA report, the focus 
is on errors that result from failures that are either active or latent and contained within the 
larger organisational dynamic (Reason, 2000). Dekker (2011, p. 110) argued that Reason’s 
Swiss cheese model “sets error in organisational context” by distinguishing individual active 
errors from system latent errors. From this perspective, Reason’s views reflect the intent of 
 Chapter 6: Latent Analysis 143 
the RCA. Therefore, the underlying “ethos” of the RCA was to provide a structured 
investigation of clinical incidents and to identify an accumulated cause in the form of root 
cause(s) (Iedema, Jorm, Braithwaite, et al., 2006, p. 1613). However, the language in the 
RCA largely represented active errors, or actions by the person at the sharp-end (the person 
last in contact with the patient before the incident occurred) and these remained separate 
from any systemic latent failures identified later in the report. As such, the peculiarity is that 
the structure of the RCA report is not clear because the focus of analysis is on individual 
failures. 
As noted, it is not the intention of the RCA to hide information nor blame or criticise 
the clinical practice of colleagues (Iedema et al., 2006). However, the complexity of human 
error in the RCA cannot be explained other than in terms of mistake, misconduct or error 
because this is how the chain of event documents typically depict causality. In the 
description of the event section, no errors either active or latent were identified. As a result, 
errors in a variety of forms were identified in the language of the chain of event documents; 
the RCA and the use of language here depicted multiple human errors as active errors. 
Furthermore, while active errors were central to the analysis process, they were constructed 
in the absence of systemic latent errors. Thus, with many active errors identified, the analysis 
centred on human errors and the language assigned blame to health professionals. The 
problem here is more than a contradiction in organisational and legislative constructs of the 
RCA because blame is active and latent failures are ignored (Bagian et al., 2002; Williams, 
2003). The problem is that linguistic strategies manoeuvre active errors to give the 
appearance of latent issues to comply with regulatory demands. Linguistic strategies 
construct individualised blame and a fragmented report.  
In the absence of latent failure, individual error was transformed into blame in the 
final report in contravention of policy. Multiple accounts of human error were marked as 
individual failures and acknowledged frequently in the RCA. As human error escalated in 
the absence of the identification of contextual latent failure, the notion of blame entered the 
language of the RCA most prominently in the chain of event documents. What the above 
suggests is that although it is not the intention of the RCA to impose blame, the structure and 
function of the RCA deems this unavoidable (Williams, 2003, p. 431). The language 
identified particular professionals or groups of professionals that suggested wrong-doing 
rather than error. An example of wrong-doing was typically represented as individual error 
in excerpts of text. Examples of finger-pointing included “patient was over sedated” (RCA 
# 22), “patient assessment inadequate” (RCA #19), “plan of care not consistent with 
assessment” (RCA #24) and “antibiotics not administered” (RCA #7). These inferences, 
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however, were not supported by the corresponding error chains but appeared as statements in 
the absence of systemic latent failures. The result is the RCA presented as an “analysis of 
sharp-end frontline human error” (Kennedy, 2004).  
The notion of sharp end failures was significant and comprised 71% of the research 
data in the individual category. It was found to be relevant that as an RCA progressed to the 
final parts of the report and the categorisation of problem statement, causal statements and 
recommendations, there was another language shift from direct individual error to system 
factors. These “linguistic moves” (Pollner, 1974, p. 39) diverted the text and the reader’s 
attention from active errors to system failures. The problem is that latent system failures 
appeared innovative and without causal reference and created ambiguity in the final report. 
This approach was challenging for a number of reasons but principally because the strategy 
avoids the allegations of directing blame and conforms to legislative provisions by not 
naming, blaming and shaming (Runciman et al., 2007). These conditions prompted linguistic 
moves (Pollner, 1974) where techniques to conform to regulatory instructions framed the 
language. 
Sections of the legislation dictate exemptions whereby the RCA team is not liable 
for identifying human error that may be apportioned to acts of negligence. Nor, is any person 
on the RCA team liable for information, giving information, or any breech to professional 
codes, standards or conduct attributed within the RCA (Health and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act, 2007, s38Z). As Wakefield and Rashford (2011, p. 6) asserted, the RCA 
“lacks the capacity to apportion blame”. Moreover, the RCA is not designed to investigate 
human error because regulatory focus is on correction of system failures rather than 
individual culpability. Legislatively, it may be that the RCA ultimately lacks the capacity to 
apportion blame but in practice blame has a strong presence in the RCA reports. In view of 
language decoys and the inconsistencies in legislative and operational agendas, the paradox 
is that blame is overlooked by governing bodies because the legislation imposes an onus on 
the RCA to report systemic failure and not blame. To that end, the legislation protects 
information contained in the chain of event documents which disables the notion of blame 
(Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007; Health Services Amendment 
Regulation (No. 1), 2008). As a consequence, human error goes unnoticed because it is 
disregarded within legislative information disclosures. The problem with this is that the RCA 
is challenged to balance human error with latent failures because without systemic causality 
all that is left is human error.  
To explore this further, excerpts such as “The relieving Registrar did not escalate” 
(RCA #7), “Incorrect diagnosis” (RCA #24), “Patient assessment inadequate” (RCA #26), 
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“Medical officers believe patient injuries were minor” (RCA #20) and “Wrong surgical 
procedure performed” (RCAs #12, #9), are typical of statements that appear in relation to 
issues of malpractice. Yet, the legislation relieves the RCA team of accountable language, as 
noted earlier. The data revealed that the scale of human error described in the RCAs was 
large. This is an unexpected finding which appears to go unnoticed. In addition, human 
errors appear task to task, unit to unit, facility to facility and are easy to identify, therefore 
individual fault is hard to dismiss in the RCA because crowds of human errors exist. As a 
result, the complexity to delve into the multiple accounts of individual failure to search for 
latent failure (Bagian et al., 2002) is beyond the scope of the RCA in Queensland. The search 
for causality is the issue here.  
The search for cause and effect is an active principle in the RCA and central to 
methodologies in the regulatory framework of the RCA (Health and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act, 2007; Latino et al., 2011). With the principal tenet being that cause and 
effect must be identified in the RCA and legislative privileges exist that protect the RCA 
team from interpreting and reporting individual clinical practices, finding cause and effect is 
not only complex but unmanageable within the current governances. The problem, although 
it is not the intention to assign blame in the RCA, is that responsibility is apportioned 
because fault is hard to dismiss. Further, active failures inform latent system failures and this 
is an organisational requirement. It appears that the complexity of the analysis, which works 
in retrospect and up through Reason’s (1990) defences to source system failures, is difficult. 
The difficulty is that blame or fault cannot be disregarded from the minds of the RCA team 
or from the language in the report. The process of doing an RCA requires the investigators to 
detach notions of fault and blame and show causality and this is a skill of discernment 
(Latino et al., 2011). Yet, these issues further complicate the process of doing an RCA. The 
characteristics of blame in the RCA are complex.  
Williams (2003) argues that blame constitutes particular features. For example, 
blame is hard not to assign in the event of wrong-doing (O’Connor et al., 2011) and 
judgements are made that acknowledge how blame is constructed. These features are 
contained within the language used in the RCAs. The process of assigning blame is termed 
“attributions of responsibility” (Williams, 2003, p. 431) and this is relevant to expose more 
understanding of and about blame. According to Williams (2003), blame and responsibility 
are assigned to three characteristics of an offender and these features were represented in the 
data. For example, “. . . the CTG trace was interpreted incorrectly because the medical 
officer and the midwife were not familiar with CTG trace” (RCA #32). In this excerpt, the 
attribution of blame involved the incorrect analysis of the CTG and particular health 
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professionals were apportioned fault. Williams (2003, p. 432) terms this “demonisation” 
where the emphasis is on recognising offender(s).  
The second characteristic is “tunnel vision” (Williams, 2003, p. 436). An example of 
it is “failure to identify the deteriorating patient from clinical observations” (RCAs #4, 
#24). The tunnel vision in this excerpt is that the team were focused on other issues and were 
unaware of the declining observations.  
The third characteristic is “scapegoating” (Williams, 2003, p. 438), where 
responsibilities are separated or assigned to another person. This differs from demonisation 
because moral accountability is diverted to another. The notion of moral accountability 
points to the re-assignment of blame in an attempt to justify the result. An example of this 
was difficult to find. Yet, in the event of wrong site surgery the language in the RCA 
diverted attention from the surgical error to focus on the patient’s lifestyle patterns and 
weight which the RCA claims contributed to the orchidectomy. While this may be a 
significant contributing factor, system failures were not identified. From the data, the 
patient’s “BMI was 24.3%, weight 78 kg, height 179 cm” (RCA #10) and appeared a 
secondary rather than immediate cause for the loss of the testicle. The point is that only the 
complications associated with repeat hernia repair operations were identified and no system 
failures. From the example, in the RCA (#10) “loss of blood supply . . . the patient’s lifestyle 
factors” were recognised as contributing factors to the orchidectomy and because of this the 
focus of the recommendations turned to the consent form which did not explicitly inform 
“high risk” patients of testicular viability. This type of blame shifting language has the effect 
of abrogating responsibility and is contrary to the principals of the Act (2007). Blame in the 
examples above is overtly assigned to professional(s) and acknowledges active failure 
principles. Williams (2003) argues that the assignment of blame occurs because there is a 
social need to determine who is responsible.  
The social view of blame language in the RCA is that another approach would have 
resulted in a different outcome; and that “things could have been done otherwise” (Williams, 
2003, p. 432). This notion is central to blame, and implies individual fault. This is significant 
because the unintentional assignment of blame has a latent characteristic of drawing the 
analysis to a close rather than opening systemic inquiry. Unfortunately, this is beneficial to 
the organisation because resources are contained through the process of approval and 
completion. However, drawing the RCA to a close in the absence of latent causality and 
fragmented language, masks not only that an alternative approach exists but also that closure 
of the report is endorsed by methods that blame and deny the organisational view of system 
safety and harm in the report.  
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To understand more about how these characteristics manifest, Pollner’s (1974) 
notion of mundane reasoning is addressed. “Mundane reasoning” (Pollner, 1974, p. 35) 
explains how information is interpreted and rationalised and versions of reality are re-
constructed that represent the RCA report. Pollner (1974) argues that mundane reasoning 
occurs when people simultaneously look at the same problems but describe the problem in 
disparate and contradictory ways. Previously it was noted that sequences of events are 
reconstructed and comprise worldviews. It is also acknowledged that worldviews are 
accumulative and informed by legislation and governance provisions. The worldviews 
deconstruct the information through the processes of reconstruction. In this process, 
worldviews evolve to become versions of reality that are more subjective than objective 
because the world view is grounded in experiences of healthcare (Derthick, 1990; Pollner, 
1974). These conditions latently inform the assignment of blame because the reality in 
healthcare is that no-blame processes exist. While this appears objective, the reality is that 
blame in the RCA is legislatively biased because individual wrong-doing is not permitted. 
The assumption is that blame appears in the RCA, but this is bizarre because blame is made 
‘visibly invisible’ to regulatory influences. This is an example of blurred reality that prevents 
healthcare from seeing what is really there. More importantly, blame prevents the 
organisation from seeing what is not there: latent causality that contributes to harm.  
From the above we understand that blame is apportioned in the RCA. Furthermore, 
in the quest for cause and effect, blame is overlooked and is not visible to the RCA team or 
to the organisation because no-blame assertions exist. The meaning behind this is that 
“silence is the predominant rejoinder in healthcare” (Khatri et al., 2009, p. 315). The RCA 
fails to see the blame in the language because it was never intentionally applied and is not 
operationally supported. Therefore, blame does not exist. While this appears intangible, the 
problem is that harm is interpreted through active error statements because there are no other 
possibilities in the absence of latent causal chains. In so doing, reality is distorted by the 
volume of active failures that migrate into blame as the RCA unfolds. The problem is that 
these constructs appear routine and normalised in the RCA (Vaughan, 1996) because much 
of the language (71%) in the individual category focused on individualised error. 
It is not the case that the RCA actively encourages individualised error statements 
nor that governance authorities endorse blame statements. Yet, blame is omnipresent and 
endorsed in the RCA within multiple accounts of individual failures. Moreover, these 
statements were overlooked and ignored by governance bodies because notions of mundane 
reasoning provided a way of seeing and then not seeing. Further, the majority of harm was 
attributed to multiple accounts of human error and previously unacknowledged failures 
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brought to support the constructs of system analysis. The design of the flow diagrams to 
focus on chronologies of active failures constrained the process in such a way that systemic 
issues were not addressed. Indeed, a systems analysis would require a divergence from the 
RCA process. Blame in the RCA represented a significant challenge because “individuals are 
not held or taken responsible for their actions . . . rather . . . they are victims of a greater 
force that holds them in its sway” (Locke, 2009, p. 577). In the absence of latent failures, 
blame dominated because analytical attention focused on perpetual active failures which 
could not be avoided. Blame was not intentionally evoked but existed as a construct of the 
conduct of the RCA, one that prevented the identification of causality and thus learning from 
error.  
Thus far, the argument is that fragmented language in the RCA diverted a systematic 
process of analysis which departed from organisational policy to a point where 
individualised fault was exposed in the RCA. Yet, these ideas have invoked questions about 
why there is departure from a theoretical base that has been widely adopted and drives the 
RCA to improve patient safety. 
 
6.4 THE RCA IS NOT GROUNDED IN THE THEORY THAT 
UNDERPINNS HEALTHCARE’S SYSTEMATIC PROCESS OF 
ANALYSIS 
To explore this the argument draws on the theoretical ideas that not only underpin 
this research but the systemic nature of harm in healthcare; that everything interacts with 
everything else; that change that goes unnoticed results in disaster (Vaughan, 1999). The 
apriori categories sort the theoretical ideas into a systems-level discussion. The challenge 
here is to determine if a theoretical relationship exists between the categories to understand 
more about the function of the RCA to SAC 1 harm events. As such, a deeper examination of 
healthcare’s systematic process of analysis to include latent causes, root causes and 
recommendations that underpin the conduct of the RCA are the focus here because these 
have legislative and regulatory influence in the conduct of the RCA. 
As noted, the perspective is that everything interacts with everything else and this is 
common to the RCAs systematic process of analysis where adverse events are a consequence 
factors that go unnoticed and result in harm. The emphasis is to understand the social 
construction of the RCA as a technique to improve SAC 1 harm.   
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6.4.1 The Environment 
As noted, the environment category referred to political, legislative, regulatory and 
cultural settings and their networks and social inter-organisational relationships (Vaughan, 
1999). This is the overarching structure of healthcare from which a system of broad social 
constructs that comprise policy, legislation and governance documents, RCA processes are 
informed. The theoretical view argues that an inter-connectedness exists that exerts a 
relationship not only between components of this category but and across and between other 
categories and this is central to explore the function of the RCA.  What follows is a closer 
examination of organisational policy to explore if a relationship exists that influences the 
dysfunction between policy and practice. 
RCA Organisational Policy and Legislation 
Queensland Health provided organisational directives to support the process of 
doing an RCA and these are supported and regulated by legislation. In brief, state-wide 
policy asserts to improve patient safety using the RCA as a technique to locate cause and 
effect through the identification of latent system failures and develop corrective strategies to 
mitigate patient harm. Yet, these fundament principles were absent from RCA reports 
leaving the RCA without a systematic approach of analysis which jeopardised the function 
the RCA to improve patient safety.  
In Queensland Health, RCA policy documents were framed in internationally 
accepted concepts that declare a focus on system failures rather than individual error using 
system-level analysis. The work of Reason’s (1990) system/person is explicitly defined in 
the analysis of harm events in healthcare. Reason (1995) provided a distinctive classification 
between active errors and latent failures, where active errors were failures that involved 
people and latent error were failures within the system.  These principles were endorsed by 
Queensland Health’s policy documents (Queensland Health, 2010) that guide the RCA.  
Further, organisational policy makes clear Reason’s (1990) safety defences as barriers and 
these are key elements in the RCA process. Five organisational barriers comprised 
healthcare’s system and these were defined as the organisation, the workplace, the team, the 
individual and the patient (Queensland Government, 2010). These theoretical barrier points 
provided markers within the analysis process that permitted error to be traced back to a 
functional part of healthcare, making visible the location of the error in the system. The idea 
was that any one of five safety barrier points in an error trajectory may be blocked at a level 
to prevent patient harm.   
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In addition to Reason (1990), patient safety in Queensland Health has also been 
influenced by the work of Perrow (1984). Perrow’s (1984) ideas are not clearly expressed in 
Queensland Health RCA policy documents but frame the safety culture of healthcare in 
recognising that harm is not the result of individuals but a sequence of interactive system 
failures. The view draws on Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 1984) that human errors 
cannot be isolated from complex systems because the system is an intricate balance of 
components. The relationship is that these frameworks of humans working in organisations 
were considered components of larger network.  More specifically these tenets asserted that 
a connection between the network and people is central to harm in healthcare.  As such, 
explicit theoretical ideas underpin RCA policy documents.  
Reason’s (1990, 2000) theoretical principles were detailed in the Queensland Health 
Root Cause Analysis Reference Manual (Queensland Government, 2010) and implicitly 
referred to in A Guide for Root Cause Analysis Teams (Queensland Health, 2009b). These 
documents conceptually framed a systematic approach to the RCA. Further, the Root Cause 
Analysis Reference Manual (Queensland Government, 2010, p. 6) asserted that “improving 
safety is all about identifying, understanding and managing risks” the implication that a 
network of factors contributed to safety. As a result, clinical adverse events were understood 
to be an organisational concern because accidents or errors were more persuasively 
explained in terms of organisational system failures rather than human error.  More 
precisely, Perrow (1984) and Reason (1990) converged on Queensland’s Health 
organisational view of safety in acknowledging that human error and unanticipated failures 
were components of the system.  Perrow (1984) provided a broader organisational 
perspective that underpinned the approach to patient safety while Reason’s (1990) 
perspective informed the process of doing an RCA.   
It thus can be argued that in the development of policy, the aetiology of system 
failures existed as a broad framework to guide patient safety and to retrospectively examine 
adverse events in healthcare. In this way, the RCA was informed by organisational policy to 
guide the conduct of RCA to identify system failures supported by error chains and the 
provision of solutions to mitigate patient harm.  The approach  supported ideas that patient 
harm was a systemic process and drew on systems thinking (Queensland Government, 2010, 
p. 7) as a way of focusing clinical investigations away from blaming individuals to identify 
causal relationships between active errors and latent failures (Reason, 2000). In a consistent 
manner, the adoption of systems thinking was a global approach designed to shift healthcare 
away from a culture of blame or sharp-end failures. This offered a “multilevel understanding 
of the factors that contribute to human errors” (Paletz, et al 2009, P. 435). As a result, RCA 
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was prompted by questions that enquire what happened, why it happened and how could it 
be prevented.  The RCA repeatedly asked why to establish root cause(s).  Thus, detailed 
RCA processes were attended in further policy documents.  
In addition, organisational directives in the form of the Reference Manual 
(Queensland Government, 2010) and Guide for Root Cause Analysis Teams (Queensland 
Health, 2009b) elicited more detail in the process of doing RCA. These documents provided 
detail that used a step-by-step approach to elicit latent cause. A “chronological order”, 
(Queensland Government, 2010, p. 12-13) was noted in the policy to support the 
development of chain of event documents and identify latent failures.  The Guide as 
mentioned above, (Queensland Health, 2009b) assisted the RCA team to gather human factor 
information, to understand more about situations that comprised harm, through a set of triage 
questions to support the development of cause and effect.  However, because the chain of 
event documents contained information that was largely extracted from clinical notes, the 
process to identify latent failures represented a chronology of a patient’s admission rather 
than a “sequence of events” to answer “how and what questions” (Queensland Government, 
2010, p. 19). 
As noted, the RCA is buttressed by legislation. In the legislation, Part 4B, Root 
Cause Analysis (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007) legislative conditions 
inform to the conduct of RCA. In particular, the legislation makes clear the RCA is a 
“quality improvement” technique and not a safety initiative (Health and Other Legislation 
Amendment Bill, 2007, p. 3) and this is relevant to the broader legislative conditions that 
guide the RCA. Of relevance, sections of the legislation provide details that relate to the 
release of information and information disclosures, and these are significant to the 
development of chain of event diagrams, part 1 and 2. Yet, the chain of event documents 
contain privileges that allow authorised healthcare personnel only to access chain of event 
documents. As a result, the RCA template consisted of sections that were approved for 
distribution while other sections were locked and could not be distributed. Despite this, the 
RCA template intended to ensure RCA processes were consistent across Queensland through 
the application of a working document to produce a standardised report. The problem was 
that in spite of the template, an application of organisational policy was absent from RCA 
reports. In practice healthcare’s RCA did not extend to an examination of system defences as 
defined. 
A contradiction appeared where in practice, the RCA report did not reflect processes 
defined by organisational policy or by the legislation.  A number of issues were revealed 
from the data that revealed a separation from organisational directives.  First, Reason’s 
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(1990) active errors and latent failures and organisational barrier points were explicitly 
defined in policy but were not represented on the RCA. A reason for this is that the template, 
where analysis of an event is recorded, provided no capacity for active errors to be traced 
back to latent system failures. This meant that during the processes of doing RCA, analysis 
did not extend across all five levels of defences as defined by organisational policies. Rather, 
analysis was restricted to the patient, the individual and the team where issues of active 
failure and human error prevailed. This was not commensurate with the discourse of safety 
defined by policy. As a result, latent system failures were not clearly identified. This is 
addressed more as the discussion unfolds.  
The second issue which is commensurate with organisational policy is that the RCA 
template made clear the application of the 5Whys processes, but these were difficult to place 
in the RCA.  By way of illustration, the 5Whys processes involved breaking complex issues 
into smaller components to more clearly reveal latent cause and effect in the chain of event 
document, Part 1 where these concepts were mapped onto the RCA template, chain of event 
document, Part 2. The point is that organisational barriers were not clearly identified in the 
template for the reason that safety defences could not be predicted in the absence of 
identifying latent failures. Without the presence of organisational safety defences and the 
avoidance of 5 Whys principles, key safety issues were lost from the RCA’s investigation. 
Further, this approach was hard to comply with because the RCA template provided a set of 
numbered frames only and contributory factor information was entered in terms of a 
chronology. The avoidance of safety defences could be explained by template inadequacies. 
As such, the chain of event document, Part 1 that was intended to identify cause and effect 
did not replicate organisational safety system failures according to Reason’s (1990) defence 
barrier approach.  
To examine this more closely by returning to the data, minimal excerpts of text were 
sorted into the environment category and issues that appeared in the initial stages of the RCA 
and were relevant to this category such as  remoteness, transport and infrastructure, 
disappeared from the RCA report. This is significant because organisational policy 
announced to identify latent failures yet when factors related to infrastructure or broader 
complex systems were identified they were not analysed and disregarded from the RCA 
report.  This idea is complex and reasons are unclear to this research.  Overall, analytical 
process that underpinned a systematic process of analysis was overlooked and distinctive 
safety components that comprised the investigation were not attended. 
 The issue was that there was failure to analyse incidents using safety levels to guide 
the investigation and the analysis focused on front-line services rather than organisational 
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safety dimensions (Reason, 2000) that contributed to harm.  As such, the applications of 
RCA processes were not consistent with organisational policy or theoretical directives. In so 
doing, the RCA had no capacity for construction of latent cause because in practice system 
safety defences in healthcare, the organisation and the workplace were excluded from 
analysis. Not only were defences as safety ideas ignored in the RCA at the local level, more 
widely, there are no lessons to be shared for events that repeat in healthcare. Moreover, a 
lack of convergence between policy documents that informed the application of the RCA 
rendered an optional approach to the conduct of the RCA which changed the way an analysis 
of an event is carried out.  
6.4.2 The Organisation 
The organisation is healthcare. The organisation carries out the RCA with the motive 
to improve patient safety. For that reason the focus of this section is to examine central 
components that drive the process of RCA; a systematic process of analysis; latent failures, 
root causes and recommendations from an operational perspective with the view to explore 
the relationship between the environment and the organisation.    
Systemic Process of Analysis 
Previous Chapters revealed a principle cause of concern was that the adoption of a 
clear process of analysis was poorly represented in the RCA where the analysis goes behind 
immediate active failures in the pursuit of underlying organisational risks (Latino, 2011), or 
latent failures as defined in organisational policy. Specifically, the “RCA is a process of 
discovering the causes of an incident, used systems thinking” (Queensland Government, 
2010, p. 7) to provide information about how the incident occurred and to develop strategies 
to mitigate harm.  Reason’s (2000) defence barriers were central here. Yet, this was not 
apparent in the data. More specifically, the retrospective approach and the backward path of 
analysis that flowed upward from the adverse event to identify errors/risks in higher level 
defence barriers were not clear. Nor was the 5 Whys processes to identify safety concerns in 
the chain of event documents and these concepts were central to a systematic process of 
analysis. 
Returning to the data, most of the sample RCAs completed the part 1 chain of event 
documents. Of these, 50% identified barrier points onto the RCA template but the barriers 
were not labelled to be able to identify the level of the error. This is not consistent with 
Reason’s five barrier framework (Queensland Government, 2010). Without clear error 
trajectories to define organisational safety concerns system failures were not clear and the 
identification of latent cause was ignored. This is a type of “knowledge to action gap” where 
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“knowledge is not used because there is a failure to transfer it effectively to the intended 
audience” (Strauss et al., 2013, p. 16).  In the process of analysis the interaction between 
human failures and the system were disregarded and this is an important omission in the 
RCA.  Further, in the absence of system defences to trace error back to the source, the RCA 
focused on failures of healthcare workers and these characteristics were not consistent with 
organisational policy. Moreover, not only were the failures of individuals noted in the RCA 
chain of event documents but regulatory agents endorsed RCAs that lacked a clear 
systematic process of analysis. This is an organisational failure. To address this, the 
following sections examine principal components of the RCA to understand more about a 
phenomenon where the organisation affirms a discordant approach to a systematic process of 
analysis.  
Latent Causes 
Reason (1995, p. 1710) declared that latent failures were created “along various 
organisational and departmental pathways to the workplace where they create the local 
conditions that promote the commission of errors”.  Despite latent causes being fundamental 
to the systematic process of analysis, latent causes that informed the cause of the event were 
hard to find in the RCA. 
The data revealed that the chain of events document part 1 and part 2 situated latent 
cause(s) from the analysis. Yet, these were difficult to identify in the chain of event 
documents part 1 and 2. In the data 80% of the RCAs developed the chain of event document 
part 1 but this featured as a patient admission event chronology rather than an error chain. 
Despite the almost routine application of the chain of event document part 1, the chain of 
event document part 2, the root cause documents were not consistently applied to the 
completed RCA report.  
Less than half (43%) of RCAs that completed a chain of event document part 1, 
moved on to the development a chain of event document part 2. Apart from error chains that 
lacked processes to identify latent failures, root causes, although randomly constructed, were 
not framed on the evidence derived from the analysis. This challenges the function of the 
RCA as an analysis technique. To provide more explanation, there was an organisational 
expectation that the RCA would recognise system deficiencies through the analysis and 
provide practical recommendations to fix the problem. However, it is argued in the processes 
to find latent cause the focus of analysis could not move past individual active errors. As 
such, cause and effect centred on health care worker error during a patient’s admission. 
While it was the purpose of the RCA to explore human error, the failure to neither locate 
system failure nor provide a connection to higher level system breeched organisational 
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directives. This rendered the RCA an analysis that focused on volumes of individual error, or 
the person at the sharp end, from which to develop root causes. The result, was that root 
causes were constructed arbitrarily; the consequence of other devices. 
A clearer example of these issues is sourced from the data. The data implicitly 
referred to individual errors as knowledge errors, or a lack of information or acquisition of 
knowledge across the a priori categories. For example, “Surgical side not on form” (RCA 
#9), “Medical officers believe patient injuries were minor” (RCA #26), “Multiple staff not 
familiar with form” (RCA #32) and “Conflicting assessments between team” (RCA #21). 
While these types of errors have been linked to harm in healthcare, errors in knowledge are 
considered a systemic issue. This was reflected in the data where 69% of the text sorted into 
the individual category focused on individual errors and failed to expose systemic causes that 
led the individual to act in that manner. The point was that the focus of analysis was on 
issues of violation where organisational policies were not followed, rather than an analysis to 
find the cause of the violation(s). Moreover, the RCA applied language decoys that shifted 
the analysis away from initial concerns of violations onto other issues. From the example 
“staff not familiar with the form”, the RCA determined that although the checklist should 
have been filled out, staff lacked knowledge of the form. Yet, in the absence of more 
information the analysis failed to linked the harm to “staff not familiar with the form”, to 
deficiencies within the system.  As a result, issues of violation were excluded from the 
analysis and ignored. In the absence of latent system failure the focus of analysis was human 
error. The result was individual blame became the default position in the absence of latent 
cause and effect. 
A further 62% of text sorted into the task subcategory identified failures to carry out 
a task. The significance here was that individual acts were defined in the RCA as a failure to 
effectively deliver a task and the analysis focused on the unsafe act rather than systemic 
latent failures. The principal concern is not just that individuals were linked to harm, the 
issue is that blame is contraindicated in organisational policy. More importantly, the 
legislation protected RCA information (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007, 
38J) that included healthcare workers statements and information from derived from clinical 
sources during the RCA investigation. Thus, the legislation provided sanctions that allowed 
information such as violating safety procedures or acts of individual failure to be revealed in 
the chain of event documents and at the same time the legislation provided an option to 
avoid correcting factors that contribute to harm. More specifically, the legislative sanctions 
granted disclosure of active errors while concealing safety events in documents that 
prevented disclosure of individual harm. On the surface this approach may help reduce 
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healthcare’s blame culture, but the process is counterproductive to improving patient safety 
because active errors may be discretely revealed and protected within the legislation while 
latent system failures quietly disregarded in the legislation and obscured in organisational 
processes. 
Central to this predicament is relationship between healthcare, health professionals 
and the patient which is multidimensional. By way of example “surgical side not on the 
form” identified individual error as the focus of the analysis rather than system issues that 
contributed to the omission. The point is that in the search for cause and effect each human 
error warranted further investigation to enable latent failures to be recognised. Yet, these 
relationships were too complex.  As such as human errors were identified, no chain of events 
connected human errors to up-stream system failures. One explanation for this can be 
sourced back to the construction of the RCAs cause and effect documents.  The purpose of 
cause and effect documents was to facilitate broad ranging discussions and a flow of ideas 
around errors and causes and the articulation of a chronology of events by way of operational 
classifications (Queensland Health, 2010). However, as noted in deconstructing error, the 
RCA COE diagrams did not effectively identify organisational risks/errors so latent failures 
were excluded from analysis. Further, healthcare policy established that cause and effect was 
depicted as a relationship to connect one event to another, the analogy is akin to links in a 
chain. Returning to the data, cause and effect was hard to find in the RCA and did not 
identify a relationship between harm and error, nor did causality link active and latent 
failures because the chain of event document, part 1 was a record of the patient’s admission 
events rather than a collection of active and latent interactions that contributed to the harm. 
Thus, the short-comings to define latent causality were clear in the chains of event diagrams 
where there was a failure to show a relationship between these active and latent factors to the 
harm.   
More understanding of the failure to show cause and effect in the RCA was revealed 
in section 38M(2) of the Queensland Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act (2007) 
which stated that 
the RCA team may prepare a document (the chain of event document) that 
details or pictorially represents, the chain of event identified by the RCA 
team as having led to the happening of the reportable event.    
The legislation supported no impetus for the development of the chain of event 
documents. The predicament was that the legislation and organisational directives were 
conflicting.  The legislation gave the option to construct the chain of event documents while 
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policy situated the chain of event documents as the core of RCA to elicit latent failures and 
to prompt the development of root causes. In general, the application of only one chain of 
event document as a chronology of admission asserted a simplified approach to the 
construction of cause and effect. Little is understood about this, but the prospect of searching 
for latent failures for each human error would mean the development of an infinite number 
of cause and effect documents to address the interconnectivity of error variables in SAC 1 
harm events and this seems an impossible request. Moreover, the construction of one cause 
and effect document determined the isolation of system failures too problematic and 
extended beyond the scope of the RCA.   
Root causes or not? 
The systematic process of analysis supported the development of the chain of event 
document, part 2 where root causes of an event were revealed. Yet, as the previous section 
made clear, the data revealed that only the cause and effect document, part 1was constructed 
and these failed to expose latent causes. In the absence of latent cause, the development of 
root causes remains unclear.  Thus, the construction of root causes was arbitrarily applied in 
the data. Marais (2006) et al, argued the complexities of forming root causes, that the RCA is 
not a linear process and nor is it easy to engage (Marais, Saleh, & Leveson, 2006). 
Moreover, Carroll (1995) argued that the construction of root causes is not only complex but 
organisationally satisfying. Carroll (1995) termed this “root cause seduction” (Carroll, 1995, 
p. 180). The view is that in search for cause and effect the development of root cause is 
organisationally fulfilling. Returning to the data with in this knowledge, in view that most 
RCAs did not identify root causes and the unsystematic manner that accompanied the 
identification of root causes in the remaining sample, there a luring quality that attracts root 
causes to developing solutions. 
In this research, the manifest analysis revealed that root causes were mostly ignored 
in the RCA process because, as argued, latent causes were not typically identified.  From the 
data, root causes were hard to find or “no root causes were identified” was represented in 
57% of the RCAs. The point is that the RCA team reached a predetermined conclusion about 
the cause and effect but these decisions are either not clear or identifiable in the RCA report. 
The flow on effect of this was that decisions were made to inform the development of root 
causes in the absence of clear cause and effect. It is argued, the RCA team could not break 
the event down sufficiently to identify principal root cause(s). More importantly, the 
complexity that surrounds a patient harm event, it is likely that no single root cause existed. 
Hence, because of the multi-dimensional nature of error and the structure of the RCA that 
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lacked identification of organisational barrier points or to reveal latent causes, impossibility 
existed to identify root cause. 
It remains unknown how root causes were developed in the absence of an analysis to 
establish the development of root cause. The constraints are that SAC 1 harm remains 
multifaceted and the systematic approach to analysis is so complex that the approach to 
identify cause and effect mitigates the formation of root causes.  Iedema et al. (2008, p. 469) 
argued that the value of recommendations is negligible because there are “too many 
constraints” which limit the function of  RCAs. The effect of a subjective approach to the 
construction of root causes is that the development of recommendations is equally an 
arbitrary approach and not based on evidence from the investigation. To that end, the 
purpose of the RCA without formative root causes is unclear (Percarpio & Watts, 2013). The 
result, as argued, was that the RCAs search for causality finished prematurely in the absence 
of latent failures and the approach to develop root causes, although expected and central to 
RCA methodology appeared from the context of the text not vital to an investigation which 
left development of solutions problematic. 
Solutions or Assumptions? 
Despite the complexity associated with the RCA process argued as a lack of latent 
causality and the random approach to develop root cause, there was an imperative to localise 
solutions in the RCAs. This was revealed as a richness of solutions where 89% of the RCAs 
proposed recommendations or lessons learned despite absent, or ambiguous assignment of 
cause and effect and root causes. These results made clear that recommendations were not 
only a desired result but expected.  A latent consequence was that recommendations 
appeared hastily compiled and decontextualised rather than informed by the analysis. 
According to Mengis and Nicolini (2011, p. 171), healthcare tradition favours “quick fixes 
and work-arounds rather than systematic analysis”. As such, the swift development of 
recommendations was justified in the RCA and these were endorsed by commissioning 
processes.    
While the reasons for the above phenomenon are not completely clear there is a 
culture surrounding adverse incidents in health care that encouraged the identification of 
solutions ahead of time (Mengis & Nicolini, 2010) and hence before the RCA process has 
been authorised, pre-determined cause and effect had been sub-consciously initiated because 
harm is a re-occurring phenomenon (Kohn et al., 2000; Wilson & Van Der Weyden, 2005).  
As such, similar patterns of harm invited premeditated conclusions in the RCA.  Moreover, 
cause and effect was predictive because of patterns of harm re-appeared.  As a result, causal 
statements were justified in the report despite the absence of robust cause and effect. In this 
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manner, the RCA provided recommendations that were symptomatic solutions (Marais et al., 
2006) in the absence of a robust systemic analysis (Latino, 2011).  This left RCA 
recommendations without influence and the quality of recommendations poor (Atkins, 
2004).  According to Carroll (1995), these constructs make the RCA a solution driven report 
and without theoretical justification.  
The consequence of disparities in the RCA appeared as an impromptu dissemination 
of solutions.  As noted, 89% of the sample provided recommendations or lessons learned.  
While this appeared an exemplary effort, there was little evidence of a process of analysis 
(Nicolini et al., 2011b).  Thus, the development of corrective actions which were not 
informed by systems analysis was acknowledged by dissenting views. In New South Wales 
Australia, Taitz et al., (2010) argued that RCA recommendations lacked strength and the 
focus rested within local facilities rather than broader organisational failures.  Again a 
similar trend appears in Queensland as recommendations are directed at local facilities.   
The arbitrary development of recommendations appears a salient issue that 
surrounds the RCA internationally (Nicolini et al., 2011b). As Wu et al. (2008) explained 
this can be attributed to the failure of recommendations, and indeed the process as a whole, 
to address patient safety and associated issues from broader organisational perspectives. 
Overall, recommendations were amorphous and did not belong to the problem statement or 
the risks and errors identified in the report. To that end, in the absence of latent cause and 
effect and the arbitrary development of root causes it is asserted that that there is a 
predicament is to understand how the technology behind the RCA has transformed.   
Thus, it appears that despite the RCA underpinned by technologies that announce a 
clear process of analysis, a pattern appears in the construction of the RCA where 
technologies are circumvented.  It is the view here that this is not an intentional action, but a 
relationship appears where legislative and organisational agendas are discordant.  It is argued 
that heuristic devices take priority over rational and technical process of doing the RCA. 
This is addressed next.    
6.4.3 The Individual 
In this section, it is an important reminder that the individual refers to the acts of 
people as a socially constructed phenomenon. The discussion is not about the RCA team 
specifically, but about the relationship between the construction of the RCA, the organisation 
and policy and a process that contradicts organisational agendas. This section does not 
suggest nor imply fault.  The social view is that heuristic devices shape the RCA and these 
jeopardise the function of the RCA.  
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 Heuristic devices 
It is argued here that familiarity and consensus are social characteristics that have 
eased a way into the RCA and deconstructed the systematic approach of analysis.  The 
dilemma is that familiarly and consensus draw on  individual experiences and these are 
context specific because experiences are distinct The difficulty is that an RCA seeks to 
understand events behind harm, yet the collection of views, experiences and agreement of 
team members cannot be avoided to explain causation.  It appears from the arbitrary 
construction of ideas held by individual members are subsequently organised to confirm to 
RCA methodology. However, this result cannot be substantiated in full from this research.  
As such, heuristic devices deconstruct organisational directives that inform the RCA because 
a systemic approach cannot be separated from individual perspectives and experiences.    
Heuristic devices bring familiar clinical situations and strategies applied to previous events 
to a current RCA where improving safety is central. While there is knowledge that harm is 
recurring, the dynamic interaction of events that includes individual past experiences is 
overlooked in RCA processes because a SAC 1 investigation applies a linear construction to 
cause and effect. More specifically, a problem appears that the logic behind a systems 
approach where cares are routine, differs from reality where cares are a social interlocking 
process across healthcare dimensions. The departure to investigate harm as a complex social 
engagement of actions at multiple levels is attributed to heuristic devices. 
Collective descriptive experiences challenge the RCA design because of the 
respective approach to incident investigation.  One component requires a reflective aspect to 
learn from harm but another aspect looks for elements within events where rational cause 
and effect thinking is applied.  What occurs is an RCA that represents a collection of abstract 
ideas that change RCA methodology. The problem as the data revealed, was that issues of 
familiarity and consensus deconstructed RCA methodology from  development of causality 
chains to the development of  root causes and thus, the composition of recommendations was 
unorthodox.  
Familiarity 
Familiarity draws on professional experience of harm, an awareness and closeness to 
an event, even though the RCA team was not involved in the care. In particular, familiarity 
assumed that past experiences hold true in the present and that drawing on past situations 
could fix the current issue. In the RCA, the inconsistent approach to develop the chain of 
event document, part 2 and the abundant development of corrective actions that announced 
to review current processes, showed that issues of familiarity had incrementally changed the 
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way the RCA was constructed. This differed from organisational policy. Hence, it is argued 
that patterns in the data from 2009, 2010 and 2011 were influenced by familiarity heuristic. 
In particular, at the centre of the notion of familiarity, the RCA team could not 
dismiss collegial closeness to a SAC 1 event because harm in healthcare remains common 
and recurring (Brennan et al., 1991; Kohn et al., 2000; Wilson et al., 1995). The volume and 
collective nature of human error in healthcare meant that almost every health professional 
would be, at some point be involved in an adverse event and this adds to the notion of 
familiarity in the RCA. Thus, each RCA team member may relate to a similar incident from 
their practice which has had a compounding influence on RCA’s over time. As a result, the 
shared view of the RCA meant that new harm events could not be compiled in the absence of 
professional experience which without intention, drew past experience to the investigation of 
new events.  
Further, blame cannot be ignored here because blame was recognised in the data 
from 2009, 2010 and 2011. It is argued that issues of familiarity were central to the volume 
of individualised blame found in the RCAs because personal fault could not be avoided, but 
was rationalised because blame is socially established in Western cultures. As such, the 
social characteristics of familiarity have influenced the construction of the RCA which has 
altered the RCAs systematic process of analysis from organisational directives. A further 
heuristic device disrupting the RCAs process of analysis is consensus.   
Consensus 
Nicolini et al. (2011b) argued that consensus informed the RCA in asserting that 
“the effort of maintaining consensus amongst participants . . . had a visible effect on the 
content of the documents” (Nicolini et al., 2011b, p. 222).  Further it was argued consensus 
provided an “information pooling methodology” to generate a shared truth (Anders & 
Batchelder, 2012, p. 452).  These characteristics are vital to the RCA and were most obvious 
in the use of language decoys which fragmented the investigation and deconstructed the flow 
of analysis.  More specifically, it is argued here that issues of consensus were central in 
establishing language decoys that changed the process of analysis.  
Hierarchical pressures influenced consensus because unless there was agreement on 
report by the team and commissioning authorities, the RCA was not closed.  These tensions 
shaped the generation the RCA report that gave primacy to completion of the RCA that was 
something other than a systemic process of analysis.   The dilemma is that consensus socially 
informs the construction of the RCA but at the same time consensus is problematic. 
Consensus was essential in the compilation of the RCA report because unless consensus was 
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reached, as selected concerns were added and others removed, the RCA cannot be compiled.  
Yet, there was nothing in the organisational conduct of the RCA to sanction dissenting views 
and these constructs informed the social characteristics that limited the function of the RCA 
to pursue patient safety effectively (Wu, 2008).   
More importantly, consensus was informed by the dominant coalition of healthcare 
rather than the behaviours of the working group, the RCA team. Despite a team of healthcare 
professionally developing an RCA report, consensus is not determined until an RCA was 
approved by facility commissioning authorities. This leaves the RCA as neither a quality 
improvement tool nor a learning instrument and organisational and governance expectations 
confused over the effectiveness of the RCA (Percarpio et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2008) as a 
safety incentive to improve patient safety. In the absence of latent failures where individual 
failure and blame characterised  the RCA, root causes were arbitarily constructed and 
solutions were randomly applied, the RCA was signed-off and approved where issues 
familiarity dominated the construction of the RCA and consensus, subject to bureaucratic   
influences. 
Heuristic devices explained social characteristics that shifted the RCA from a 
systematic process on analysis. These features comprise the culture of the RCA. Analysis of 
the text did not identify culture as a latent failure that contributed to harm. Rather, culture 
stood alone or was randomly identified as a root cause in isolation form the contributing 
factors.  The distinction is that the RCA cannot collectively know how culture influences 
harm because the social construction of the RCA does not investigate culture.  It was here 
that a system failure could not be identified nor was the culture of healthcare attributed to 
harm.  While a clear framework to guide the construction of the RCA exists, the RCA is 
burdened by notions of familiarity and consensus and organisational pressure to complete an 
RCA. This end-orientated approach is supported by bureaucratic and regulatory agendas that 
rationalise and conceal blame in the RCA and shape the RCA to be non-compliant with 
organisational policy. As such and without intention, another way of doing an RCA has 
unfolded. 
 
6.5 SUMMARY OF LATENT ANALYSIS 
The latent analysis revealed unexpected results to expose organisational and 
governance dysfunctions that left the effectiveness of the RCA as an organisational 
technique to improve patient safety lacking.   
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First, the application of the RCA was inhibited by language decoys that fragmented 
the language to a point where information was disregarded and process of gathering 
information to inform cause and effect was unclear. In particular, language decoys 
established a disjuncture whereby organisational goals were blurred and operational 
imperatives to complete an RCA dominated. Concurrently, language decoys circumvented 
the disclosure of systemic latent failures because system risks were challenged by multiple 
accounts of human error that made the distinction between the systemic risk and human error 
hard to find. In the search for cause and effect and the absence of latent system failures, 
multi-dimensional blame became the focus in the RCA because issues of familiarly and 
consensus dominated the investigation of an event  
Second, legislative conditions provided a flexible approach to the application of the 
RCA that sought to find cause and effect. An option was legislatively created to complete the 
chain of event documents that contradicted organisational directives which explicitly defined 
how to complete the chain of event documents. As a result, chain of event documents were 
absent or constructed in a manner that identified multiple active errors and failed to identify 
latent system failures. This meant only individual failures comprised an investigation of a 
harm event. Hence, the RCAs’ systemic approach to the analysis of harm departed from 
organisational policy. 
Moreover, the latent analysis revealed that the purpose of the RCA to function as a 
systematic technique for the analysis of SAC 1 harm and to improve patient safety in 
Queensland Healthcare facilities is compromised because legislative and organisational 
agendas are in conflict. In the absence of directions, RCA methodology departs from patient 
safety agendas. Language decoys circumvent latent system failures, root causes are avoided 
and recommendations are arbitrarily applied. It is not that there is intent to ignore healthcare 
directives that support an agenda to improve patient safety; but in search for cause and effect 
that departs from patient safety ideology, the construction of the RCA is characterised by 
active errors that impose blame rather than a culture of harm. The social construction of the 
RCA is limited by an RCA process that does not view harm as a system failure but views 
harm as a failure of multiple individuals as the doctor, the nurse. The RCA failed to 
determine this as a characteristic of culture, or the way we do things around here. The point 
is that overall RCA teams work in isolation while knowledge and experience of patient harm 
is abundant and a culture of harm is acknowledged, there is no sharing of information 
because the RCA applies mono-causal methods (Fahlbruch, 2011). The investigation of 
patient harm has separated from a systems analysis and patient safety is not addressed in the 
RCA. In addition, the departure from processes creates an opportunity for heuristic devices 
 Chapter 6: Latent Analysis 164 
of familiarity and consensus to dominate an investigation. Thus, an anomaly in regulatory 
documentation announces a systematic process of analysis optional that renders the function 
of the RCA as a technique to investigate SAC 1 harm compromised.  
A deeper theoretical issue emerges that despite a conflict in organisational agendas 
that inform Queensland Health’s patient safety agenda, the RCA departs from wider 
theoretical imperatives, a systems approach, to improve patient safety. The final chapter, 
Chapter 7 goes back to overarching theoretical directives that drive an imperative to improve 
patient safety; back to the IOM’s (2000) theoretical safety agendas to discuss the challenges 
of applying a systems approach. 
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 The RCA unlocked  Chapter 7:
In closing the research, Chapter 7 ‘lifts the lid on the RCA’ and goes back to 
principal theoretical ideas that frame patient safety, a systems approach (IOM, 2000). It is 
discussed here when designing a safer healthcare system for Queensland that draws on safety 
principals established by international agendas, theoretical safety concepts that underpin the 
RCA are difficult to translate Nicolini et al., 2011b) and have been lost from practice. While 
it was identified that opportunities exist in key documents that depart from theoretical 
agendas more understanding about the social views that comprise this phenomenon are 
addressed. This chapter discusses the challenges to apply Queensland’s systems approach 
where safety ideas cannot be predicted through the RCA.  
To briefly review, Chapter 5 generated four key theoretical propositions from the 
manifest analysis. Chapter 6 applied latent analysis to these theoretical ideas that gave focus 
to a paradox that existed between language decoys, the rhetoric of an organisation’s patient 
safety policy and the reality of the RCA process that centred on failures of a group and 
individual practices. It was revealed that legislative and organisational agendas were 
discordant. In application, this conflict created opportunities for the RCA to depart from 
organisational policy. While latent analysis presented in Chapter 6 demonstrated that a 
systematic process of analysis had been avoided through language decoys and heuristic 
devices, it was also argued that deviating from policy could not be circumvented. This 
chapter takes this notion further to gain a deeper understanding of concepts that fail to 
support a systems approach (IOM, 2000), the central ideology to improve patient safety. The 
underlying argument is that there are conflicting safety agendas in RCAs’ regulatory 
documents while organisational documents provide a clear framework for the analysis 
process. Yet, this is ignored and this needs closer examination. In this Chapter, it is argued 
that a systems approach is silent in the RCA while there is an illusion that systemic safety 
agendas are active in the investigation of harm events. The discussion centres on the notion 
that theoretical safety agendas have not translated effectively in practice because notions of 
“conceptual slack” (Schulman, 1993) socially inform the RCA and are central to the 
predicament. 
 Section 7.1 briefly re-examines theoretical perspectives as Queensland Health’s 
organisational safety agendas that underpin the RCA’s systems approach. In particular, 
theoretical safety ideas recommended by the IOM (2000) report and frame Queensland 
Health’s systematic process of analysis, are absent in the RCA. As such, complexities that 
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challenge a systems approach are discussed. Section 7.2 draws on these ideas to argue the 
challenges to apply the IOM’s safety agendas to the RCA. A matter of translating high 
reliability concepts (Rochlin, 1996) which as noted, Queensland Health discreetly applies, 
Normal Accident theory (Perrow, (1984) and a systems/person approach (Reason, 1990) to 
the RCA are central here. The challenge in this chapter is to address the social characteristics 
of safety concepts that underpin a systems approach to understand how standardised RCA 
methodologies systems approach have been ignored. As the discussion develops, 
recommendations are provided to progress areas of concern which are united with a 
determination to advance patient safety in Queensland. Section 7.3 provides the conclusion 
to the thesis followed by implications for further research and the limitations of the research.  
Finally, the thesis proposes the future of the RCA. 
 
7.1 KEY SAFETY AGENDAS AND A SYSTEMS APPROACH 
A systems approach was recommended in the IOM report (IOM, 2000) to provide a 
safer healthcare system and to address error and harm rates. The approach (IOM, 2000) drew 
on high-reliability concepts specifically Perrow’s (1984) Normal Accident theory and 
Reason’s system/person approach, to drive a new safety agenda because patient harm was 
considered similar to other organisational disasters (IOM, 2000). It is argued here, that 
despite significant safety benefits of theoretical agendas (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006), a 
systems approach has been difficult to implement because safety agendas are challenged by 
social and political influences.  
In 2005, the RCA was introduced to Queensland Health. In a consistent global 
manner, safety principals noted above, informed a new patient safety agenda. In part, these 
ideas frame key regulatory documents that guide the conduct of the RCA, yet a focus of 
system safety principals is absent in the RCA. To explain this, healthcare’s safety concepts 
are briefly re-addressed as they inform the RCAs systems approach. 
In high-reliability organisations, safety is a priority where a limited number of 
accidents that result in harm exist. This approach is aspired to by healthcare but not visible in 
the key documents that inform the RCA.  Nonetheless, the view of safety in high reliability 
organisations is determined by principles where reducing variation, increasing 
standardisation and anticipating failures are key concepts (Welch & Jenson, 2007). Further, 
there is a commitment to safety and to improve organisational design, where design 
shortfalls are viewed to manifest human error and this aspect is recognised in healthcare’s 
patient safety ideas. Returning to safety in high-reliability organisations, safety is achieved 
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through compliance to standardised rules and organisational procedures (Rochlin, 1993). 
Importantly, a culture of rule compliance exists in high-reliability where attendance to rules 
is obeyed and learning from error is an ongoing process of analysis because adapting 
processes are a matter of risk that can be avoided (Casler, 2014). As noted, while only some 
characteristics of high reliability have been bought forward here, they are central ideas that 
frame the social construction of the RCA. The view is that while patient safety draws on 
reliability constructs, such as the adoption of legislation to guide the RCA and the provision 
of organisational rules, procedures and policy, the notion of compliance departs healthcare 
from high-reliability principles. This notion is central to understand the relationship between 
the RCA and system failure and disaster (Vaughan, 2004). 
Healthcare’s theoretical perspective clearly draws on Normal Accident theory 
(Perrow, 1984), where harm is predictable because human error cannot be avoided. While 
this is marginally consistent with reliability concepts where error is recognised, in Normal 
Accident theory safety principles depart from reliability principles in a number of ways. 
These are briefly re-examined. Perrow’s (1984) Normal Accident theory defines interactions 
between the system and its components and this is central to locating harm causality in 
healthcare. In Normal Accident theory, issues of standardisation are acknowledged, but a 
divergence from high–reliability is that safety concepts are obscured by multiple layers of 
redundant safety processes and levels of authority that shift priorities of rule-based safety. In 
addition to Perrow (1984) healthcare applies a no-blame approach to lift traditions that 
blamed healthcare workers for harm events. The no-blame notion supports safety processes 
such as reporting incidents and analysing incidents without fear of retribution. Further, 
Reason’s (1990) system/person approach has been adapted to represent the complexity of 
healthcare services. Fundamental principles remain intact, where a model is applied to define 
error causation and error management occurs through a series of organisational safety 
defences to identify active and latent failures. The idea is that human factor principles are 
mapped to an event to represent the flow of error causation to identify organisational safety 
risks. 
The social assembly of key regulatory documents addresses healthcare’s safety 
agendas as tightly coupled systems because governance, standards and centralised systems 
are identified. As noted in Chapter 3, Tamuz and Harrison (2006) argued that although 
hospitals are complex, comprising of tightly coupled and loosely coupled systems that exist 
within complex social, political and technical environments, there are multiple 
understandings to achieve outcomes. Healthcare functions under conditions of high risk 
where human factor principles are so complex that a systems approach cannot be 
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distinguished. Despite this, RCA methodologies draw on safety concepts that underpin 
notions of high reliability theory to determine how people, policy, environmental or 
procedural issues contribute to patient harm. The problem is that RCA legislation and 
organisational policy while providing a framework to inform the investigation of a harm 
events and to improve patient safety, theoretical safety ideas are avoided. 
 
7.2 A SYSTEMS APPROACH: THE DEPARTURE 
As noted in Chapter 6, new knowledge was established to highlight that governance 
and legislative agendas which are intended to improve patient safety have created 
opportunities where RCA methods depart from organisational directives. Moving on from 
this perspective, it is asserted that a departure from a systems approach is influenced by a 
complex set of safety agendas where safety is individually determined rather than informed 
by a collective approach. As such, improving patient safety through RCA methods cannot be 
predicted. 
7.2.1 The Legislation 
Safety ideas are not acknowledged in Queensland’s RCA legislation, while quality 
activities frame the conduct of the RCA. This is problematic because quality improvement 
activities and safety agendas are different (Sheps & Cardiff, 2011) and this is central to the 
shared social views of the RCA because there is no accountability directed to safety 
principles. The challenges of quality legislative agendas rather than safety are addressed 
next.  The avoidance of safety in the legislation is complex and complicated by an 
“enabling” component (Health and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, 2007, p. 2). It is 
argued here that ‘enabling’ characteristics deconstruct notions to achieve system safety 
through processes that select some SAC 1 events to undergo RCA. In particular, a selection 
process is determined at a governance level and it is at this point that bureaucratic agendas 
introduce counterproductive safety agendas. More specifically, ‘enabling’ processes fail to 
address the systemic and recurring nature of harm because some SAC 1 incidents are 
reviewed drawing on RCA methods and some  SAC 1 incidents are reviewed by other 
methods. The problem is that because SAC1 harm shows a pattern where human mistakes 
contribute to harm, the collaborative nature of harm is disregarded. As such, safety agendas 
that are dynamic and interactive (Weick, 1998) are ignored through enabling characteristics. 
Enabling conditions silence regulatory agendas to achieve safety because the 
legislation “[did] not mandate that an RCA be conducted for a reportable event” (Health and 
Other Legislation Amendment Bill, 2007, p. 2). While a Commissioning Authority may 
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select SAC 1 events to undergo RCA and the enabling characteristics may be considered 
favourable in ways to reduce the number of RCAs conducted, enabling practices are in 
contrast to the social perception to review an event and this is politically influenced. By way 
of example, 324 Reportable events were recorded in 2010-2011 yet only 41% (Queensland 
Health, 2012) of these proceeded to RCA. This declining trend of completed RCAs has 
widened in 2014 (Queensland Government, 2013). The problem is that “safety competes 
with other agendas” (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006, p. 1656). This is more clearly addressed by 
Casler (2014) who argues that social rivalry of an organisation’s safety agenda and election 
agendas is a fine balance. 
Activities of pubic organisations must reflect the will of the electorate and 
the organization must be accountable for its actions . . .  in a larger sense 
organizations are not free to choose arbitrarily the products and service to be 
provided.  An organization that ignores the electorate’s wishes will soon not 
have the political foundation needed to exist (Casler, 2014, p. 235). 
Casler (2014) argues from a high reliability perspective, and notions of electoral 
promises that influence healthcare and re-election appear consistent. A recent example of 
this is electoral statements that announce to improve surgical waiting times for eligible 
public undergoing elective surgical procedures (Queensland Government, 2014).  The point 
of this example is that activities of the Government to reduce surgical waiting times are 
socially desirable. Returning to Casler’s (2014) quote above, these actions that aim to reduce 
surgical waiting times, are viewed to be the will of the voting public and will encourage 
votes prior to an election in 2015.  Conversely, and in relation to enabling characteristics, 
flexibility in legislative provisions that prompt a selection of services ignores the will of the 
public to improve patient safety and this is confusing for the electorate.  While the enabling 
features of the legislation are mostly hidden, when patient safety issues arise, social tensions 
that demand to improve patient safety influence change in government. Thus, an erosion of 
safety (Vaughan, 2005) undermines the notion of public trust.   
A further predicament in the legislation is the use of legislative language that 
provides a discretionary approach to safety agendas.  It is common that legislative language 
contains words such as ‘must’, ‘shall’, and ‘will’. These terms remove the discretion to 
perform an act because there is no legislative option but to follow the conditions, while 
words like ‘may’ provide a level of discretion. This is an accepted feature of legislation and 
is a significant barrier that influences a lack of system safety in the RCA because first there 
is an option to undertake an investigation of a harm event and second central elements that 
comprise root cause analysis may be avoided. The point of the legislation is to provide a 
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State-wide approach to regulate the RCA through standardised processes (Welch & Jenson, 
2007) and to reduce variation. Yet, the data revealed that the RCAs standardised processes, 
identification of latent system failures to construct root causes were collectively avoided. To 
that end, Shortell and Singer’s (2008, p. 445) publication, “Improving patient safety by 
taking systems seriously” is aptly entitled because not only are tenets of the culture of 
healthcare central here but legislative agendas in Queensland provide an optional approach 
to safety agendas. As such, a systems approach is silent. Importantly, there is an illusion that 
patient safety is a priority while a social commitment to review an event is publically 
addressed. The contradictory safety agenda is that legislative agendas that claim to support 
the interests of society to provide an investigation of harm events depart from social 
perspectives because there is discretion to commission an RCA and an application of 
healthcare’s safety agendas is concealed.  A foundational flaw appears in Queensland 
Health’s systems approach which is the result of “slack” (Schulman, 1993, p.353). It is 
argued here that slack within the legislation, provides healthcare a contract of flexibility and 
“freedom to manoeuvre” (Schulman, 1993, p.353) that is problematic to improve patient 
safety. 
The paradox is that safety is deconstructed through a variety of legislative provisions 
comprising enabling provisions, information and disclosure conditions and a no-blame 
criterion. These directives establish a complex approach to the application of an RCA where 
the focus is finding error with no organisational accountability to improve patient safety. As 
such, quality frameworks have done little to improve patient safety or the recurrence of SAC 
1 harm events. While some advances have been made to improve safety it is contended that 
overall the contributions of an RCA are negligible. While it is argued that strengthening 
legislation may not be an effective solution (Mascini, 2005), legislative issues that depart 
from safety agendas need to be addressed. Conditions in the Queensland legislation are 
relaxed that enable a discretionary approach to death and permanent harm events and these 
need to be  abolished.  To that end, recommendation number 1 asserts: 
Recommendation 1 
1. Legislative reform is critical to give patient safety precedence; to define clear safety 
agendas where responsibility is assigned to organisational agendas and organisational 
autonomy is disrupted. 
a. New legislative criterion asserts a systematic process of analysis framed in new 
safety models 
i. Establish legislation that identifies organisational accountability to the 
investigation of patient harm and safety improvement. 
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b. Abolish enabling provisions to provide social equity in the investigation of SAC 
1 harm events and interrupt the culture of autonomy.  
2. Prepare a Ministerial Brief to inform Queensland Parliament of the key findings of the 
research to progress legislative amendments and move patient safety forward. 
a. Politically motivate healthcare to improve patient safety through financial 
incentives.  
3. Develop state-wide infrastructure that commits to improving patient safety through 
research. 
7.2.2 Organisational Directives 
Understanding safety agendas is a key principle that informs healthcare’s 
organisational directives to improve patient safety. As such, standardised RCA processes are 
endorsed, yet as a social group, healthcare departs from safety agendas that announce a 
standardise process to improve safety. The view here is that although legislative conditions 
are complex and organisational directives aspire to locate human error and identify latent 
failures, there is “divergence in analytical processes” (Schulman, 1993, p. 364) that is 
collective. This draws on an idea that the RCA is theoretically informed and socially 
constructed. Yet, conversely, the collective view to improve patient safety that draws on 
clinical knowledge, experience and learning to identify error, departs from system safety 
ideas. As noted, Perrow’s (1984) Normal Accident theory asserts that accidents are rare 
events although normal in complex organisations. In addition and more explicitly defined, 
healthcare’s safety directives draw on Reason’s system/person approach where active and 
latent failures are mapped to form error trajectories. To these trajectories, the 5Why’s 
principles are located. Thus, clear directives emerge that theoretically identify system safety 
constructs. The point is organisational directives provide standardised methods to the 
application of an RCA as noted above. Yet, the data revealed despite these theoretical 
agendas, the application of an RCA was lacking in a systems approach. The issue is that 
standardisation, the agendas that drive the RCA, are avoided in healthcare.   
The idea that healthcare fails to support approved agendas, is alarming and a full 
explanation cannot be gathered from this research. Nonetheless, there was a collective view 
in the RCAs that non-compliance to rules was accepted and these risky behaviours 
(Vaughan, 1999) are supported. More specifically, it is not only that non-compliance to rules 
is accepted, but non-compliance to standardised policies has normalised in healthcare. A 
pattern emerges where there is a culture in healthcare to acknowledge rules but at the same 
customises (Welch & Jensen, 2007) the rules to make them fit. This means that 
organisational policies, procedures and guidelines are manipulated to suit local conditions 
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which is challenging in terms of patient safety because concepts of organisational safety can 
be worked around. This appeared in the RCA. It is predicted that these departures from 
policy are not intended to cause harm. Yet, on returning to the data, the data typically 
revealed that harm resulted from active errors where standardised processes were not applied 
and the other approach resulted unexpectedly, in harm. These actions are similar to enabling 
characteristics where an RCA is not mandated for a reportable event and learnings from 
harm can be acquired through other techniques. The issue is that rules are either intentionally 
ignored or modified because healthcare is a “hero-seeking” organisation where health 
professionals “overestimate their knowledge” (Rochlin, 1999, p. 1557) and safety activities 
are compromised. Rowley (2011) in part, identifies with this phenomenon claiming that 
“deviantly innovative” acts that depart from standardised practice can be advantageous and 
advance medical knowledge (Rowley, 2011, p.95).  As noted, while advances in medical 
knowledge were not identified as causal factors in the RCA, what was revealed was that 
standardised procedures were modified, patient harm resulted and RCA recommendations 
announced the development of further organisational procedures. A clear dichotomy prevails 
where patient safety is characterised by individual efforts. 
Returning to theoretical safety frames and the idea that RCA legislation fails to 
address safety and the notion of hero-seeking (Rochlin, 1999) an impasse forms where the 
application of theoretical views in the RCA creates conceptual safety chaos. To explain this 
by drawing on healthcare’s safety ideas, in high reliability organisations, non-compliance to 
rules is not typically accepted, but is managed. In Normal Accident theory, rule violations 
are tolerated because the notion of social redundancy acknowledges that problems are 
overlooked (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006). Departing from organisational rules by customising 
(Welch & Jensen, 2000) procedures through decision making processes where it cannot be 
predicted that potential interactions or unexpected outcomes may arise, is routine in Normal 
Accident theory (Perrow, 1984). From a system/person approach (Reason, 1990) individual 
clinical judgements are supported, but not regulated by RCA legislation or by organisational 
safety concepts. As such, healthcare’s safety perspective grants a level of autonomy that 
extends beyond specified policies and procedures and beyond theoretical safety models 
because changing patients’ needs are a priority. This is how concepts of safety are adapted to 
best fit clinical demands.  
Thus, RCAs systems approach is challenged because the social construction of the 
RCA cannot explain how dedicated health professionals adapt rules that result in harm again 
and again. The problem is that safety cannot be predicted through the RCA because the RCA 
does not clarify why active errors are abound or why organisational rules are overlooked or 
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why individual recurring safety deviations that result in harm are disregarded. Thus, human 
errors that result in harm are being ignored by the RCA. Moreover, the notion of avoiding 
standardised procedures is at a point where the RCA departs as a technique to learn from 
harm and improve patient safety because theoretical safety agendas cannot be applied while 
safety is an obscure construct in healthcare. There is a culture in healthcare where medical 
autonomy is accepted in the event of harm but this disrupts teamwork (Shortell & Singer, 
2008) and is counterproductive to apply theoretical safety agendas. More specifically, 
healthcare is unable to translate the interactive dynamics of hero-seeking into theoretical 
safety ideas to inform the RCA. 
In closing, safety agendas cannot be translated into practice because the principles 
that inform each safety concept are divergent and one approach cannot be converted into 
healthcare’s RCA. Moreover, a systems approach is not possible because standardisation is 
not collectively attended and there is a culture in healthcare to customise organisational rules 
and this is contradictory to improve patient safety. These ideas draw on Schulman’s (1993) 
notion of “conceptual slack” where a level of autonomy departs from systemic goals 
(Schulman, 1993, p. 364). More precisely, conceptual slack (Schulman, 1993) occurs when 
an interpretive approach to theoretical patient safety agendas is applied. For patient safety 
and the RCA, individual safety ideas and an autonomous clinical environment that result in 
error and harm are consistent with notions of conceptual slack. Further, bureaucratic 
influences have shifted a “locus of control” (Rochlin, 1996, p. 1554) from official promises 
to improve patient safety to individuals. As noted, there is a culture of autonomy in 
healthcare that disrupts a systems approach. As a result, safety constructs are perceived to 
occur. For this reason a systems approach is not underpinned by theoretical safety agendas 
but by clinical needs and clinical autonomy. To that end, a variety of theoretical safety ideas 
shape the RCA but no explicit safety agenda is applied. Thus, there is an illusion that the 
RCA is buttressed by safety principles but in application the social view of the RCA is 
burdened by conflicting regulatory agendas and a culture where autonomy of clinicians self-
governs patient safety. 
In Queensland, the function of the RCA to improve patient safety is contentious 
because system risks are abandoned and theoretical safety agendas underpinned by a systems 
approach are not applied and notions of conceptual slack (Schulman, 1993) cannot be 
ignored. Queensland Health’s systematic process of analysis (Queensland Health, 2009b) is 
problematic because the “determination of systemic causes to prevent recurrences of adverse 
events” (Percarpio et al., 2008, p 391) is absent. Hence, a safer system cannot be predicted. 
As a result, the RCA is not a report informed by a systems approach but is a report of social 
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significance. It is recommended that patient safety be reaffirmed as a priority in the 
following way:  
Recommendation 2 
1. Develop regulatory documents linked to organisational patient safety outcomes to 
specifically address matters of compliance and autonomy of clinicians.  
a. Relinquish no-blame frameworks and assign levels of accountability to 
healthcare facilities that are rewarded. 
2. Introduce frameworks to move patient safety investigations from mono-causal 
methods to systematic processes (Fahlbruch, 2011). 
i. Develop a system based event analysis technique to address latent system 
failures. 
ii. Include clinical staff to inform data gathering processes.  
iii. Listen to and involve consumers in the process of healthcare incident 
analysis is recommended (Ocloo, 2011). 
iv. A modified  approach will: 
1. Undertake preliminary investigations that engage frontline staff and 
develop resident solutions for localised latent failures. 
2. Apply a matrix approach (Fahlbruch, 2011) to make clear a 
framework for a sustained investigation. 
3. Enlist a specialist incident analysis team to the investigation of SAC 1 harm to 
deactivate bureaucratic tensions and limit collegial examination of practice.  
4. Develop new safety agendas to frame an investigation of an event that are 
compatible with new legislative frameworks.   
5. The Australian Commission of Safety and Quality to address definitions of harm to 
clarify inevitable or avoidable harm (Noble & Pronovost, 2010). 
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7.3 CONCLUSION 
The theoretical ideas that underpin the RCA declare that the function of the RCA 
was to identify latent failures which inform the development of root causes and corrective 
actions. The objective of the RCA was thus to make visible systemic failures, to mitigate 
harm and to improve patient safety. The findings from this research suggest that although 
organisational policy is theoretically informed the application of these principles fails to 
provide a systemic process of analysis which renders latent failures hard to find and root 
cause arbitrarily applied. For this reason, the RCA as a tool to investigate harm in healthcare 
was ineffective to mitigate harm and improve patient safety. In the absence of application of 
methodological processes and the presence of heuristic devices, the function of the RCA was 
jeopardised for a number of reasons.   
First, if we accept the prevailing assumption that patient safety is a system or 
organisational issue then it appears that the RCA is failing in its endeavour to address harm 
events in healthcare. In particular, the RCA fails because a broader analysis is fundamentally 
circumvented, latent causality is discreetly ignored and root causes are arbitrarily applied. 
This left the propagation of recommendations and lessons learned in Queensland’s RCA 
nebulous and discordant from the views expressed in the RCA. The challenge in Queensland 
was that legislative conditions enabled a discretionary approach to SAC 1 events. Further, 
legislative conditions disabled systemic processes of analysis because the construction of 
error chains was optional and this opposed typical RCA methodology. Added to this, the 
flourishing complexity of human error stood-out as individualised wrong doing in the 
absence of latent failures. The problem was further complicated by additional legislative 
provisions that had a double-edged approach of protecting the RCA content by sanctioning 
parts of the report. This distracted the RCA from seeking latent failures because sanctions 
protect human errors in the form of patient harm and concealed latent harm within the 
organisation.  
Second, the function of the RCA did not sufficiently identify organisational latent 
failures and this was inconsistent with organisational agendas. More prominently, there was 
a collective culture of healthcare that challenged the conduct of the RCA as an event analysis 
to learn from harm and improve patient safety. The culture saw self-regulating views prevail 
over organisational policy. The culture sought a report that disclosed human errors as the 
main contributors to SAC 1 harm which were later circumvented for development of 
solutions. While the focus of solutions was on inter-organisational process in the absence of 
root causes.  The abundant development of solutions in the absence of analysis provoked the 
idea that solutions already existed in the minds of the RCA team which continued to distort 
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the systemic process of analysis. Thus, if we accept the prevailing assumption that patient 
safety is a system or organisational issues then it appears that the RCA is failing to meet 
organisational agendas to apply a systems approach to improve the SAC 1 harm. 
Third, in an absence of systemic processes that cannot adhere to theoretical 
directives, the RCA as a quality technique simply conformed to social demands of reviewing 
an incident. This limited the function of the RCA although the RCA may be drawn upon in 
meetings to satisfy consumer complaints and provide feedback. The failure of the RCA as an 
analysis technique cannot be completely disregarded because the completion of the RCA 
report fulfilled secondary governance obligations while principle safety commitments to 
learn from harm, reduce preventable harm rates and improve patient safety were shelved 
(Birkland, 2009). Secondary obligations of the RCA are important to the construction of the 
RCA report because it does not matter that RCA fails to address SAC 1 harm in health care. 
What matters is that the community perceives that harm has been addressed. This is an 
unrecognised consequence of RCA on society. 
The RCA is in a precarious predicament between organisational goals, process, 
application and effectiveness of a systemic safety process that by all counts fails to improve 
patient safety; minimise patient harm and fails to provide adequate systemic learning from 
error. Despite theoretical directives and regulatory agencies, the RCA is product of neither 
wider systemic influences which render the RCA not objective as defined, nor a neutral tool. 
Above all, the RCA is an interpretive investigation that functions as a shelf document 
(Birkland, 2009) to legitimise the RCA as an intensive investigative strategy by supporting 
local governance expectations and bureaucratic pressures. Despite these findings, the RCA 
conforms to social expectations of disclosure processes and fulfils a social justice function to 
review adverse events.  
To that end, new theoretical propositions generated from this research assert that the 
function of the RCA does not conform to dominant theoretical work on patient safety and 
nor to legislative and policy objectives. Specifically, the prevailing healthcare view deviates 
from patient safety agendas because rule breaking has normalised and creative methods 
influence the RCA. 
7.3.1 Implications for further research 
Patient safety research in Queensland is underdeveloped. In Queensland, more 
research is needed to understand the choices that determine the analysis of an event. For 
example, other forms of analysis were conducted on SAC 1 harm events despite the breech 
of organisational policy. More needs to be known if alternative analyses such as Clinical 
 Chapter 7: The RCA unlocked 177 
Review and Human Error and Patient Safety reports improve patient safety and provide 
organisational learning. 
More research is encouraged to understand the perceptions of a systems approach to 
investigate the broader notions of healthcare safety. Lastly, it is vital that research is directed 
to understand to role of politics and authority in healthcare because system failure and 
disaster are infused with politics (Sagan, 1993; Vaughan, 1999) which influences the safety 
of patients in care. Limitations of the research are addressed next. 
7.3.2 Limitations 
There are several limitations to the research that centre on the legislative conditions 
that surround the RCA and control the release of information contained in the RCA.  
The research was influenced by Queensland’s legislative provisions (Health Services 
Act, 1991; Health and Other Legislation Amendment Act, 2007; Health Services 
Amendment Regulation (No.1), 2008) which enforced a number of restrictions on the use of 
the text RCA in research. These conditions limited the disclosure of information in the 
research. 
The legislative provisions prevent disclosure of information relating to the adverse 
incidents, health service facilities, the RCA team and the content of the RCA. In addition, 
RCA information is strictly restricted by clauses of information disclosure, confidentiality 
and anonymity in the Act (2007). To that end, legislative provisions limited the amount of 
the data to illustrate the point. As such, the presentation of findings was informed by 
excerpts of de-contextualised text only as full sentences were prohibited. The restricted use 
of the data was a limitation. 
A further limitation enforced by the legislation involved data analysis. Data analysis 
was restricted to hand sorting because the RCAs could not be photocopied or uploaded 
electronically for computer coding. This may be considered a limitation as data analysis was 
labour intensive. 
The data were interpreted as a whole and no single RCA was used as case in point to 
meet legislative conditions.  This meant that the use of data as evidence was severely 
constrained.  
The design of the research draws on document analysis. To some this may be a 
limitation because documents in social research have traditionally been criticised as 
secondary sources of information when there are no other options or other material available 
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(Miller & Alvarado, 2005; Prior, 2008). As such, the retrospective approach in the absence 
of interviews or observations determined a contracted view. 
Reflecting on the limitations and the findings from the research the future of the 
RCA follows. 
7.3.3 The future of the RCA 
The future of the RCAs is problematic and RCAs shortfalls do not need to be re-
examined. The role of governance and political agendas are central to this predicament and 
warrant attention.   
Recent changes in the decentralisation of Queensland Health’s Patient Safety 
Quality Improvement Service and the election of a new government in 2011 saw the assent 
of the Queensland Health and Hospital Boards Act, 2011. This means that each Hospital and 
Health Service holds governance to support patient safety and drive a review of a clinical 
incident. No longer is there a commitment to a standardised process of analysis because 
decentralisation provides a level of autonomy to patient safety, reporting and analysis of 
events. Furthermore, the Health and Hospital Boards Act 2011 maintained legislative 
enabling conditions that allow healthcare authorities the option to conduct RCA. While a 
patient safety entity, individuals granted access to view an RCA report, have been expanded. 
The Health and Hospital Boards Act, 2011 
. . . replaces the quality assurance provisions of the Health Services Act 1991 
(Part 4, Division 2), the provisions have been modified to reflect the 
establishment of networks and to incorporate some of the protections that 
apply to root cause analysis teams (Health and Hospitals Network Bill, 2011, 
p.25). 
This means legislative provisions provide protections for safety and quality 
committees to access RCA information more easily in the new Act (2011). The problem 
remains in the current legislation that bureaucracies shape not only the conduct of RCA but 
initiating processes while provisions of concealment are maintained and these conditions 
inherently contribute to accidents (Sagan, 2004) and fail to improve patient safety.  Thus, 
policy-making needs to focus on issues of secrecy and concealment that limit the process of 
techniques to improve patient safety.  Finally, the future of patient safety relies on new 
patient safety methodologies with a greater focus on safety.  An example is reliable measures 
of incident reporting that provides data that is trustworthy and not bureaucratically tailored 
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for electoral purposes; where inter-organisational factors draw lessons that guide and prevent 
future patient harm rather than safety models that support subjective approaches.
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Appendix A 
Queensland Health RCA template including the chain of events 
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Appendix B 
RCA reports and completed proportions 
Completed 
sections of 
RCA 
report 
Description 
of the Event 
Chain of 
Event 
document 
part 1 
Chain of 
event 
document 
part 2 
Recommendations Lessons 
Learned 
SURGICAL 
1 Y Y N 0 0 
2 Y Y 3 2 1 
3 Y Y 0 0 5 
4 Y Yb 3 3 1 
5 Y N 0 0 2 
6 Y YB 6 7 0 
7 Y Y 0 0 4 
8 Y Y 0 0 0 
9 Y YB 1 1 0 
10 Y Y 0 0 1 
11 Y N 0 2 1 
12 Y YB 2 2 1 
13 Y Y 0 1 1 
14 Y Y 3 3 0 
15 Y YB 3 3 0 
16 Y Y 2 2 1 
17 Y YB 6 5 3 
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Competed 
sections of 
RCA 
report 
Description 
of the Event 
Chain of 
Event 
document 
part 1 
Chain of 
event 
document 
part 2 
Recommendations Lessons 
Learned 
MEDICAL 
18 Y YB 5 3 3 
19 Y YB 0 0 3 
20 Y Y 3 3 2 
21 Y Y 0 0 1 
22 Y YB 3 3 2 
23 Y YB 0 3 1 
24 Y YB 5 5 4 
25 Y YB 3 3 2 
26 Y N 0 0 1 
27 Y Y 0 0 1 
28 N N 0 0 1 
29 Y Y 4 2 0 
30 Y YB 6 7 1 
 
 
Competed 
sections of 
RCA 
report 
Description 
of the Event 
Chain of 
Event 
document 
part 1 
Chain of 
event 
document 
part 2 
Recommendations Lessons 
Learned 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
31 Y Y 0 0 1 
32 Y YB 0 0 5 
33 Y YB 4 4 1 
35 Y YB 1 1 0 
36 Y YB 1 1 1 
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Competed 
sections of 
RCA 
report 
Description 
of the Event 
Chain of 
Event 
document 
part 1 
Chain of 
event 
document 
part 2 
Recommendations Lessons 
Learned 
Mental Health 
37 Y YB 0 0 1 
38 Y N 0 0 4 
39 Y Y 0 0 6 
40 Y N 0 0 1 
41 Y YB 0 0 3 
42 Y YB 0 0 1 
43 Y N 0 0 0 
44 Y YB 0 4 3 
45 Y YB 0 0 2 
46 Y YB 4 3 2 
47 Y N 0 0 0 
48 excluded      
 
Total   

    


  


 															
	

       


 
 
Red RCA’s no COE2, no Root causes, no Rec/Lessons Learned 
 
Key: 
1 – 48: RCAs numbering system. 
 
YB - Chain of events document, part 1 that identified barriers at individual and 
workplace level.  Only 2 of 5 lower system defence levels were identified. 
 
5 of 48 RCAs: Completed COE 1. No COE 2, No RR and No LL. 
 
1 Document excluded, not RCA. 
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Appendix C. 
Data Management Frame: Sample of Manifest analysis process 
 
Data Management Frame 
 
Environment 
Definition: The framework in which healthcare organisations operate. It includes the 
organisation, associated networks and inter-organisational agencies that inform the social context 
of healthcare.  
 
Textual Data: 
1. Transfer delay from rural to urban (3) 
2. Mechanism of injury not triggering retrieval (17) 
3. No root causes. 
4. Difficult site location (3) 
5. Terrain (3) 
6. Pilot could not land in terrain. (3) 
7. Remote geographical location of injury  delay to arrive.(3) 
8. No root cause (3) 
 
KEY:  
Yellow = transfer delays (3). 
Green = no root cause (2) 
Pink = Qld’s vastness, unique characteristics (3) 
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Appendix C.1 
Data Management Frame: Sample of manifest to latent concepts and the generation of 
preliminary theoretical ideas. 
 
Data Management Frame 
Environment: The framework in which healthcare organisations operate. It includes the 
organisation, associated networks and inter-organisational agencies that inform the social 
context of healthcare. 
Date with RCA code New concepts Analytical propositions Latent Concepts 
Delay in transfer (3) 
No root causes (5). 
No system issues 
identified.  
Pilot could not land in 
terrain. (3). 
Remote geographical 
location of injury 
 delay to arrive (3). 
No clear specified roles 
(3). 
Differences between 
management practices 
(11). 
 
 
 
Transfer delay from 
rural to urban. 
Delays due to 
infrastructure but no 
further analysis - 
stopped short. 
RCA moved onto 
other concerns. 
Many complex 
events.  
Causal chain chunky 
and ambiguous.  
Patient death – 
secondary 
underlying 
condition. 
Nothing can be 
found.  
All system processes 
satisfactory.  
 
Disconnected 
concerns. 
Opinions of panel 
identified. 
 
Lots of information 
sources, (Nicolini et 
al., 2011a). Lots of 
communication.  
Disconnected ideas  
Nothing changes 
anyway – safety 
culture (Flin, 2007; 
Vaughan, 1999) 
Culture– 
discretionary 
mandated RCA 
Man-made 
disasters, reports 
(Turner, 1976) 
Disconnected ideas.  
 
Evasion of analysis 
 decoy tactics 
(Turner, 1976)  
 
 
Variables of 
disjuncture (Turner, 
1976). 
 
Organisational 
safety culture (Flin, 
2007; Rowley & 
Waring, 2011; 
Vaughan, 1999)  
 
 
KEY: 
Yellow = transfer delays (4). 
Green = no root cause (2) 
Pink = Qld’s vastness, unique characteristics (3) 
Preliminary theoretical ideas generated from the data: 
The language of the RCA dilutes as complex issue fade and are discounted and disregarded 
from analysis  
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Appendix D. 
Data Management Frame: Environment Category 
ENVIRONMENT category 
The framework in which the organisation (healthcare) operates. 
DATA: Excerpts of 
Text 
New Concepts Analytical ideas Latent Ideas 
Transfer delay from 
rural to urban(3 
Delay in transfer 
(17) 
No root causes (2, 
5,26,27,28,, 38,44). 
No system issues 
identified(36, 39) 
facilities 
Lack of roads and 
resources due to 
flooding 
QAS Pilot could not 
land in terrain (3). 
Remote geographical 
location of injury(3) 
delay to arrive. 
No root cause(39,42)  
Rural facility 
transfer delay(5) 
External programs 
not linked to 
inpatient services. 
No off-site 
services.(13) 
Nursing staff do not 
routinely 
escalate(6)concerns 
to after hour’s 
manager or 
consultant 
Differences between 
divisional(4) 
practices 
A culture of not 
using the system.(3) 
Handover(12) 
strategy. 
System 
vulnerabilities too 
complex and RCA 
team can’t address 
these issues (no root 
cause, non system 
issues because the 
focus is the 
individual. 
 
Improvement 
activities identified 
as lessons learned. 
 
No areas of concern 
identified. 
 
 
Nil 
recommendations 
No system issue. 
 
 
Delay to provide 
care 
 
 
No root causes in 
Mental health RCAs 
 
Not within the 
capacity of the RCA 
team to fix.  
Issues of isolation, 
lack of services, 
transport, 
infrastructure not 
addressed by the 
RCA. 
 
Recommendations do 
not support issues in 
report 
. 
 
Gap in services 
between community 
and hospital(Grol et, 
al) 
 
Routine non-
compliance(Vaughan) 
 
Multi-layered team 
dynamics disjointed. 
Un-coordinate 
 
 
Death of the 
individual is the 
starting point for the 
RCA. 
 
 
Complex networks 
 
Complex and 
multifarious  
 
Isolation 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Local RCA team 
can’t fix the 
complexity 
 
Gap 
 
Multilayered 
 
Routine 
System failures are 
ambiguous and lost 
in the RCA 
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Length of time for 
retrieval. 
Sent home for 
follow-up with GP. 
Managed by part-
time clinicians 
Trauma in isolated 
region (17) 
A culture of rural 
facilities when the 
(18 )retrieval team 
arrives, retrieval 
team is in control. 
Retrospective 
documentation(12)  
Test not available in 
the area (25) 
Issues identified, no 
root cause found(18) 
Culture for nurses 
not to re-position(6) 
Culture of non-
compliance(16) 
Lack of Australia 
and New Zealand 
evidence of the use 
of guidelines(12) 
Working in torch 
light 
No specialist 
services available at 
facility 
 
KEY: 29 statements 
Light blue = Culture 
Yellow = ‘No root 
cause’ 
Grey = Geography 
D/Green = 
Infrastructure 
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Data Management Frame: Environment Category (Problem statements) 
ENVIRONMENT category 
The framework in which the organisation (healthcare) operates. 
DATA: Excerpts of 
Text 
New Concepts Analytical ideas Latent Ideas 
Problem statements 
 
1. Permanent severe 
brain damage (35) 
2. Unexpected death 
of a neonate (33) 
3. Unexpected death 
(23) 
4. Still birth (32) 
5. Accidental removal 
of fallopian 
tube(34) 
6. Unexpected death 
(24) 
7. Death of patient 
due to cardiac event 
(25) 
8. Subdural 
haemorrhage 
leading to death 
(22) 
9. No system 
vulnerabilities (26) 
10. Distance from ward 
to unit (29) 
11. Death of patient 
(20) 
12. Stage 4 pressure 
ulcer (6) 
13. Permanent cardiac 
muscle damage 
(18) 
14. Intravascular air 
embolism (30) 
15. Incorrect site 
surgery (12) 
16. The primary team 
did not complete 
the request form 
(16) 
17. Death following 
suspected bowel 
obstruction (15) 
18. Suspected suicide 
in the community 
(42) 
19. Delayed diagnosis 
and management of 
multi trauma (17) 
20. Testicle was 
 
 
14/ 47 RCAs did not 
identify a problem 
statement 
 
1 document excluded 
from sample 
 
 
Death reoccurs as the 
problem statement and 
keeps the focus 
centred on the 
individual.  
 
Death of the 
individual 
 
Overlapping of 
categories. Death as 
the problem 
 
 
The statements re-
define the nature of 
the SAC 1 event. This 
is the framework for 
the conduct of the 
RCA. 
 
Individualised – the 
patient 
 
When no root causes 
are found “no system 
vulnerabilities” or “no 
root causes is cited. 
 
 
 
Not within the 
capacity of the RCA 
team to fix.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local RCA team 
can’t fix the 
complexity. 
 
 
Multi-layered team 
dynamics disjointed. 
Un-coordinate 
 
 
System failures are 
ambiguous and lost 
in the RCA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complex networks 
 
 
Outside the scope of 
the RCA. 
Fragmented 
 
Gap in language, gap 
in analysis 
 
Death of the patient 
is the starting point 
 
No search for 
causation 
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mistakenly 
removed (9) 
21. GP did not receive 
a copy of the scan 
(13) 
22. Re-operation for 
removal of screw 
(14) 
23. Profound multi-
organ failure (4) 
24. Unexpected death 
of patient (39)  
25. Patient is now 
quadriplegic (11) 
26. Intravascular air 
embolism (30) 
27. Orchidectomy(10) 
28. Infract of testicle 
requiring 
orchidectomy(2) 
29. Death of mental 
health patient (41) 
30. Suicide of mental 
health patient (43) 
31. Arrest post cardiac 
surgery (29) 
32. Death by suicide 
(45) 
33. No root causes 
identified (44) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 of 47 RCAs contained problem statements. 14 RCA did not provide problem statements or 
recommendations. 
  
In the event where one or more problem statements were identified the first problem statement was 
applied to the data frame and the RCA code assigned. 
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Appendix E 
Organisation Data Frame: Structure subcategory. 
ORGANISATION CATEGORY: 
Includes Qld public healthcare facilities 
Structure subcategory: text that includes state and local policy, procedures, guidelines 
Excerpts of Text New Concepts Analytical ideas Latent Ideas 
1. No district specific 
assessment training 
(34) 
2. No district specific 
assessment tool –
(18) 
3. No urgency for 
reporting images 
(19) 
4. No refresher 
training (5) 
5. In adequate 
orientation (27) 
6. Limited resources 
for impatient (46) 
7. Not previously 
known to Mental 
Health (40) 
8. TIVA recently 
implemented in the 
facility (30) 
9. Scoop and run (29) 
10. Difficulty with 
recruitment and 
retention (4) 
11. No provision for 
GPs to access 
imaging records 
(14) 
12. Poor skill mix (4) 
13. Inadequate training 
of the clinician 
14. Agency and causal 
staff (22) 
15. No sedation 
guidelines (20) 
16. Guidelines not 
available (35) 
17. No standards for 
parameters of 
neurovascular status 
(16) 
18. No letter to GP 
19. Poor skill mix (4) 
20. Staffing levels 
inadequate (25). 
21. . Distance from 
ward (29) 
22. No standardised 
 
No process/guidelines 
 develop new 
process. 
 
 
Process exists but 
failure to apply. 
 
Process does not meet 
issues identified in the 
analysis  
interpretation 
 
Non compliance to 
national surgical safety 
processes 
 
Communication issues 
 
 
Absent formalised 
documents of process 
 
 
The RCA is a quality 
process: 
Inconsistent language 
applied to each section 
Narration 
Investigation 
Fault-tree analysis 
(occasionally) 
Recommendations 
 
 
 
Processes not linked – 
complex, multi-levels 
Communication 
deficiencies at many 
levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RCA applies Swiss 
cheese principles –  
 
Human error and 
trajectory. 
 
Paradox 
noncompliance 
policy/guidelines and  
 
The development of 
new documents 
 
Disconnect in 
organisational 
purpose of the RCA 
and the conduct of the 
RCA 
 
Each section of the 
RCA describes the 
event differently,  
 
RCA largely 
recognises individual 
and not system issues. 
 
 
Focus on current 
multi-layered 
documentation 
insufficiencies. 
 
 
Non compliance 
 
 
Search for someone to 
blame. 
 
 
Gap in infrastructure 
 
 
 
Disjointed system 
 
Disconnected 
language  no flow 
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record to detail co-
ordination efforts 
23. No communication 
between MO - 
rural/regional (24) 
24. Information 
systems not 
consistent (37) 
25. Double shifts (20) 
26. Agency and casual 
staff (29) 
27. No trained medical 
staff to perform 
operation (23) 
28. No current 
guidelines (35) 
29. Theatre scheduling 
did not allow (12)  
30. Inadequate staffing 
levels(9) 
31. Review roles of 
staff (17) 
32. Minimum 
guidelines (25). 
33. no standard for 
implants.(14) 
34. No guidelines to 
manage event. 
35. Procedure does not 
clearly identify 
36. No available 
protocol for the 
management and 
risks (14) 
37. Procedure does not 
identify (30) 
38. The consent form is 
poor (25) 
 
KEY: 38 statements 
Light blue = Resources 
(6) 
Yellow = No, Not – 
absent or lack of 
operational structure 
(20) 
Pink = Communication 
(2) 
Green = staff (7) 
 
 
 
 
Teamwork difficulties 
 
Multi-layered blame 
Time pressures 
Failure to 
communication  
 
 
Multilayered non-
conformity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedures are 
discretionary 
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Appendix E.1 
Organisation Data Frame: Process subcategory. 
ORGANISATION CATEGORY: 
Includes Qld public healthcare facilities 
Process subcategory: text that includes systemic delivery of care 
Excerpts of Text New Concepts Analytical ideas Latent Ideas 
1. Ineffective follow 
up process (25) 
2. ED stress test not 
available (25) 
3. No sedation 
guidelines (20) 
4. Falls procedure 
does not clearly 
articulate (22) 
5. Surgical safety 
process not 
followed (16) 
6. No effective 
process for follow 
up (21) 
7. No VTE 
prophylaxis 
measures taken (22) 
8. No clear specified 
roles and 
responsibilities in 
critical situations 
(35) 
9. No process for 
communicating (42) 
10. Inadequate process 
for family visits 
11. Inadequate process 
to escalate (30) 
12. Insufficient 
supervision(36) 
13. Inadequate medical 
and nursing 
education (4) 
14. No documentation 
(7) 
15. No clear process for 
escalation(16) 
16. Inadequate process 
to escalate(15) 
17. No guidelines to 
manage (35) 
18. Insufficient 
supervision (9) 
19. No process led to 
loss of limb(11) 
20. No process for 
medical review 
 
The process does not 
support the delivery of 
actions. 
 
Guidelines and process 
are not clear enough 
but not followed either 
 
Individual failure 
where is the 
connection to latent 
causality 
 
 
Multiple individuals 
that fail to adhere to 
organisational 
processes/guidelines – 
 
RCA shows inability 
to deliver care  
 
Non-compliance 
  
Routine 
 
Unchallenged but 
acknowledged in 
report 
  
Where is cause and 
effect? 
 
 
Too hard to fix –
Nicolini (2011) 
 
Approved and 
endorsed. 
Normalised and 
deviant 
 
 
 
 
 
Disparity between the 
purpose of the RCA 
and the conduct – 
reflexive notion 
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with re-location (8) 
21. No clear process for 
communication(2). 
22. No 
documentation.(10) 
23. Absence of spinal 
observation chart 
(11) 
24. Standards of 
documentation not 
maintained.(42) 
25. No process to notify 
the relevant clinical 
team of results(42) 
26. Referral process not 
undertaken(38) 
27. Surgical check list 
bypassed(6) 
28. No process for 
communication (13) 
29. In adequate process 
for the recognition 
and response(17) 
30. Communication 
breakdown(20) 
31. Inadequate process 
for rapid 
recognition(27) 
32. Inadequate process 
for accurate 
counting(14)  
 
KEY: 32 statements 
Blue = Communication 
(3) 
Yellow = No, Not – 
absent or lack ( 
24) 
Olive = Documentation 
(4) 
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Appendix E.2 
Organisation Data Frame: Task subcategory. 
ORGANISATION CATEGORY 
Task subcategory: text that includes delivery of care 
Excerpts of Text New Concepts Analytical ideas Latent Ideas 
1. Principles of life 
support not applied 
(44) 
2. Specialist review 
8hrs after arrival at 
regional facility 
with service 
capability(3) 
3. Equipment failure 
4. Misinterpretation of 
ECG. 
5. Administration of 
wrong drug (15) 
6. Limited experience 
for level of activity 
7. Fatigue risk.(25) 
8. Removal of wrong 
body part 
9. No diagnosis 
10. Delay in 
diagnosis(17)  
11. Wrong surgical 
procedure 
performed 
12. Overestimated 
weight = over 
heparinised. 
13. Equipment not 
available 
14. Implanted items not 
documented  
15. Delay in treatment 
(2)  
16. No scales. 
17. No documentation 
of a resus plan (25).  
18. Consultant not 
informed 
19. Advice not sought 
to clarify difference 
in clinical 
opinion.(31) 
20. Delay in medical 
immaging (19) 
diagnosis to patient 
21. No clinical team 
identified to 
transfer result 
information 
22. Lack of continuity 
of care 
 
 
Human error. 
 
Multiple  human error 
 
 
 
 
Categories of error 
(Runciman et al., 
2007) 
 
Errors in complex 
systems (Runciman, et 
al., 2007, . 115) 
 
Errors in knowledge 
 
Skill based errors 
 
 
Technical errors 
 
Professional blaming 
 
 
Where is the 
connection of the 
individual to the 
organisation or the 
environment? 
 
 
 
Unintentional 
professional blaming. 
 
 
The quest for the 
search for cause 
 
Find fault – search 
over.  
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23. Pressures for OT to 
complete on time. 
24. Time-out session 
not undertaken. 
25. Inadequate staffing 
levels.(4) 
26. Insufficient senior 
supervision.(9) 
27. Equipment failure 
(26)  
28. No count at time of 
implanted item. 
29. Not standard 
practice. 
30. Patient admitted to 
wrong ward 
31. No plan of care. 
32. Suite of forms not 
used (31) 
33. Delay in aggressive 
intervention (24) 
34. SMO normally 
works …in training 
position (25) 
35. Pt difficult to assess 
(20 
36. Senior medical 
officer reviewed the 
patient (27) 
37. All intakes are 
discussed at 
handover (46) 
38. Underestimation of 
clinical condition 
by staff (9) 
39. Failure to document 
(23). 
40. Suite of forms not 
used consistently 
41. Care plans not used. 
42. Referral not 
followed through 
43. Tracings not 
reviewed (33) 
44. No surgical site 
marked. 
45. Surgical side not on 
form 
46. Handover 
processes, 
unstructured 
47. Incorrect plan of 
care. 
48. Insufficient 
information. 
49. Delay in 
administering Lysis 
(18). 
50. Tracings from 
reviewed( 33)  
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51. Difficult and 
complex workloads. 
52. Tracings not 
reviewed shift by 
shift. 
53. Failure to 
communicate 
between staff. 
54. Breakdown in 
handover between 
teams(26) 
55. Team dynamic 
irritable (9) 
56. Equipment not 
available ( 28) 
57. Delay in aggressive 
intervention (24). 
 
KEY: 57 statements 
Grey = Individualised 
failure (35) 
Pink = Equipment issues 
(5) 
Blue = Delay issues (6) 
Purple = Team issues 
(8) 
Green = Staff (3) 
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Appendix F 
Organisation Data Frame: Excerpts of Recommendation text 
ORGANISATION CATEGORY 
Qld Health public healthcare facilities 
RCA recommendations 
Excerpts of Text 
RCA recommendations 
New Concepts Analytical ideas Latent Ideas 
 
1. A/EDMS request that 
another service detail 
roles and responsibilities 
for clinical care. 
2. A D/Ex request PSQ 
develop and implement a 
standardised assessment 
tool(15) 
3. Review current trauma 
call procedure(21) 
4. Establish and formalise a 
process to enable nursing 
staff to communicate (26) 
5. Review after hours nurse 
manager role to include 
clinical component (24) 
6. A D/Ex request that a 
clinical dataset for 
primaries requiring aero 
medical assistance be 
constructed.(15) 
7. Research and develop a 
process so that the 
medical record clearly 
identified the events as 
they occur(15) 
8. Ward round notes are 
written at time of ward 
round (22) 
9. Implement a process to 
facilitate communication 
in and between medical 
streams(24) 
10. Review the falls 
procedure 
11. Review the fasting 
process for patients 
12. Reinforce the legal 
requirement for date and 
time entries in the 
progress notes(18) 
13. ensure reasonable 
measure are taken to 
obtain consent prior to 
admission to ED (19) 
 
Recommendations 
are inconsistent with 
primary issues in the 
report. 
 
 
 
The 
recommendations 
and LL do not 
clearly sort into the 
categories of 
structure, process 
and task. 
 
 
 
 
Interpretive review 
of cause and effect. 
 
 
 
Multilayered 
interpretation creates 
more documents to 
achieve ‘clarity’. 
 
 
The number of 
recommendations 
that support the 
development of new 
policy/procedure is 
significant when 
compliance to 
existing documents 
is ignored. 
 
 
 
 
Measure and 
monitor approach = 
Regulation 
 
 
 
 
Recommendations 
ignore system issues 
 washed out. 
 
 
Recs deflect analysis 
ideas in analysis and 
focus on individual 
issues and locally 
manageable issues. 
(Vaughan) 
 
 
 
 
 
“Nothing changes 
anyway” 
organisational 
culture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
System issues not 
attended ignored. 
 
Diluted 
recommendations 
 
 
Inconsistent, lack of 
structure to recs. 
 
Ambiguous 
(Nicolini, et al., 
2011) 
 
Repeating actions 
that have already 
been proven. 
 
Perpetual and 
cyclic(Waring & 
Rowley, 2011).  
 
Predictive  
organisational 
endorsement is 
guaranteed. 
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14. Ensure all staff are 
orientated to state wide 
cardiac pathway(18) 
15. All medical staff and 
nursing staff will receive 
education (35) 
16. Quarterly 
multidisciplinary 
treatment drills will 
ensure staff are able to 
practice escalation and 
graded assertiveness. (13) 
(14) 
17. A checklist will be 
available for thrombolytic 
therapy  
18. Re-education of all 
district nursing and 
medical staff on the 
procedure (34) 
19. Consider ECG 
interpretation workshop 
(33) 
20. Review and implement 
minimum guidelines to 
initiate discharge process 
(16) 
21. Train all ED staff with 
triage categories (18) 
22. All patients that present 
with chest pain are 
provided with ongoing 
monitoring and 
observations between 
triage and MO assessment 
(18) 
23. Complete the QH state-
wide lumber puncture 
consent form 
24. Implement the QH state 
wide handover strategy 
25. Review all medical staff 
admitting protocols after 
hours 
26. Develop and implement a 
patient education program 
(2) 
27. Review the role and 
definition of SMO to 
specify responsibility (9) 
28. Review and develop an 
education program for 
patient transfer 
29.  Regular basic life support 
and advanced life support 
drills for all staff. 
30. Review the nurse manager 
role on nightshift to 
ensure they are aware of 
the ill patients 
  
 
No root causes in 
Mental health RCAs 
 
 
Superficial  
Band-aid (temporary 
and transient fix) 
 
 
Recommendations 
contain more than 
one action: Review 
and role definition 
Review and Develop 
Implement and 
communicate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Temporary/ transient 
fix.  
 
Issues addressed and 
re-dressed. 
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31. Implement a process for 
medical and nursing 
handover from evening to 
night shift (33) 
32. Implement fluid 
assessment guidelines and 
formalised guidelines on 
QHEPS 
33. Review nursing skill mix. 
34. Observations will be 
recorded on one 
organisationally approved 
observation chart 
35. Implement a process for 
escalation of the 
deteriorating patient (24)   
36. Exec Dir should consider 
relocating the (29) 
37. Implement cardiac 
pathways (18) 
38. Develop a comprehensive 
process of staff selection, 
supervision and 
mentoring (24) 
39. Implement a fatigue(25) 
management process and 
policies 
40. Implement a clear process 
to describe roles and 
responsibilities of medical 
officers and midwives 
(32) 
41. Increase staff knowledge 
and understanding of 
early notification of 
trauma (18) 
42. Develop a comprehensive 
orientation package 
43. Exc Dir corresponds with 
QH medical advisory to 
consider trauma service 
(29) 
44. Implement a retrieval 
service medical record 
from for use in rural 
facilities (35) 
45. Provide forma debriefing 
of incident 
46. HEAPS program for all 
medical and nursing, 
allied staff 
47. Undertake workplace 
survey to investigate 
culture 
48. Implement SBAR at 
clinical handover 
49. Exc Dir corresponds with 
Med Dir regarding failure 
to trigger bypass 
protocol(29) 
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50. Ensure processes are in 
place for families waiting  
51. Review the ED education 
protocol (27) 
52. Ensure the staff receive 
education 
53. Adopt guidelines on 
sedation endorsed by the 
Australiana college of 
emergency medicine 
54. Review the nurse manager 
role (24) 
55. District wide 
implementation of VTE 
risk assessment and 
management (35) 
56. District wide compliance 
auditing for VTE risk 
assessment and 
management (18) 
57. Develop sedation 
guidelines (20). 
58. Full implementation of 
risk assessment and 
prophylaxis (26) 
59. Implement alert and 
action lines as a stand 
documentation tool (21) 
60. All caesarean after 39 
weeks are booked (33) 
61. Develop and implement 
guidelines that O&G 
student can perform (36) 
62. Increase CTG training for 
all doctors and midwives 
(32) 
63. CTG interpretation to be 
conducted as 
formal/structures sessions 
(36) 
64. Develop a system for 
recording clinical staff 
meet their requirements 
for CTG training, 
workshops and 
(35)interpretation 
sessions. 
65. Replace current CTG 
assessment form with a 
CTG assessment sticker to 
be attached to CTG trace 
(31) 
66. Develop an education 
program in rural facilities 
(3) 
67. Ensure that all clinical 
staff are aware of the 
scenario based program 
(14) 
68. Ensure all medical 
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officers complete medical 
(25) risk management 
training. 
69. Notify fatigue issues (25) 
70. Escalation procedure is 
utilised to escalate fatigue 
concerns and contingency 
plan for fatigue (25) 
71. Allocate tasks as roles in 
the recognition (32) 
72. Immediate education and 
training of the device (23) 
73. Develop a workplace 
instruction for the 
management of the device 
(30) 
74. Review the district policy 
to identify 
interdepartmental effects 
of new equipment  (35) 
75. Develop a workplace 
instruction for the 
management of CVL 
76. Establish a working 
committee for the second 
victim 
77. Design an alert sticker as 
an interim measure 
78. Falls committee re-
implement the district 
falls procedure (22) 
79. Develop strategies to 
ensure that 
communication of falls 
risk is managed between 
shifts. 
80. The DMS work with the 
Dir of surgery, 
orthopaedics, medicine 
and anaesthetics to 
develop a model of care 
81. Individual units review 
the requirement regarding 
scales 
82. Service lines to support 
the purchase of scales 
(23) 
83. Circulate a memo to all 
clinical staff regarding the 
requirement to 
84.  Maintain accurate records 
of weight. 
85. Undertake a clinical 
review to assess intro-
operative blood pressure 
86. Clear and concise post 
operative observations 
much be documented by 
the surgeon on the OT 
chart 
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87. Undertake evidence based 
research to determine the 
timeframe for patients to 
be on the OT table before 
skin is compromised 
88. Escalate to the PSQ and 
pressure ulcer manager to 
review flow chart and 
other documents 
89. The PSQ produce a paper 
for learning 
90. Develop a process 
between multidisciplinary 
services to gain rapid 
medical review. 
91. Review the local process 
for adequate cover (16) 
92. Conduct pre and post 
audit for imaging from 
ED(19) 
93. Audit the current 
processes for discussion 
to ensure delays are 
reduced 
94. Use the case as an 
education tool 
95. Deployment of the QAS 
liaison officer position 
96. Education for staff to 
provide accurate 
information 
97. Develop a process for 
medical officers to 
demonstrate baseline 
competencies 
98. Conduct simulations of 
chest pain 
99. Review fall procedure 
(22) 
100. Develop an education 
plan 
101. Implement a state-wide 
chest pain pathway 
102. Develop guidelines for 
early notification of chest 
pain. 
103. The team communication 
with the referring GP 
104. Review ED sedation 
protocol (27) 
105. Review current integrated 
risk screen assessment 
tool, nursing care plans, 
and procedures to ensure 
that they assist/enhance, 
and guide the provision of 
care. 
106. Develop sedation 
guidelines (27) 
107. Guidelines for re-feeding 
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syndromes are updated 
and published  
108. Review fluid 
administration in agitated 
patients 
109. Review access to the 
speech services over the 
weekend (20) 
110. Ongoing purchase of 
pressure relieving devices. 
111. Patients managed 
according to best practice 
guidelines. 
112. Amend the pathways to 
include inter-district 
contacts (43) 
113. Countersign forms 
114. Rural hub to be notified of 
patients with acute MH 
issues (43) 
115. Relevant document and 
discharge summaries are 
entered electronically (11) 
116. Audit MH documentation 
to measure consistency of 
risk assessment (40) 
117. Lack of resources for 
escalation to district 
committee for 
consideration (42) 
118. Staff should be able to 
contact patients following 
inpatient discharge 
119. Education program to 
include collateral 
information 
120. Review discharge process 
for MH 
121. Observations to be 
recorded on one 
organisationally approved 
observation chart 
122. The Exc should consider 
relocating the ward 
closer(29) 
123. Update the consent form 
to include preoperative 
information regarding 
risks of orchidectomy in 
hernia repairs. 
124. The case to be used as 
case study 
125. Review the discharge 
process post operatively 
126. Review the re-
development and 
implementation of patient 
education program for 
pain at home. 
127. Clinicians should have 
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appropriate training and 
supervision (12) 
128. Orientation manual to be 
developed\ 
129. Enter data onto electronic 
system 
130. All clinicians must be 
trained in electronic 
system 
131. All patients must be seen 
within 24 hours 
132. patient with diabetes 
much be flagged 
133. patients admitted with risk 
of suicide will be 
managed in accordance 
with local policy which 
aligns with QH guidelines 
134. Implement the 
deterioration system 
135. Implement the change of 
patient condition post 
tirage process 
136. Review and manage 
existing staff 
establishment (4) 
137. Requirements for 
documentation be 
reiterated 
138. Nomination of site on 
booking form 
139. Conduct a random audit 
140. Continuation of EIS 
audits and table results 
141. Check collateral 
information 
142. A memo from EDMS to 
clinical directors to 
remind them to ensure 
that Registrars are 
orientated(26) 
143. Develop a learning 
package for nursing staff 
144. Review the current PHO 
orientation program 
145. Research and develop a 
process for the monitoring 
of the deteriorating patient 
(4) 
146. Review current breast 
clinic process 
147. Review and ensure the 
pathology form is 
completed(26) 
148. A letter be written to the 
Director 
149. A gap analysis of the 
compliance process to 
surgical safety 
checklist(29) 
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150. Review the theatre 
schedule 
151. Medical imaging process 
ensures the availability of 
equipment to meet service 
demands. 
152. Review local process for 
counting and tracking and 
planning implanted items. 
153. The service needs to 
develop… (16) 
 
KEY: 153 statements 
Green – Develop or implement 
(44) 
Yellow – Review or audit (38) 
Pink – Issues of 
communication/documentation 
(34) 
Blue – Education (28) 
Grey – Language (consider, 
should, compliance (17) 
Olive – role/responsibilities 
(9) 
Red – Culture (1) 
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Appendix G 
Data Management Frame: Individual category 
INDIVIDUAL:  
People that work in the organisation; the acts of healthcare workers in the RCA. 
Excerpts of Text New Concepts Analytical ideas Latent Ideas 
1. Death of a patient. 
2. Stage 4 pressure 
ulcer 
3. Death by suicide 
4. Referring MO do not 
have contact with 
pathologist 
5. Removal of wrong 
body part 
6. Primary clinical team 
did not complete 
request form 
7. Patient was over 
sedated 
8. No knowledge of 
injuries from QAS 
9. Lack of knowledge 
and experience 
10. Overestimated 
weight = over 
heparinised. 
11. Patient is 
quadriplegic (11) 
12. Suicide in 
community.(42) 
13. Unexpected death 
post operatively.(29) 
14. Patient died 
15. Patient death – 
cardiac event (29) 
16. No surgical site 
marked. 
17. SWC did not escalate 
concerns (11) 
18. Patient sent by GP. 
19. Stage 4 pressure 
injury (24) 
20. Patient death (15) 
21. Unwitnessed falls 
22. Incorrect diagnosis 
23. Patient assessment 
inadequate 
24. Medical officers 
believe patient 
injuries were minor 
25. Wrong surgical 
procedure performed 
(12)  
26. Deceased in place of 
residence 
 
 
 
 
Authority 
gradients 
 
lack of 
cohesion 
 
 
 
 
Unfamiliar. 
Not routine, 
not practised 
 
 
Mistake 
human error 
 
 
 
 
 
Deflecting 
responsibility  
 
Blame. 
 
Multilayered 
failure to 
recognise 
deterioration. 
 
No explicit 
guideline 
 
 
Many people 
involved in 
the event  
multi-layered  
 
Death of the 
patient is the 
focus rather. 
Where is the 
system focus? 
 
Multi-level 
individual 
failures. 
evasion to 
disclose 
 
 
Focus on 
Professional 
failure (Rabol, et 
al) 
 
 
Over-estimation 
of failure the 
RCA can’t turn 
the focus from the 
individual to the 
system 
 
 
Accountability/res
ponsibility  
(Dekker) 
 
 
 
 
Incorrect clinical 
decisions are 
strengthened by 
lack of 
organisational 
policy... – 
justifying clinical 
action. 
 
 
 
Death is legislatively defined 
and supports a social 
element. 
 
 
 
 
Attributions of Responsibility 
(Williams2003) 
 
 
 Analysis focuses on the 
individual failures 
lack of documents  
Routine, non-compliance to 
national documents safety 
agendas. 
 
 
 
 
RCA moves from individual 
blame to lack of policy to 
correct the harm 
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INDIVIDUAL:  
People that work in the organisation; the acts of healthcare workers in the RCA. 
Excerpts of Text New Concepts Analytical ideas Latent Ideas 
27. Misinterpretation of 
ECG (23). 
28. Administration of 
wrong drug 
29. The relieving 
Registrar did not 
escalate(2) 
30. Sub-optimal 
management of 
patient 
31. MO impression not 
noted in progress 
notes 
32. Delay to recognise 
33. Underestimation of 
clinical condition by 
staff  
34. Suite of forms not 
used 
35. severity of illness 
36. Inconsistency in 
documentation 
37. Multiple staff not 
familiar with 
form(38) 
38. Pt co-morbidities not 
considered in care 
plan 
39. Patient completed 
suicide 
40. No consideration to 
alternative treatments 
41. No pain relief 
provided 
42. Death due to 
secondary disease. 
43. Subdural 
haemorrhage leading 
to death. 
44. Permanent brain 
damage 
45. Suicide in 
community 
46. No discussion of 
patients condition 
47. No multidisciplinary 
consultation 
48. Significant 
behavioural 
problems 
49. Plan of care not 
consistent with 
assessment 
 
Blame 
 
Death of the 
individual 
 
 
Causal chains 
identify 
individual 
error at 
multiple 
levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SAC 1 re-
classification 
 
 
 
Human error 
Identification 
of blame. 
 
 
 
 
RCA team 
have 
insufficient 
documentatio
n to identify 
issues 
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INDIVIDUAL:  
People that work in the organisation; the acts of healthcare workers in the RCA. 
Excerpts of Text New Concepts Analytical ideas Latent Ideas 
50. No clinical 
assessment 
51. Unexpected death 
52. Unexpected death. 
53. Suicide in refuge 
centre. 
54. Death of a patient 
55. Stillbirth 
56. No medical 
assessment because 
no process 
57. New procedure for 
surgeon  
58. No requirement for 
operative team to 
follow-up 
59. Death of a patient 
60. Unexpected death of 
patient 
61. Patient non-
compliance 
62. Conflicting 
assessments between 
team 
63. Undiagnosed 
condition 
64. Unclear decision.  
65. No chest pain 
assessment. 
66. Staff did not escalate 
concerns 
67. Advice sought from 
another facility MO 
68. Consider 
competency of health 
workers 
69. Discordance between 
clinical and 
investigative regimes 
70. Surgeon 
inadvertently 
removed testicle 
71. No escalation when 
difficulty was 
identified 
72. Inadequate 
communication 
73. Antibiotics not 
administered (10) 
74. Incorrect site 
surgery(12) 
75. Care and 
management was 
 
 
 
 
 
Human error 
not 
interpreted in 
RCA 
Disparity 
between 
medical/nursi
ng 
description 
Non-
compliance 
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INDIVIDUAL:  
People that work in the organisation; the acts of healthcare workers in the RCA. 
Excerpts of Text New Concepts Analytical ideas Latent Ideas 
appropriate 
76. Junior surgeon 
missed prompts 
77. No documentation of 
incorrect site surgery 
78. No clinical 
disclosure 
79. Delay to recognise 
the severity of 
illness, diagnosis, 
administration of 
antibiotics, fluid 
resuscitation, 
consultation and 
surgical washout. 
80. Patient developed 
multi-organ failure 
 death 
81. Seen by junior doctor 
82. Re-operation 
required. 
83. Delay to complete 
discharge summary 
84. Suicide risk not 
identified 
85. No observations 
overnight recorded 
86. No documentation, 
no communication 
87. Delay in diagnosis 
and treatment 
88. Symptoms not seen 
as significant 
89. Incomplete 
observations and 
recording 
90. Treating team not 
contacted  
91. No communication 
across medical 
disciplines. 
92. Level of nursing staff 
experience 
93. Inadvertent removal 
of fallopian tube 
94. Initial procedure 
performed by student 
95. Decision made by 
Registrar 
96. Level of compliance 
and monitoring 
97. Delay in arrival of 
anaesthetist 
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INDIVIDUAL:  
People that work in the organisation; the acts of healthcare workers in the RCA. 
Excerpts of Text New Concepts Analytical ideas Latent Ideas 
98. Difficulty finding 
atropine 
99. Staff not aware. 
100. No concerns about 
the practitioner’s 
clinical skills 
101. No update of care. 
102. Staff unsure of use. 
103. Clinicians not 
accessing updated 
information 
104. Pts presentation not 
recorded 
105. Physical 
observations and 
vital signs not 
monitored as 
medically ordered. 
106. No patient 
assessment.  
107. Documentation did 
not support clinical 
decision 
108. Interpretation skills 
did not meet clinical 
needs 
109. Subdural 
haemorrhage leading 
to death (22) 
110. Personality issues  
111. Communication 
overrides objectivity 
in practise 
112. Lack of 
documentation 
113. Poor service delivery 
114. No clear role 
delineation 
115. No clear evidence of 
assessment/plan 
116. Delivery not 
performed in time 
117. Clinical actions 
would have changed 
the outcome 
118. Delay in aggressive 
intervention 
119. Delay in medical 
management 
120. No medical 
ownership 
121. Misdiagnosis 
122. Wrong drug 
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INDIVIDUAL:  
People that work in the organisation; the acts of healthcare workers in the RCA. 
Excerpts of Text New Concepts Analytical ideas Latent Ideas 
treatment 
123. Delay for radiology 
to review scans 
124. No escalation to 
consultant 
125. Delay to surgery 
126. Inadequate 
observations and 
assessment 
127. Guidelines not 
applied  
128. Qld pressure ulcer 
guidelines not 
followed 
 
Key: 128 statements. 
 
Green – individualised 
error (79) 
Red – Non compliance 
(4) 
Blue – delay (10) 
Pink – culture (7) 
Yellow – 
death/permanent harm 
[SAC 1 categorisation] 
(24) 
 
Theoretical idea: RCA not grounded in systems processes. 
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Appendix H 
Queensland Health of Health and Medical Research Human Research Ethics Approval 
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Appendix I 
Queensland University of Technology Research Ethics Exemption 
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Appendix J 
Queensland Health Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Service Research 
Associate 
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